Wednesday, 24 June 2026
FED AND TREASJURY BUYING SHORT AND LONG END
SLOWING LIQUIDITY
24 June 2026
The Liquidity Tide Is Slowing
There is a distinction that most market participants miss, and missing it is costly. The absolute level of global liquidity - somewhere in the region of $193 trillion by recent measures - continues to inch higher. But the rate of change is slowing, and it is the rate of change that markets price. That inflection is now underway, and it matters enormously for how portfolios should be positioned.
The broad implication is a rotation from financial assets towards real assets, and within real assets, towards those most sensitive to monetary inflation.
Where We Are in the Cycle
The current phase is what analyst Michael Howell at Cross Border Capital describe as the speculation phase. The label is apt in ways that are not entirely flattering. Certain segments of the market - AI, semiconductors, robotics - have delivered spectacular short-term gains, but the broader market is not participating equally. This is a narrow market, built on narrow foundations, and that narrowness is itself a late-cycle signal. Volatility is rising. But trees do not grow to the sky.
What comes next, historically, is a turbulence phase: a period in which liquidity drains more quickly and the directional bias in risk assets reverses. We are not there yet, but the transition is the time to prepare, not the time to react.
Three conditions currently confirm the late-cycle read. First, commodity markets are performing strongly - precisely what you would expect as liquidity begins to roll over and real economy activity accelerates. Second, yield curves are exhibiting a bearish flattening: long yields are rising, but short yields are rising faster, compressing the curve. This was almost universally non-consensus at the start of the year; it is now the reality before our eyes. Third, equity market breadth is narrowing even as headline indices hold up. These three boxes are all ticked.
Why Is Liquidity Slowing If Central Banks Are Still Loose?
This is the question worth thinking about - how can this be and how does this fit in with maganomics? Central banks, broadly speaking, are not tightening. So why is financial liquidity decelerating?
The answer is that money must always be somewhere. What the data is showing is a significant migration of capital out of financial markets and into the real economy. All we as investors have to do is to find out where money is heading and get there first, before prices rise. That migration is fuelling what appears to be a robust - perhaps stronger than consensus - US economy. Nominal GDP growth in the 7–8% range is not an unreasonable estimate when you account for the scale of AI capital expenditure, the size of the fiscal deficit, and growing energy export revenues.
This dynamic is good for certain things: commodities obviously, and earnings in parts of the corporate sector. But it is not straightforwardly good for financial asset prices. The earnings multiple P/E - the P in ratio may rise as capital moves in, then compress as underlying earnings (the E) good news materialises. Wall Street has had three or four years of excellent returns. Main Street is now getting its turn. That transition is always awkward.
To repeat, the sequencing is important to understand. Liquidity leads the real economy; it does not follow it. Capital moves in fast. Stock markets are leading indicators precisely because money gets there first, pushing prices up before the underlying earnings materialise. As that same capital migrates into the real economy, it justifies the earlier price appreciation ie the E in P/E now appears - but the fuel for further multiple expansion is no longer flowing in.
The Debt Architecture and Its Implications
The structural backdrop here is one of extraordinary debt accumulation, not just in the United States but globally. An estimated four out of every five primary market transactions worldwide are now debt rollovers - refinancing of existing obligations - not new capital formation for investment or consumption. Capital markets have been quietly transformed from engines of investment into debt recycling mechanisms.
The liquidity-debt nexus is a closed loop that is worth understanding clearly. Liquidity is needed to roll over debt. If it is not there, you get financial crises. But liquidity itself is largely created through collateralised lending these days - roughly 75 - 80% of all lending worldwide, on World Bank figures, is collateral-based. The value of that collateral, largely government debt and real estate, underpins the whole system. Disrupt the debt markets and liquidity can spiral downwards rapidly.
The historical exit from excessive debt accumulation is, without exception, monetisation. You cannot default on sovereign debt at scale. The only route is dilution - printing money, engineering inflation, reducing the real burden of obligations over time.
Japan demonstrated this after its 1990s bubble: Abenomics, quantitative easing, a collapsing yen. China is now on a structurally similar path, having accumulated vast real estate-related debt after the post-GFC boom. Capital controls allow Beijing to print without immediate external leakage, and that money is finding its way into one traditional Chinese store of value above all others: gold. The Shanghai exchange, not COMEX or London, is now the primary driver of the gold price.
The United States is not exempt from this dynamic. It is already participating in it. The Treasury is issuing debt heavily at the short end - bills rather than bonds - with something approaching 50% of US government debt now maturing within two years. The weekly refinancing requirement runs to around $600 billion. Banks absorb this short-dated paper willingly because fiscal deficits are simultaneously filling their deposit books; they have the money deposited in their reserves but they want assets that generate interest to match the liability growth. When banks buy government debt, they monetise it. Milton Friedman would not have approved.
Suppressing the Signal: The MOVE Index
One of the less-discussed mechanisms currently at work is the active suppression of bond market volatility through Treasury buybacks. The MOVE index - the bond market's equivalent of the VIX - has been kept artificially low, and the mechanics are worth understanding.
Hedge funds have become the dominant buyers of US Treasuries, running what is known as a basis trade: buying physical bonds while shorting futures contracts and clipping the spread between the two. The trade is highly leveraged and is entirely dependent on low volatility. If the MOVE index spikes, the leverage unwinds and those buyers disappear.
The MOVE also matters through the collateral multiplier. Around 80% of lending in financial markets is collateralised, and dealer banks determine haircuts based on the perceived quality and volatility of the collateral. Low MOVE means small haircuts, high collateral multiplier, abundant liquidity. Elevated MOVE compresses the multiplier and drains liquidity through the system. This is why the Treasury intervenes with buybacks each time the index threatens to break higher - replacing illiquid off-the-run Treasuries with fresh on-the-runs to keep the market functioning smoothly.
The question is how long this suppression can be maintained. A new Federal Reserve chair will be tested by markets, as is traditional. And the arithmetic is challenging: if nominal GDP is genuinely running at 7–8%, 10-year yields at around 5% represent a deeply negative real return on long duration. The long end of the curve looks structurally mispriced. The Treasury is currently starving that end of the market of supply - insurance companies and pension funds wanting duration simply cannot get it - which is providing an artificial dampener. But artificial dampeners have limits.
What This Means for Positioning
The broad implication is a rotation from financial assets towards real assets, and within real assets, towards those most sensitive to monetary inflation.
The distinction between monetary inflation and consumer price inflation matters here, and it is routinely conflated. CPI reflects two components: cost inflation (inputs, technology, productivity, energy) and monetary inflation (the debasement of the paper currency in which prices are denominated). For decades, cost deflation - cheap Chinese goods, cheap energy, technological productivity - held consumer price inflation well below the rate of monetary expansion. That gap is why Wall Street dramatically outperformed consumer purchasing power. Gold, as a direct monetary inflation hedge, has outperformed both: up roughly 15 times since 2000, compared to six or seven times for US equities.
If US federal debt continues to grow at 7–8% annually - the Congressional Budget Office's own projection - that is the hurdle rate your wealth must clear simply to stand still in real monetary terms. The instruments that clear that hurdle are precious metals, prime residential real estate, energy and resource equities, and - with appropriate caveats around volatility - leading cryptocurrencies.
Within commodities, the sequencing historically runs from precious metals to base metals to food commodities. That process appears to be underway. Oil looks cheap relative to gold on a long-run ratio basis - the gold-to-oil ratio has historically averaged around 20; at current gold prices, a mean reversion implies oil well above current levels. Energy stocks and gold miners offer leveraged exposure to these underlying trends.
The contrarian call worth flagging is that the Federal Reserve may be forced to raise interest rates within the next twelve months. The US economy is generating substantial inflationary pressure - in nominal GDP terms and in the lived experience of consumers - even as official messaging attempts to frame inflation as contained. If that pressure breaks through, the Fed's hand will eventually be forced, regardless of the short-term political calculus.
The immediate task for investors is context, not prediction. Understanding which phase of the cycle we occupy - late speculation, approaching turbulence - determines the architecture of a sensible portfolio: a diversified core weighted towards monetary inflation hedges, real assets, and late-cycle equity sectors, with a smaller, actively managed trading allocation for those with the appetite for it. The direction of the liquidity tide has changed. The wise response is not to fight it.
Monday, 22 June 2026
HOW CHINA'S CONTINUING RISE IS RESHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY PT 3 of 3
Sunday, 21 June 2026
THE INVERTED YIELD CURVE: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS
21 June 2026
The Inverted Yield Curve: What It Is and Why It Matters
I. The Setup: What Is a Yield Curve?
Before we get to the inversion, we need to understand what a yield curve is and why it normally slopes upwards.
When governments borrow money, they issue bonds - pieces of paper that promise to repay the lender after a fixed period, with interest. The United States government issues these across a range of maturities: 3 months, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 30 years. The interest rate paid on each of these - the yield - varies depending on how long you agree to lock your money away.
Under normal conditions, the longer you lend, the more interest you receive (annualised interest rate is the yield). This makes intuitive sense: if you lend a friend money for a week, you might do it for nothing. If you lend for ten years, you want compensation - for the risk that circumstances change, that inflation erodes the value (buying or purchasing power) of your money, or simply that you might need those funds back before the decade is out. The line connecting yields across all these maturities is the yield curve, and in ordinary times it slopes upward, left to right: low short-term yields on the left, higher long-term yields on the right.
Glossary
Bond - A loan made by an investor to a borrower (here, the US government). The borrower promises to repay the principal at a fixed future date and to pay interest - the coupon - along the way.
Yield - The annual return an investor receives on a bond, expressed as a percentage. Yield and price move in opposite directions: if a bond's price rises (because many people want to buy it), its yield falls, and vice versa.
Maturity - The date on which a bond's principal must be repaid. A 2-year Treasury matures two years after issue; a 10-year Treasury, ten years.
Yield curve - A graph plotting the yields of bonds of the same type (here, US Treasuries) against their maturities. The shape of this curve tells us a great deal about what markets expect the future to look like.
Duration risk - The risk that arises from lending for a long period. The longer the loan, the more time there is for inflation to erode the real value of your return, or for interest rates to rise and make your existing bond less attractive. Long-term lenders demand higher yields as compensation for taking on this risk.
II. The Inversion: When the Curve Goes Wrong
"The one sure way to cure an inflation problem is to create a recession."
When the gap between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields goes negative - meaning short-term debt pays more than long-term - that's an inverted yield curve. In modern economic history it has preceded virtually every recession.
Why? Because markets are pricing in a sequence: the Fed raises short-term rates now to fight inflation*, but that tightening kills growth, which later forces the Fed to cut rates later. The long end reflects that expected future cut, staying low even as the short end rises.
*The 17 June meeting left rates on hold but markets are expecting one or two 1/4% 25bp rises this year.
Think of it this way. The 2-year yield reflects what markets expect the Fed to do over the next two years - and right now, they expect it to keep rates high, even raise them. The 10-year yield reflects a longer horizon: over a decade, markets expect that the current tightening will have done its work, a recession will have followed, and the Fed will have been obliged to cut rates back down again. So the 10-year stays lower than the 2-year - ie, the curve inverts.
This is not a technical glitch. It is the bond market - the largest and most sophisticated financial market in the world, this is where the really serious money is - delivering a verdict on where the economy is heading.
Glossary
Inverted yield curve - The condition in which short-term bonds yield more than long-term bonds of the same type. An abnormal and historically significant configuration.
The Fed (Federal Reserve) - The central bank of the United States. Its principal tools are the federal funds rate (the overnight lending rate between banks) and large-scale asset purchases. Its dual mandate is to maintain price stability (low inflation) and maximum employment.
The policy rate / federal funds rate - The interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight. When the Fed "raises rates," it is raising this rate. Because it flows through into all short-term borrowing costs, it is the most powerful lever the Fed possesses.
Tightening - When a central bank raises interest rates or reduces its balance sheet in order to slow the economy and reduce inflation. The opposite is easing or loosening.
Basis point (bp) - One hundredth of one percentage point. 16 basis points = 0.16%. Used in financial markets because the differences that matter are often too small to express clearly in whole percentages.
Pricing in - When market prices already reflect an expected future event. If markets are "pricing in" a recession, bond and equity prices are already adjusting as if a recession were coming, even before it arrives.
III. The Signal: What Happened Last Wednesday
Last Wednesday, 17 June - Warsh's first FOMC - confirmed this is where we are now. When Warsh announced the rate decision, the 2-year yield jumped 16 basis points - the largest single-day move on an FOMC announcement day since 2008. And notably, his closing line contained no mention of the 2% inflation target. He said only that the Fed would do "whatever it takes" to preserve price stability. Markets heard that as open-ended tightening.
That phrase carries weight. "Whatever it takes" is the language of commitment without limit. When Mario Draghi used it in 2012 to defend the euro, markets took him at his word and bond yields in southern Europe fell immediately. When Warsh used it last Wednesday without attaching any numerical target to it, markets drew the obvious inference: rates will go as high as they need to go, for as long as they need to stay there. There is no pre-announced ceiling.
The 16 basis point jump in the 2-year yield is the market adjusting to that message in real time.
Glossary
FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) - The committee within the Federal Reserve that sets monetary policy, specifically the federal funds rate. It meets eight times a year. Its decisions move markets worldwide.
Kevin Warsh - The current Chair of the Federal Reserve, appointed in 2026. Previously a Fed Governor and financial advisor. His tone and word choices in press conferences are scrutinised intensely by markets.
"Whatever it takes" - A phrase associated with decisive, open-ended central bank commitment. First made famous by Mario Draghi, then-President of the European Central Bank, in July 2012, when he pledged to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro.
2% inflation target - The Federal Reserve's official long-run inflation goal (not achieved in the last five years). When a Fed Chair omits reference to this target, markets notice: it may suggest that the near-term priority - crushing inflation - has displaced the usual framework.
Open-ended tightening - Monetary tightening without a specified end-point or ceiling. More alarming to markets than tightening with a stated target, because it removes the implicit promise of relief.
IV. The Mechanism: Why Rate Hikes Cause Recession
Most borrowing today is at the short end - buyers generally do not want the duration risk of long-term Treasuries (and normally, higher long-term rates are offered to entice them in). So rate hikes bite hard and fast, they slow down the economy and eventually will stop it... recession. The inverted curve is the market's verdict: the medicine works (it cures inflation), but it causes the disease (recession).
The Fed raises the policy rate. Short-term borrowing costs rise immediately - business credit lines become more expensive, floating-rate loans reprice, and the cost of overnight lending between banks climbs. Longer-term rates, including mortgages, are priced off the 10-year Treasury and move differently - but as the yield curve inverts and uncertainty about growth rises, long-term lenders also become more cautious and credit conditions tighten across the board. Businesses find new investment costlier or simply harder to finance; they slow hiring or begin laying off. Consumers, squeezed by tighter credit and higher borrowing costs, spend less. Demand falls. Eventually, falling demand brings inflation down - but by then, the economy has contracted. That contraction is the recession.
The inverted yield curve does not cause this sequence. It predicts it - because millions of market participants, each making their own assessment, are collectively concluding that this is the most likely outcome. History suggests they are usually right.
Glossary
Short end / long end - Shorthand for short-maturity and long-maturity bonds respectively. "Short end" typically refers to maturities of two years or less; "long end" to ten years and beyond.
Floating-rate debt - Loans whose interest rate adjusts periodically in line with a benchmark rate, typically the federal funds rate or a related short-term rate. When the Fed raises rates, floating-rate borrowers feel it immediately.
Credit conditions - The overall ease or difficulty of obtaining credit in the economy. When credit conditions tighten, borrowing becomes more expensive or harder to obtain, reducing spending and investment.
Recession - Conventionally defined as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, though the official US definition (determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) is broader and considers employment, income, and industrial production as well.
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) - The total monetary value of all goods and services produced within a country in a given period. The primary measure of economic output and the basis on which recessions are formally declared.
The bond market as forecaster - Bond markets are widely considered the most sophisticated financial markets in the world, attracting large institutional participants - pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies - with long time horizons and deep analytical resources. When the bond market signals recession, it is worth taking seriously.
References
Friday, 19 June 2026
CHINA'S HISTORICAL WORLDVIEW: EMPIRE, ORDER AND CONTINUITY ; THE RISE OF CHINA PTS 1 & 2 of 3
8. China's Rise: From Reform to Technological Power
China's rise in the twenty-first century emerged from the convergence of Chinese reforms, Western investment, global trade and technological progress.
Following the opening of relations between China and the United States in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping launched a programme of reform and opening-up. Special Economic Zones attracted foreign capital, while hundreds of millions of workers moved from rural areas into expanding industrial cities.
Western companies gained access to abundant labour and rapidly growing production capacity. Consumers in Europe and North America gained access to inexpensive manufactured goods. China gained investment, technology, industrial know-how and export earnings.
Over the following four decades, China experienced one of the fastest economic transformations in human history. It became the world's largest manufacturing nation, a leading trading power and a major centre of technological innovation.
The first phase of development focused on low-cost manufacturing. The second phase focused on infrastructure. China built the world's largest high-speed rail network, modern ports, airports, power systems and digital communications networks. The third phase focuses on advanced technology, including electric vehicles, batteries, robotics, artificial intelligence, aerospace, biotechnology and semiconductors.
Today China leads the world in several industrial sectors and files more patents annually than any other country. Chinese companies increasingly compete at the technological frontier rather than simply manufacturing products designed elsewhere.
Military modernisation has accompanied this economic transformation. Chinese leaders argue that a stronger military is necessary to protect sovereignty, secure trade routes, prevent a repetition of the Century of Humiliation and respond to perceived containment by rival powers. Critics view the same military expansion as a challenge to the existing international order. Both interpretations influence contemporary geopolitical debates.
For many Chinese leaders, the ultimate objective is not merely economic growth but national rejuvenation: restoring China to a position of prosperity, security and international influence comparable to that enjoyed during earlier periods of Chinese history.
Reform and Opening Up - Economic reforms launched from 1978 that integrated China into the global economy.
National Rejuvenation - The idea that China is overcoming the legacy of foreign domination and restoring its historical strength and status.
Technological Frontier - The most advanced level of scientific, industrial and technological development.
Thursday, 18 June 2026
IRAN NEW DEFENDER OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN WEST ASIA
IRAN NEW DEFENDER OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN WEST ASIA
Overview
On 17 June 2026, after months of war, blockade and brinkmanship, the United States and Iran signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding. The Strait of Hormuz reopens. The naval blockade lifts within 30 days. Up to $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets becomes available. A $300 billion reconstruction plan is to be built with regional partners. Sanctions are on a path to termination, contingent on a final deal within 60 days, itself to be endorsed by binding UN Security Council resolution.
Most analysts are reading the document for what it does to Iran's economy and to the oil market. Fair enough - both matter. But the document is also a text, in the way Joseph Campbell taught us to read texts: as the surface expression of a much older structural pattern. And read that way, the MOU is not really about Iran at all. It interestingly allows us to see this story as one where Iran is being written into a new role as Defender of American Interests in West Asia, replacing a failed Israel. Iran also offers the advantage of a pristine market with unmatched resources and consumer population untouched for 47 years.

The pattern Campbell described
Campbell's Hero's Journey runs through a recognisable sequence of figures: the weakness that traps the hero in ordinary life, the demon that weakness curdles into, the protector who does not slay the demon for the hero but equips the hero to face it, and the transformation that follows. The detail people skip past is that demon and protector are not fixed roles. They are functions that a story assigns and reassigns as the plot requires. The dragon of one chapter can become the guide of the next, if the story's needs change and someone is willing to write it that way.
That is precisely what happened in Washington this week, except the author is a superpower and the manuscript is a memorandum of understanding.
What makes this geopolitical moment feel decisive rather than merely a 39th tactical move is when the story's functions finally match the facts on the ground. But of course this could all be a Minsk-type trap for Iran.
The Minsk analogy — a framework designed to look like resolution while buying time for the other side to rearm. Iran's hardliners are certainly reading it that way, and they have 47 years of evidence for their scepticism.
Israel: the rising power that exhausted its role
For two decades, Israel occupied the protector function in America's Middle East story: the regional partner whose threat assessment Washington adopted as its own, whose intelligence and strikes did the work US policymakers wanted done without US fingerprints, whose enemies became, by extension, American enemies. That arrangement reached its operational peak in the February 2026 war — joint US-Israeli strikes, a campaign with the explicit ambition of breaking Iran's nuclear infrastructure and possibly its regime.
It did not deliver a clean result. It delivered a 14-point memorandum that Israel was not shown until after it was substantially settled, and reportedly continued not seeing for some time after that. Netanyahu's own coalition and opposition are now united in calling the war's outcome a strategic failure, his domestic position has become an open question ahead of autumn elections, and a former prime minister has said in public what Israeli officials have been saying anonymously: Iran emerged stronger, Israel emerged weaker. Whatever one thinks of the merits, that is the protector function visibly failing to protect the thing the story needed protected — stable, cheap transit through Hormuz, a contained Iran, an American position in the region that didn't require permanent military overwatch.
A protector who cannot deliver protection stops being cast as the protector. That is not a moral judgment. It is just how the role works in any story, mythic or geopolitical.
Iran: the demon being recast
Here is the move almost nobody in the commentary is naming, because it inverts forty-five years of received categorisation. The MOU does not just de-escalate. It assigns Iran a new function in the story. Iran becomes the guarantor of free transit through Hormuz, in active dialogue with Oman and the Gulf states on the strait's future administration. Iran becomes the recipient of a $300 billion American-coordinated reconstruction plan — not a punished adversary, but a project America is now invested in succeeding. Iran becomes the counterparty whose "good behaviour," in the words of one US official, is rewarded on a dial, not a switch — meaning Washington has committed itself to a relationship that continues, that requires tending, that has stakes in continuing to work.
None of that is friendship. It is something more useful than friendship: function. America's interest in the Gulf — open shipping lanes, contained nuclear risk, a check on chaos that disrupts energy markets and currency flows — increasingly requires Iranian cooperation to deliver, and Washington has just put $300 billion and a UN-endorsed deal architecture behind making that cooperation durable. The demon has been handed the protector's job description. Whether Iran performs the role well is a separate, open question — and Israeli officials are right that the missile programme, the proxy network and the regime's durability are all unresolved. But the role has been offered, and Tehran has signed for it.
Why this is the part everyone is missing
The analyst consensus I'm seeing frets that Iran "rises to become a fourth global power." That framing assumes Iran is acting alone, accumulating power against American interests. It misses that the more consequential rise here is being engineered, not resisted, by Washington. A power that the United States needs and is actively building up to perform a function for it is a fundamentally different geopolitical object than a power rising in defiance of the United States. Saudi Arabia, since the 1940s, has been the textbook case of the former. Iran, as of this week, has been handed the application.
This is also why the Lebanon clause matters more than its brief mention suggests. The MOU folds Israel's war in Lebanon into the same ceasefire architecture, over Israeli objections about freedom of action. That is not incidental housekeeping. It is the new protector being given authority over the old protector's remaining theatre of operations — Iran's position on Hezbollah and Lebanon now sits inside the framework America is building, while Israel's position sits outside the room where the framework was written.
The economics: what a 90 million-person market unlocked looks like
Set the mythic frame aside for a moment and look at the balance sheet, because this is where the thesis stops being interpretive and starts being investable. Iran has roughly 90 million people, a young and reasonably well-educated population, a domestic engineering and manufacturing base built under decades of sanctions pressure (which forces self-reliance the way nothing else does), the second-largest natural gas reserves on the planet, and oil infrastructure that has been running under sanctions constraint rather than capacity constraint. Layer on $100 billion in unfrozen assets, a $300 billion reconstruction commitment, and a sanctions-termination pathway, and you have the outline of one of the largest single-country reopening trades available anywhere in the world economy — bigger, in raw addressable-market terms, than anything else currently on offer in emerging markets.
Reconstruction capital flows first into energy infrastructure, ports, and the Hormuz transit and demining work the MOU itself specifies. Behind that comes telecoms, healthcare, consumer goods and financial services serving a population that has been cut off from global supply chains for most of two generations and has pent-up demand to show for it. None of this happens on the original 60-day clock — the nuclear question is still open, the "minimum methodology" for down-blending enriched material is unresolved, and Israel's continued operations in Lebanon are a live spoiler risk to the whole architecture. But the direction of travel, and the scale of capital Washington has now committed to that direction, is the signal worth pricing.
The closing irony
It is worth sitting for a moment with the country that doesn't get this treatment. Russia has comparable resource depth, a comparable case for reconstruction-led growth once a settlement exists, and no equivalent path on offer from its principal antagonists. Europe, unlike Washington with Iran, shows no sign of being willing to write Moscow into a protector role at any price, on any timeline, however reluctantly. Whether that reflects sounder judgment about Russia or simply a different story being told is a question for another post. But the contrast is a useful reminder that what looks like geopolitical reality is often, underneath, a choice about which character gets cast in which part.
The Minsk objection mentioned above is serious. But in the case of Russia, Minsk cost NATO nothing if it failed. This Iran deal has already cost Washington something that can't be clawed back - its posture towards Israel, now visibly subordinated to a framework Israel didn't write and wasn't shown.... and Trump has made himself a heap of enemies by signing this MoM (memo of misunderstanding).
Reality Check
Prof Pape says there is no graceful way out of the escalation trap for America in its conflict with Iran, but ...
The truth about the Iran deal that no one seems to have noticed (perhaps for good reason and it's me missing something) is that this is a classic case of demon-transformed-into protector - America is replacing a failed Israel with a winning Iran.
America gets two things:
- a new and competent protector of its interests in the Gulf ;
- and a far more monetisable market of over 90 million people, with a work force that is skilled in Engineering and Technology, and a land full of resources, fueled by the return of its frozen assets and the lifting of sanctions.
It's a great deal though it relies on
- Iran following the American lead & breaking with its allies; and
- the neocon hardline zionists in Washington n Tel Aviv "shutting their clappy".
Wednesday, 17 June 2026
SLOWING LIQUIDITY
Glossary
Bearish Flattening Yield Curve
- This is a market condition where:
- Long-term bond yields fall faster than short-term yields, or
- Short-term yields rise while long-term yields fall
- The result is a flattening of the yield curve (the gap between long and short rates narrows) combined with a bearish signal for growth assets, especially equities.
Yield curve – the line plotting government bond yields across different maturities (e.g. 2-year vs 10-year).
Flattening – a reduction in the spread between short and long-term yields.
Bearish – expectations of economic slowdown, tightening conditions, or risk asset weakness.
This needs a bit more explanation, which is offered at the end of this piece...
Did you spot an apparent contradiction? - long-term yields will be lower not higher than yields today, though we are in aperiod of higher inflation. Surely yields will have to be higher for longer?
This apparent contradiction is exactly why yield curve analysis can be confusing.
The key point is that long-term bond yields are driven by three things - not only by inflation, but by expectations of future growth and expected future short-term interest rates.
If investors believe that:
Inflation is currently high, and
Kevin Warsh central bank (or any other CB) may raise rates further in the short term (as is currently expected)
Those higher rates will eventually slow the economy,
> then investors may conclude that rates will have to be cut later.
Higher rates will raise the dollar, making gold - which has no yield - less attractive
In that case they sell some gold perhaps, to buy long-dated bonds today, locking in current yields before future rate cuts arrive. The increased demand pushes bond prices up, long-term yields down, gold down, equities down.
So the market is effectively saying:
"We think policy may become tighter in the near term, but so tight that it ultimately forces easier policy in the future."
A simplified example:
2-year Treasury yield = 5.0%
10-year Treasury yield = 4.5%
The 10-year yield is lower because investors expect that over the next decade the average policy rate will be below today's 5%.
The bond market is not saying inflation is harmless. It is saying that future growth will be weak enough that inflation and interest rates will eventually fall.
A useful way to think about it is:
Inflation risk → pushes yields up.
Recession risk → pushes yields down.
In a bearish flattening, recession fears are beginning to outweigh inflation fears at the long end of the curve.
That is why long bonds (price up = yield down) can rally even while central bankers are still talking tough on inflation. The market is looking beyond the next few meetings and pricing the entire economic cycle.









