Tuesday, 20 October 2026

LA GESTION DU DÉSORDRE : LES ÉMEUTES EN FRANCE, OCTOBRE 2026

Comment une fuite dans le toit d'un lycée de banlieue finit-elle, quatre semaines plus tard, par une mairie en flammes à Limoges ?

En bref

Les émeutes du 17 octobre 2026 n'ont été plannifiées d'avance par personne, mais elles ne sont pas tombées du ciel. Comme les soulèvements français précédents, elles suivent six dynamiques récurrentes : l'accumulation des tensions, l'étincelle, la contagion, l'escalade, la diffusion, puis la tentative de rétablir l'ordre. L'État retrouvera sans doute le contrôle de la rue. Rien ne garantit qu'il retrouvera la stabilité.


1. Un pays qui se soulève régulièrement

En France, la contestation de la jeunesse a souvent payé : retrait de la loi Devaquet en 1986, abandon du CPE en 2006. Quand la colère venait des banlieues sans revendication unique, comme en 2005 et en 2023, l'ordre a été rétabli par la force et les griefs sont restés intacts. Quand une revendication précise s'est muée en révolte générale, comme en 1968 et avec les Gilets jaunes, l'État a mêlé concessions et répression, et la colère a fini dans les urnes. 2026 combine les trois cas de figure, ce qui la rend difficile à éteindre.

2. L'accumulation : ce qui couvait avant le premier incident

Près d'une heure de cours sur dix n'est pas assurée dans le secondaire public. Les classes comptent environ 25 élèves au collège, parfois près de 40 au lycée, alors que 30 est un plafond raisonnable. Les travaux de Piketty et Valdenaire montrent que réduire les effectifs profite d'abord aux élèves défavorisés. Surtout, l'école ne mène plus nulle part : 21,1 % des 15-24 ans actifs sont au chômage.

La tension est la plus forte en Seine-Saint-Denis et dans le Val-de-Marne, où le mouvement est né. C'est aussi là que se concentre la population immigrée (environ 32 % en Seine-Saint-Denis, contre 10 % en moyenne nationale). Le lien est géographique et social, pas ethnique : les lycées les plus dégradés sont dans les quartiers les plus pauvres, et leurs élèves, en majorité français, ont le moins à perdre.

S'y ajoutent l'austérité (54 milliards d'euros d'économies prévues pour 2027), une instabilité politique inédite (quatre Premiers ministres depuis début 2024) et le choc pétrolier de la guerre en Iran. Le nucléaire a protégé les factures d'électricité ; la hausse est passée par l'essence et l'alimentation. Dans un budget gelé, une seule ligne augmente : la défense.

3. L'étincelle : un lycée de Créteil

Le 17 septembre, les élèves du lycée Saint-Exupéry à Créteil se mobilisent contre le manque de professeurs et des bâtiments délabrés. Des revendications que presque tous les parents peuvent soutenir. Elles trouvent un terrain prêt : les canaux Telegram du mouvement « Bloquons tout » de 2025, endormis mais intacts. Une date, le samedi 17 octobre, circulait déjà sur TikTok depuis le 8 septembre, sans que personne ne la pilote.

4. Contagion, escalade, diffusion

Fin septembre, les blocages touchent environ 400 lycées. Début octobre, on compte plus de 6 000 interpellations, des gaz lacrymogènes devant les établissements, et un budget qui ne protège que la défense, présenté en pleine crise. Le 17 octobre, syndicats, Gilets jaunes et retraités rejoignent les lycéens : environ 550 000 manifestants. La mairie de Limoges brûle, celle de Marseille est envahie, et le centre de Toulouse est pillé, avec entre 32 000 et 80 000 manifestants et 1 500 à 2 000 casseurs selon le préfet. Les violences sont le fait de quelques milliers de personnes, black blocs et pilleurs, et non du demi-million de manifestants.

5. Le rétablissement de l'ordre, et ce qu'il laisse derrière lui

Le 18 octobre, Emmanuel Macron a promis la fermeté et la transparence sur le maintien de l'ordre, et annoncé une concertation avec lycéens, enseignants et syndicats. Les syndicats n'y voient « rien de concret ». Sans majorité, tenu par ses économies et à six mois de la présidentielle, le gouvernement a peu de marge. L'histoire suggère que les griefs non résolus ne disparaissent pas : ils passent dans les urnes, ressurgissent plus tard, ou nourrissent de nouveaux mouvements.

6. Ce que ces émeutes ne sont pas

Ni une simple affaire scolaire, ni l'œuvre de quelques casseurs. Ni une « révolution de couleur » orchestrée par le Kremlin : rien ne l'indique, et Viginum n'a relevé qu'une ingérence étrangère minime. Ni une conséquence directe de l'immigration : celle-ci explique où la tension était la plus forte, pas pourquoi le pays tout entier a manifesté.

7. La guerre en toile de fond

Les banderoles parlaient d'écoles et de prix, pas de la Russie. À mon sens, la plupart des manifestants se désintéressent de cette guerre, présentée selon eux à coups de propagande par une élite mondialisée lointaine, achetée par des promesses de carrière et de prospérité, et payée avec leurs écoles et leur avenir. Ce n'est pas la guerre qui a provoqué les émeutes, mais le budget qui la finance.

Récap

En conclusion

L'État rétablira l'ordre. Mais une école qui ne mène plus à l'emploi, des banlieues qui se sentent abandonnées et une génération sceptique face au réarmement seront contenues ou déplacées, pas résolues. La vraie question n'est pas de savoir si la France se soulèvera de nouveau, mais lesquelles de ces tensions s'accumuleront d'ici là.

Sources principales

Version intégrale en anglais, avec toutes les références :

THE ROAD TO THE STREET: UNDERSTANDING FRANCE'S OCTOBER RIOTS

How does a leaking roof in a Paris suburb end, four weeks later, with a town hall in Limoges burnt to the ground?



Fast Track

France's riots of 17 October 2026 were not planned by anyone, and they were not a bolt from the blue either. Like the country's earlier uprisings, they show six dynamics that recur whenever French unrest takes hold:

  1. Accumulation (years). State schools decay, classes stay among the largest in Europe, one young jobseeker in five cannot find work, and austerity, an energy shock and a revolving door of prime ministers add pressure. The strain is sharpest in the poor, largely immigrant suburbs.
  2. Ignition (17 September). Pupils walk out of a lycée in Créteil over missing teachers and leaking roofs.
  3. Contagion (late September). Blockades jump from school to school, reaching some 400 lycées, carried by social media and by protest networks left over from 2025.
  4. Escalation (early October). Arrests pass 6,000, tear gas meets blockades, and a budget freezing almost everything except defence lands mid-protest.
  5. Diffusion (17 October). Unions, Gilets Jaunes and pensioners join; around 550,000 march, and violence spreads from Paris to Limoges, Marseille and Toulouse.
  6. Restoration (now). The state promises firmness and talks. Whether it resolves the grievances, merely contains them or displaces them is the open question.

None of these made the next inevitable. Together they explain how a local complaint became a national crisis, and why order restored is not the same as stability.



Introduction

On Saturday 17 October 2026 around 550,000 people marched across France. By the end of the weekend the town hall in Limoges had been gutted by fire, Marseille's city hall had been broken into, shops had been looted from Paris to Toulouse, nearly 2,400 people had been arrested and close to 1,000 police officers and firefighters had been injured. It was some of the worst unrest the country had seen in years.

France has been here before: in 1968, 1986, 2005, 2006, 2018 and 2023. Each episode had its own cause, but they share a recognisable shape. This article uses that shape, the Six Dynamics of Uprising, to answer four questions about this autumn:

  1. What tensions had accumulated before the first incident?
  2. What turned one incident into a wider mobilisation?
  3. What explains the spread from one place and one group to another?
  4. What restores order, and what remains unresolved afterwards?

The dynamics are not a timetable. They overlap, they can stall, and they can be reversed. Nobody was steering them. Unlike the war propaganda traced in Living in the Air's Road to the Front series, which has authors and a goal, an uprising is a pattern we can recognise and compare, not a plan that someone carries out.

Why It Matters

France is raising its defence budget by roughly a third in three years, and it is also the European country whose young people have most often won in the street. If its government cannot keep its own teenagers in the classroom while it asks them to prepare for a possible war, every European government planning the same trade between schools and soldiers is watching. And the way this episode ends will decide whether the next one comes sooner or later.


1. A country that rises again and again

In most countries a school protest is a gesture. In France it is a tactic that has repeatedly worked, and every lycée student knows it, it's part of French democracy. Six modern episodes show both how often France rises and how differently each uprising ends:

Year What lit it How it ended
1968Student protests in Paris met by policeWage deal, snap election, landslide for the party of order
1986Higher-education reform; a student dies after a police beatingReform withdrawn, minister resigns
2005Two teenagers die fleeing police in a Paris suburbState of emergency, curfews; grievances unresolved
2006A law making it easier to sack under-26sLaw scrapped
2018–19Diesel fuel tax rise (Gilets Jaunes)Tax dropped, €10bn+ in measures, national debate, mass arrests, tougher protest law
2023A teenager shot by police at a traffic stopMass arrests and fast-track trials; little change

The comparison holds a lesson about endings. When the demand was narrow and the government could simply withdraw a law, as in 1986 and 2006, the young won and the street emptied quickly. When the anger came from the suburbs and had no single demand, as in 2005 and 2023, the state restored order by force and the grievances stayed where they were... ready for the next time. And when a narrow demand grew into a broad revolt, as in 1968 and 2018, the state combined concessions with coercion, and the anger was eventually displaced into the ballot box.

The lesson passed down to each new generation - now Gen Z - is that the street works, especially when the young are in it, and especially when the state over-reacts. A movement that has won before does not need persuading that protest pays.

A movement that has won before does not need persuading that the street works.

2026 combines features of all three types. It began, like 1986 and 2006, with young people making specific demands about their education. It grew, like 2005 and 2023, out of the suburbs. And it broadened, like 1968 and 2018, into a general revolt over living costs. That mixture is what makes it hard to end.

2. Accumulation: the tensions before the first incident

Uprisings begin long before the first stone is thrown. Grievances build up for years without producing open unrest. In France in 2026 they had built up in four places.

2.1 A school system that no longer promises a future

The surface symptoms are easy to count. In the 2024-25 school year nearly one teaching hour in ten went untaught in public secondary schools, mostly because there was no teacher to teach. In September 2026 the OECD reported that French 15-year-olds' scores in maths and reading had fallen to among the lowest levels on record. Pupils describe leaking roofs, no heating, broken desks, not enough chairs, classes of 30 and more.

But missing chairs are just the symptom, not the disease. The deeper complaint is that school no longer leads anywhere, offers no prospect to pupils once they have finished their schooling. In early 2026 unemployment among 15 to 24-year-olds looking for work reached 21%, and 13% of 15 to 29-year-olds were neither working, studying nor training ("NEET" - in the UK, as of early 2026, approximately 13.5% of this age group, or about 1,012,000 individuals, were classified as NEET). Tens of thousands of apprenticeship contracts disappeared. Parcoursup, the national university admissions system, is widely described by students as a source of stress and mistrust. A teenager who can see that the certificate at the end will not buy a job, a flat or a future has little reason to defend the institution that awards it.

The missing chairs were the symptom. The disease was a school that no longer leads anywhere - "is not fit for purpose".

2.2 Why class size matters

Overcrowding was the first complaint in Créteil. France has some of the largest classes in Europe, around 25 pupils for 11 to 15-year-olds, and students at some lycées report classes of nearly 40. In the experience of many teachers, about 30 is the practical ceiling for a secondary class: beyond that a teacher stops teaching individuals and starts managing a crowd. A university lecture in an amphitheatre can hold hundreds, because it is a performance rather than a conversation, but the small-group teaching typical of good universities, where students actually learn, works best with five or six.

The research supports this intuition, especially for the poorest pupils. A 2006 study by French economists Thomas Piketty and Mathieu Valdenaire found that smaller classes help disadvantaged and younger pupils most, and estimated that cutting five pupils from classes in priority-education areas could narrow the attainment gap between rich and poor schools by close to half. France now has 20% fewer births than in 2010, why not take advantage of this regrettable demographic to shrink classes? Instead, some 4,000 teaching posts were cut for the 2026 school year, and 32% of the education ministry's 2027 budget will go on civil-service pensions. One third.

2.3 The banlieues: suburbs where the strains concentrate

The movement began, and grew fastest, in the working-class lycées of Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne, on the edge of Paris. These are also the areas where France's immigrant population is concentrated: about 32% of Seine-Saint-Denis residents are immigrants, against about 10% for France as a whole, and many more are the French-born children of immigrants.

It would be dishonest to leave this out, but equally dishonest to make it purely a racial or religious explanation. The link is more geographical and social. The schools that fail the worst are in the poorest areas; the poorest areas are where many immigrant families live; and the teenagers in those schools, most of them French citizens, have the least to gain from the system as it is and therefore the least to lose by confronting it. Young people there also report being stopped by police far more often than others, and the memory of 2005 and 2023 is close. When blockades were met with arrests and tear gas, it confirmed what many already believed about the state.

2.4 The squeeze

A permanent grievance becomes one needing priority attention when everyone is squeezed at once, so that a teenager's anger about school meets their parents' anger about bills.

A teenager's anger about school meets their parents' anger about bills.

Austerity. France's public debt stands at about 119% of GDP and rising. The 2026 and 2027 budgets froze ministry spending in real terms and public-sector pay, seeking €54 billion of savings for 2027 alone. Debt interest now costs more than either education or defence. Pensions take 14% of GDP (UK: 8%). The education budget is 32% consumed by pensions.

Instability at the top. France has had seven prime ministers since 2017, and four since the start of 2024: Gabriel Attal; Michel Barnier, who fell to a no-confidence vote; François Bayrou, who lost a confidence vote over his budget; and Sébastien Lecornu, who resigned and was reappointed within days in October 2025. A minority government that represents only a diminishing pool of centre-voters, that may not survive the next vote, has little room to buy peace... and of course, the protesters know this.

The energy shock. The US-Israeli war on Iran which began on 28 February 2026, closed the Strait of Hormuz and sent oil prices soaring. France's economy stalled and inflation rose. France has one shield: nuclear plants produced about 68% of its electricity in 2025, so household electricity prices barely moved; the regulated tariff rose only 2.5% in August, for reasons the regulator said were unrelated to the war. The squeeze came through the petrol pump, the supermarket and transport, not the electricity bill.

The one line that grew. Inside a frozen budget, defence kept on rising: €6.5 billion more in 2026, which PM Lecornu called the budget's "heart", and €6.4 billion more planned for 2027. That is fact. The interpretation many protesters drew is that the state could find billions for soldiers but not for teachers. Section 7 returns to what protesters and the people make of the war itself.

In a frozen budget, defence was the only line that grew, and the students noticed which line it was not.

By September 2026 the tensions were all in place. On their own they produced complaints, not riots. What they lacked was a spark.

3. Ignition: how one school lit a national movement

Ignition is the moment a single incident turns latent discontent into open confrontation. What matters is not only the incident itself but whether there is something ready to catch fire.

3.1 The spark in Créteil

In mid-September (17 September by most accounts) pupils at the Lycée Saint-Exupéry in Créteil, a working-class suburb south-east of Paris, walked out over teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms and the state of their school buildings. Nobody could call the demands unreasonable. More teacher-time, smaller classes, a roof that does not leak, chairs for everyone: where is the parent in France who would support them?

That is what made it combustible. A grievance about pensions or taxes divides people; a grievance about children in cold classrooms unites them. The pupils were young, their complaints were photographable, and they came from exactly the kind of school described in section 2. Behind the visible demands lay something more profound these were students who could not see a future for themselves with the qualifications they were being given - and this is a failure of the state.

3.2 Networks ready to carry it

A spark needs something to land on. In France in 2026 there were protest networks already in place, built a year earlier for a different cause.

In 2025 a movement called Bloquons tout ("Let's block Everything") grew on Telegram, the encrypted messaging app, against the Bayrou government's austerity budget. On the eve of its big day, 10 September 2025, it claimed more than 100,000 people on its channels, more than 200 local groups and more than 10,000 people taking part in local general assemblies, the open meetings where French protest movements decide what to do. The day itself achieved little, but nobody deleted the channels. They fell quiet, with their members, their administrators and their habit of meeting intact.

(Bloquons tout should not be confused with the black bloc, the phrase French people often reach for when they explain these riots. Bloquons tout was a broad, mostly peaceful movement; the black bloc is a street-fighting tactic, explained in section 4.4.)

In autumn 2026 those channels woke up. Some of the 2025 groups were reactivated, and new regional channels appeared with a telling name: "Gilets jaunes ET génération Z". They offered protest guides, lists of lawyers, accommodation and lifts. No single leadership could be identified, and the calls came from many directions.

Gilets jaunes ET génération Z

3.3 A date in the air

One detail shows how loose and unplanned this was. On 8 September 2026, more than a week before Créteil, a young TikToker posted a video, watched three million times, urging people to remember Saturday 17 October, simply because it was a Saturday in the school holidays and everyone could come. Calls like this circulate all the time and almost all come to nothing. This one did not cause anything; it only meant that when the school protests erupted, a date was already floating in the networks, waiting for a cause.

Ignition, then, was the meeting of a sympathetic local grievance with a ready-made capacity to mobilise. Neither alone would have been enough.

4. Contagion, escalation and diffusion: how the unrest spread

Three dynamics explain how a walkout in one suburb became a national crisis. They overlapped in time, and each fed the others.

4.1 Contagion: from one school to four hundred

Contagion is imitation: others see the protest and join it. Lycée students now organise through TikTok, Snapchat, Instagram and X, and some calls to protest were boosted with AI-generated content borrowing from pop and street culture. Until about 25 September the blockades stayed in the Paris region, many of them in Seine-Saint-Denis. Then they jumped. By 29 September the education ministry counted around 400 of France's roughly 3,700 lycées disrupted. University students joined in solidarity, adding their own complaints about cuts to higher education.

What spread was not only a time and a place but an explanation: the state is abandoning us. Footage of a classroom without chairs spread sympathy; footage of tear gas outside a school spread outrage. Some footage was false: fact-checkers found old videos from other protests passed off as new. Social-media monitoring cited by Le Monde counted around 460,000 posts about the 17 October mobilisation in the three weeks before it.

4.2 Escalation: the state's response becomes a grievance

Escalation is when confrontations intensify and the cost of restoring order rises. By early October more than 6,000 people had been arrested since the protests began, and education ministry figures counted 170 pupils and 65 staff injured by 1 October. Protesters accused police of firing tear gas at schools, and the police inspectorate opened dozens of investigations into officers' conduct. Violence also came from the protest side: on 8 October part of the Lycée Les Iris in Lormont, near Bordeaux, was ransacked, and a fire was set outside a police station annexe in Bordeaux itself.

Then came the budget. On 1 October, at the height of the school protests, Lecornu published a plan that froze almost everything except defence, and clashes worsened. The government did try to calm things: it dropped plans to raise some university fees and promised 3,000 substitute teachers. But by then the movement had outgrown its original demands. It was no longer about one school's roof but about whether the state was on the side of its young.

4.3 Diffusion: new groups, new places

Diffusion is when unrest spreads beyond its original group and territory. Labour unions brought the cost-of-living crisis into the movement. Former Gilets Jaunes answered the Telegram calls. Two presidential candidates, the Greens' Marine Tondelier and the Communists' Fabien Roussel, announced support; Jean-Luc Mélenchon, whose party had backed the students, urged non-violence. The convergence was never tidy: a week before the big day the lycée unions had not formally committed, and some pupils said they were too tired, or too frightened of the police, to go.

On Saturday 17 October, a convenient day in the school holidays, around 550,000 people marched, including 110,000 in Paris. Most marches were peaceful. Around them, the historic town hall in Limoges was set on fire, Marseille's city hall was broken into, shops were looted in Paris, Lyon and Marseille, and cars burned beside the Canal Saint-Martin. CNN reported one police officer and one protester dead.

The south-west was among the worst hit. In Toulouse between 32,000 people (the prefecture's figure) and 80,000 (the unions') marched, more than at the height of the Gilets Jaunes. The prefect estimated that 1,500 to 2,000 rioters joined them; dozens of shops were looted, around a hundred people were taken into custody and 33 police officers were injured. New calls on Telegram brought several hundred back the next day. Nationwide the weekend ended with nearly 2,400 arrests and almost 1,000 police officers and firefighters injured, and protests had spread to Belgium, Italy, Spain and beyond.

4.4 Who did the violence: black bloc, casseurs and looters

French readers often explain riots like these with one phrase: the black bloc. It is worth being precise. The black bloc is not an organisation but a tactic: small groups of radical militants, usually anarchist or anti-capitalist, dress in black and mask their faces, then attack symbols of the state and capital such as banks, chain stores and police lines. Casseurs ("breakers") is the wider term for anyone who smashes property during a demonstration. As one French specialist put it, all black blocs are casseurs, but not all casseurs are black blocs; some come from the far right, and many have no politics at all.

On 17 October the pattern was familiar. Toulouse's mayor described the marches as hijacked first by what he called almost professional casseurs, then by very young people. The black bloc breaks the windows and draws the police; opportunistic looters pour through the gap. The violence was real and serious, but it was the work of thousands among half a million, and it is a separate question from why the half million marched.

5. Restoration: how it ends, and what it leaves behind

Every uprising ends. The question is how, and what is left once the streets are quiet. French history suggests three things to watch: how the state regains control of public space, how it tries to settle the grievances, and what happens to the grievances it cannot settle.

5.1 Regaining the street

The state's first task is physical: to make the streets its own again. The French toolkit is well worn. Massive police deployments and mass arrests come first. Curfews and a state of emergency were used in 2005. Fast-track trials, which sentenced hundreds within days, followed the 2023 riots. And after the Gilets Jaunes came a tougher law on protest. Each restored order; none, on its own, removed the cause.

The first moves of 2026 follow the pattern. In his televised address on 18 October, President Macron blamed the violence on what he called seditious ultra-left groups joined by many delinquents, promised firmness against those responsible and "transparency" about the conduct of the police. Prosecutors have opened investigations into the weekend's violence.

5.2 The politics of wrapping up

Force clears the streets; politics decides whether people stay home. Here too France has a repertoire. Governments withdraw the offending law, as in 1986 and 2006. They spend money, as with the €10 billion package for the Gilets Jaunes. They open a national consultation, as with the "Grand Débat" of 2019. They let the calendar work: school holidays and Christmas have drained many movements. And, as in 1968, they let an election turn the argument from the street to the ballot box.

Force clears the streets; politics decides whether people stay home.

Macron's address tried for consultation. He acknowledged that young people felt there was, in his words, no desirable future, and announced that the prime minister would convene pupils, students, teachers, unions, employers, local authorities and members of parliament this week to work on concrete solutions, building on an online platform that had gathered more than 100,000 contributions. Teachers' unions replied that he had offered nothing concrete, and opposition parties called the speech irresponsible.

He then went off on a three-day visit to West Asia.

The government's room for manoeuvre is narrow. It has no majority, it is committed to €54 billion of savings, the defence increase is the one line it has promised to protect, and a presidential election is six months away.

5.3 When grievances cannot be resolved

Some grievances can be settled with a cheque or a withdrawn law. Others cannot, at least not quickly: a school system that no longer leads to jobs, suburbs that feel abandoned, a generation that doubts the reasons it is given for rearmament. When grievances like these outlast the restoration of order, they do not disappear. History suggests they are displaced in one of three directions.

They can move into the ballot box, as in June 1968, when the street lost and the party of order won a landslide. They can go underground and resurface, as the suburban anger of 2005 did in 2023. Or they can migrate into new movements: the Gilets Jaunes left behind a repertoire of protest that was borrowed by Bloquons tout in 2025, whose networks in turn carried the mobilisation of 2026. In each case the government restored order but not stability.

The state can restore order in a weekend. Stability takes far longer, and France has rarely achieved it.

5.4 What to watch

What follows is anticipation, not prediction. The signals worth watching in the coming weeks are whether the talks offer real money for schools, which could separate the students from the wider movement; whether lycées reopen calmly when the holidays end; whether the violence turns public opinion against the protests, as it often has; and whether any of it touches the defence budget, which on present form it will not. The next article in this series looks in detail at how French governments have restored order, and what that sequence is likely to look like before the election.

6. What the riots are not: rival explanations

The account in this article is an interpretation, and it competes with others. Each deserves a fair hearing, because most contain part of the truth.

6.1 "It is simply about schools"

This is the government's preferred reading, and the evidence for school decay is overwhelming. But schools cannot explain the timing, the national scale, or why unions, Gilets Jaunes and pensioners marched beside the pupils. Schools explain why people were angry, not why they were all in the street on 17 October.

6.2 "It is the far left and the vandals"

President Macron blamed "sowers of chaos" and promised prosecutions. As section 4.4 showed, black bloc militants and opportunistic looters shaped what the riots looked like. But half a million people did not march because a few thousand wanted to break windows. The violent minority explains the damage, not the turnout.

6.3 "It is Moscow"

There is no evidence that Russia planned, organised or directed these protests. The idea of a Kremlin-run "colour revolution" in France has no support in anything published so far. France's own watchdog on foreign digital interference, Viginum, reportedly found only minimal foreign influence in the run-up to 17 October, and experts quoted by The Media Line say there is no established evidence of Russian organisation. The Kremlin calls the accusation absurd.

Russian media covered the riots, as Western media did, with their own angle, presenting the unrest as a failure of Macron's government. Fact-checkers did also find Russian influence campaigns circulating fabricated stories about the protests, as they have about many French events. That is opportunism, not orchestration. A foreign power can throw fuel on a domestic fire; it did not light this one, and treating it as the cause is a way of avoiding the domestic causes set out above.

6.4 "It is immigration"

President Trump claimed that the protests were driven by uncontrolled mass migration rather than schools, and many readers will have heard similar claims at home. As section 2.3 showed, immigration is part of the story: the movement began in the suburbs where immigrant families are concentrated, and the teenagers there had the most to lose from failing schools. But that is a claim about where the strain was sharpest, not about what caused the riots. The protesters' demands were about teachers, buildings, jobs and money. And the movement spread far beyond the suburbs, to provincial cities such as Limoges and Toulouse, and drew in Gilets Jaunes whose roots are in small-town France.

6.5 What the dynamics explain that the others do not

Each rival explanation answers "who was angry?" or "who was violent?". Only an account of how the dynamics interacted answers "why now, why so fast, and why on that day?". That is this article's claim to be the deeper understanding of what's going on, though readers should judge it against the evidence for themselves.

7. The war in the background

The French protesters' banners were about schools and prices, not Russia. Yet the war that European leaders are preparing for runs in the background of this story, so let's be precise about just how.

7.1 What is established

In November 2025 France's chief of the defence staff, General Fabien Mandon, caused uproar by warning that the country must be ready to "lose its children" and that Russia was preparing for a confrontation with European countries by 2030. Days later President Macron announced a new 10-month voluntary military service for 18 and 19-year-olds, citing the threat from Russia. It began recruiting in 2026 with 3,000 places, rising to 10,000 a year by 2030. Volunteers serve only in France. But in a major crisis, government and parliament could extend the service to others identified on an annual mobilisation day, making it effectively compulsory.

At the same time, as section 2.4 showed, defence became the only rising line in a frozen budget. In April 2026 the teachers' union FO-FNEC FP published a leaflet arguing that cuts to university places and the new military service were working "hand in hand" to channel young people towards the army.

7.2 How the protesters see it

Most protesters are not interested in the war at all, and that this anti-war spirit is itself the point. They do not see Russia as a threat that justifies their sacrifice. They see a war that is being sold for reasons akin to propaganda, by a remote globalist elite bought off by offers of career and prosperity for themselves and their families, and paid for with the schools, wages and prospects that were supposed to give them a future. On that view, rearmament is not protection but one more way in which the French and European economy, and their place in it, is being run down.

There is plenty of evidence for this reading. The general's remark about losing children caused an outcry certainly not a rallying of support. Left-wing outlets report French students protesting that money for the armed forces is drained from their education budget. Across Europe, rallies under the slogan "welfare not warfare" link the school protests to rearmament. And in Germany, where conscription is closer, the connection is explicit: students in more than 100 cities struck against military service under the slogan "We do not want to fight your war". It remains an interpretation; no poll of the French marchers has tested it.

"We do not want to fight your war".

7.3 Why it matters for what comes next

The riots were not caused by the war, but they were shaped by the budget that pays for it, and by a generation's growing suspicion of the reasons given for it.

The riots were not caused by the war, but the context is the budget that pays for these wars.

That matters because a government preparing for possible war needs its young people trained, disciplined and believing in a common cause. This autumn it found many of them in the street, believing the opposite. Whatever settlement ends this episode, the gap between what the state asks of its young and what they believe it offers them will remain one of the tensions accumulating for the next.


Bottom Line

The leaking roof in Créteil did not burn down the town hall in Limoges, and nobody planned the series of dynamics between them. Tensions had accumulated for years in failing schools and neglected suburbs, and austerity, an energy shock, these increasingly expensive and pointless wars, and - as Lecornu himself admits - the weakest government since 1958, sharpened them all. One sympathetic school ignited them; dormant networks and social media carried the protest from school to school; arrests, tear gas and a budget that protected only defence escalated it; and on a convenient Saturday it diffused into a national revolt which over half a million French actively joined.

The four questions this article set out to answer have clear answers for the first three. The tensions were about schools that extinguish hope, concentrated in the suburbs and inflamed by austerity. Créteil became a national cause because it was easy yo sympathise with, especially parents; and because the means to mobilise already existed. The unrest spread because the state's response gave it new grievances and new allies. The fourth question, what restores order and what remains, is still being answered. On present form the state will regain the streets, offer consultation and some money for schools, and let the holidays and the election do the rest.

If French history is a guide, that will restore order but not stability. The grievances that cannot be bought off, a school system that does not lead to work, suburbs where inhabitants feel abandoned, and a generation utterly unconvinced by the case for rearmament, will be contained or displaced rather than resolved. The real question is not whether France will rise again, but which of today's unresolved tensions will be accumulating when it does.

Deep Dive: the timeline

DateEvent
Spring 2025Call to "block everything" appears on Telegram
15 Jul 2025Bayrou budget proposes €43.8bn of cuts
10 Sep 2025"Bloquons tout" day; 200+ local groups, 100,000+ on Telegram
Sep–Oct 2025Bayrou falls; Lecornu appointed, resigns and is reappointed
Nov 2025Gen. Mandon's "lose its children" warning; Macron announces voluntary military service
2 Feb 20262026 budget adopted with €6.5bn more for defence
28 Feb 2026Iran war begins; Hormuz closed, fuel prices surge
31 Mar 2026Teachers strike against 4,000 job cuts
Apr 2026FO teachers' union links university cuts to military service
8 Sep 2026TikTok video floats 17 October as a date; 3 million views
17 Sep 2026Walkout at Lycée Saint-Exupéry, Créteil
29–30 Sep 2026~400 lycées disrupted; 625 detained
1 Oct 20262027 budget: €54bn savings, defence up €6.4bn
8 Oct 2026Lycée ransacked in Lormont; fire at a Bordeaux police annexe
Early Oct 2026Arrests pass 6,000; unions and Gilets Jaunes join
17 Oct 2026~550,000 march; Limoges town hall burned; Toulouse centre looted
18–19 Oct 2026~2,400 arrests, ~1,000 police and firefighters injured

Related Articles

Glossary

Banlieue – the suburbs around French cities, often used to mean poorer housing estates where many immigrant families live.

Black bloc – a street tactic, not an organisation: small groups of radical militants dressed in black and masked, who attack symbols of the state and capital towards the end of demonstrations., opening shops to local casseurs.

Bloquons tout – "Block Everything", the 2025 protest movement against austerity that left behind the Telegram networks used in 2026. Not to be confused with the black bloc.

Casseurs – "breakers": anyone who smashes property during a demonstration, whether black bloc militants, far-right groups or people with no politics at all.

GDP (gross domestic product) – the total value of all goods and services an economy produces in a year. Debt "of 119% of GDP" means the state owes more than a full year's national output.

General assembly (AG) – an open local meeting where French protest movements debate and vote on what to do next.

Gilets Jaunes – the "Yellow Vests" movement of 2018–19, which began over fuel taxes and drew mainly on small-town and rural France.

Lycée – a French upper secondary school for pupils aged roughly 15 to 18.

Parcoursup – France's national online system for applying to university.

Priority education (ZEP, now REP) – areas where schools receive extra resources because of high levels of social disadvantage.

Regulated electricity tariff (tarif Bleu) – the household electricity price set by the state on the regulator's advice. Because about two-thirds of French electricity is nuclear, and the tariff is revised only twice a year, oil price spikes reach French petrol pumps quickly but French electricity bills slowly and weakly.

Telegram – an encrypted messaging app whose large group channels are widely used to organise protests.

Viginum – the French government agency that monitors foreign digital interference.

References

The riots and their scale

Schools, youth and the banlieues

Budget, energy and politics

Networks, violence and interference

The war in the background

Earlier uprisings and French politics

Further Reading

  • Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (Free Press, 1962), for readers who want the academic theory of how unrest builds up behind the Six Dynamics used here.

Une version française abrégée de cet article est disponible :




The statue of Marianne at the Place de la République in Paris, France, wearing a yellow vest and banner during nationwide protests on October 17, 2026


Sunday, 18 October 2026

WAS CLOSING HORMUZ THE POINT OF THE IRAN WAR

If two decades of American war planning predicted that attacking Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz, why are we still told the closure was a blunder?

Fast Track

Ryan Perkins, an English economist who has worked in China for twenty years, argues in "They Wanted This" that the Iran war's most damaging consequence was not an accident. US strategic literature had long treated a closure of Hormuz as a near-certainty. The shortages that followed (oil, gas, fertiliser, helium) fall hardest on China, India and the dollar-dependent economies of the Global South, and lightest on the United States. If he is right, a strait that stays half-open is a lever rather than a failure. The catch is that the same lever is spending the credibility on which American financial power rests.

Introduction

Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed, half-open, briefly reopened under a June memorandum, and closed again after the ceasefire collapsed in July. For most Western commentary, the story is one of miscalculation: a war launched without a plan for its most obvious consequence, and an administration that keeps announcing a reopening that never quite arrives.

The problem with that is that the Pentagon has multiple floors, each floor full of large numbers of offices and all stuffed with analysts and planners.... there must be thousands. Then there are the Think Tanks and academics. And further out still, there is the technical and quality media. And they were all saying the same thing.

Ryan Perkins offers this alternative version too. An English academic who has lived and worked in China for two decades, he spoke to an Australian commentator after both attended the Mingde Strategic Dialogue, a tour of Chinese cities for foreign analysts. His argument is that the closure was not the failure of the policy but its function. The question he poses is not when will the strait reopen? but what if it isn't supposed to?

This article sets out his case, tests it against the evidence that can be checked, and weighs where it is strong and where it overreaches. The aim is not to decide whether Perkins is right in every detail. It is to see what changes when we stop treating a persistent outcome as an accident and start asking qui bonum?... whose interests are being served her? So we will look at history and at the nature of conspiracy theories.

Why It Matters

Before the war, roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil passed through Hormuz, along with large volumes of liquefied gas, fertiliser and industrial inputs. Its restriction shows up in fuel prices from Perth to Lagos, in fertiliser costs at planting time and, months later, in the price of food. If the disruption is a by-product, policy should aim at reopening it and waiting is reasonable. If it is an instrument, reopening may never be the goal, and every country that depends on Gulf energy, and pays for it in dollars, needs to plan for a long squeeze rather than a short shock.


1. A predictable surprise

1.1 What the planners always said

Perkins began with an unease rather than a theory. When the war started, the explanation on offer did not add up, so he went back to the record. He worked through the significant American strategic literature on war with Iran published since about 2005: studies from the US Naval War College, the Congressional Research Service, RAND, the Atlantic Council, CSIS and others. He was not looking for any single recommendation, since such reports disagree on much. He was looking for what they agreed on across institutions and across two decades.

He reports two points of consensus. The first is that a short, sharp regime-change operation in Iran would fail, and a longer campaign would also fail without a major ground invasion, which nobody seriously contemplates against a country of more than ninety million people. The second is that in any such war Iran would close the strait. In his reading, the literature treats this not as a tail risk or "black swan event", but as an expected result: even if Iran cannot hold the waterway shut by force for long, it can make it uninsurable, and an uninsurable strait is a closed strait.

This is Perkins' reading of a large body of work, and it has not been independently reviewed for this article. But the broad expectation was hardly hidden. Before the war, bank analysts were openly modelling oil at $100 to $120 a barrel in the event of a sustained closure. The step Perkins then takes is an inference, and he labels it as one: if an outcome is known in advance, there is a good case for saying it was intended. He has, he says, no documents to prove it. What he has is a hypothesis worth testing.

"If you know a particular outcome is going to come from your actions, there's a good case for saying that that's what you intended to happen." – Ryan Perkins

1.2 The convenience of incompetence

His second clue was the tone of the coverage. Across the Western media, from left to right, the dominant explanation was incompetence. Perkins finds that suspicious. In his experience, genuine incompetence is something institutions try to hide. Incompetence offered openly as an explanation can serve another purpose: it bridges the gap between a policy and what the public would have accepted had it been proposed in advance.

This is a heuristic, not evidence, and taken alone it cannot stack up. Its value is that it suggests a test: if the closure was really an accident, its costs should fall more or less at random. If it was intended, or at least welcomed, its costs should fall in a pattern that serves an identifiable interest. 

True, up to now this sounds like a conspiracy theory: history reads forward to explain outcomes, conspiracy theories read back for intention. Or, the  "cock-up theory of history" vs. a modern version of the Homeric gods ie the belief that whatever happens must be what someone powerful wanted to happen. Conspiracy theories treat the absence of evidence as proof of a cover-up, so they can never lose. They also assume a level of competence and secrecy that real-life governments rarely manage. 

The next two sections follow the cargo to see where the costs land.

2. Following the cargo

2.1 More than oil

Hormuz is usually discussed as an oil story, but the cargo is broader. Through it pass crude, liquefied natural gas, refined products, nitrogen fertilisers such as urea and ammonia, sulphur, and hard-to-source industrial inputs such as helium. In the first eight months of 2026, crude exports from the Gulf fell by about 30 per cent year on year, and the Gulf's share of world seaborne crude trade dropped to under 30 per cent from a historical norm of around 40.

The point about the wider cargo is that shortages travel. Energy-intensive industries (petrochemicals, aluminium, fertilisers, semiconductors) are hit first, and the disruption then spreads through manufacturing. A fertiliser shortage at planting time becomes a food price rise at harvest.

2.2 Who pays the most

The costs do not fall evenly. By May 2026 the United States had become the world's largest oil exporter, and it buys little Gulf energy. ECB economists estimate that Gulf energy makes up only around 10 per cent of total energy imports in the euro area, the United Kingdom and the United States. For much of Asia the share is several times higher. Perkins names India, Brazil and China as disproportionately affected, alongside the wider Global South.

2.3 The dollar door

The deepest layer of his argument is about currency. A country with a hard currency, such as the United States, Britain or the eurozone, pays for imports largely in money it can issue or borrow cheaply. Most countries cannot. They must buy their oil and fertiliser in dollars, from a limited stock of reserves. When prices jump, those reserves drain.

At that point, Perkins argues, a door opens for the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Their emergency packages come with conditions, often including privatisation and the sale of state assets, that draw the borrower back into the dollar system just as many Global South governments had been trying to reduce their dependence on it. The vulnerability of soft-currency economies to commodity shocks is well established. Perkins' contested step is to read it as the purpose of the policy, as part of a long American effort to defend the dollar's global position.

3. China's hidden soft spot

3.1 The ECB's map

On 2 July 2026, three European Central Bank economists published scenarios for a prolonged halt to Gulf energy exports. In the worst case, euro area production could fall by up to 3 per cent if firms could not replace lost supplies, but only by 0.4 to 0.6 per cent if they could substitute successfully. According to Perkins' reading of the paper, the direct production losses are largest in South Korea (up to 11 per cent), India (around 8), Japan (around 7) and ASEAN (up to 5), with the United States barely affected.

The finding Perkins stresses comes from the paper's dynamic analysis. China, he reports, ends up worse off than either the euro area or the United States: not because its direct energy dependence is the highest, but because of its central place in energy-intensive manufacturing chains. On his account of the figures, Chinese growth runs 0.8 percentage points below baseline in 2026 and 1.1 points in 2027, with inflation elevated through 2028. Some economists dispute the model. Perkins' reply is that this misses the point: right or wrong, the paper shows what one of Washington's own partners expects to happen.

3.2 What COVID taught

In a paper published in September 2025, before the war, Perkins examined how Chinese manufacturing handled the supply-chain crunch of 2022. Import prices into the sector spiked, but output prices did not. Producer price inflation surged while consumer price inflation stayed subdued, which meant the factories were absorbing the global inflation wave on everyone else's behalf.

The reasons are structural. Chinese export manufacturing is capital-intensive and energy-intensive, works through dense domestic supply chains where each stage adds energy costs, runs on thin margins, and competes on price in markets where it cannot easily raise them. Beijing responded quickly and effectively: deferred utility bills and taxes, direct subsidies, and very cheap bank loans. The rescue worked, but it was extremely expensive, and the government could afford it because it knew the problem was temporary.

3.3 Duration is the weapon

That is where duration becomes decisive. A short shock can be bridged. A shock with no end in sight turns the bridge into a permanent subsidy, which the state would have to fund while its resources were needed elsewhere.

Perkins finds his clearest signal in the words of US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. In an August interview, Bessent said that within two years the strait would become irrelevant, as 50 to 70 per cent of its energy traffic moved through new pipelines, leaving it just another body of water. On 1 September, at the G20 finance meeting in Asheville, he went further, calling it a future "worthless piece of water". If the aim were to restore the old order, Perkins argues, the language would be about reopening and normalising. Instead it is about permanence.

Energy analysts doubt the timeline: the pipelines are at varying stages, and liquefied gas cannot be piped around the strait at all. But that objection does not weaken Perkins' point; it strengthens it. Washington's own planning horizon now assumes a constrained strait for years. China is not defenceless. It controls the commanding heights of its economy, has invested heavily in renewables and spare capacity, and adapted fast: its crude imports in June 2026 were 41 per cent lower than a year earlier as it drew on stocks, burned more coal and bought more from Russia and Southeast Asia. The question is not whether China can survive the squeeze, but what it costs to do so year after year.

A short shock can be bridged. A shock with no end in sight turns the bridge into a permanent subsidy.

4. The second front: Ukraine, fertiliser and the Black Sea

From Odesa to Kharkiv, Russia is taking back Lenin's 1922 gift of Nouveau Rossiya to Ukraine. Now let us look at some of Ukraine's moves in the light of Perkin's thesis. 

The timeline is established fact. On 25 February 2026, Ukrainian drones struck the Dorogobuzh nitrogen fertiliser plant in Russia's Smolensk region, killing seven people. The plant, owned by Acron and producing about two million tonnes of nitrogen nutrients a year, was expected to stay idle until May. Three days later, the United States and Israel attacked Iran, stranding a large share of the world's seaborne fertiliser behind a closed strait just as the northern hemisphere's planting season began. Through 2026, Ukraine also ran a sustained campaign against Russian refineries and export terminals, and escalation in the Black Sea led to restrictions on shipping there, including grain.

Perkins reads these events as one picture: a coordinated destruction of energy and fertiliser supply across Eurasia, with Venezuela part of the same pattern, timed so that food and fuel shortages converge in the last quarter of 2026. That is a falsifiable prediction, and readers will be able to judge it within weeks. He also notes that Iran has denied responsibility for some strikes on Gulf facilities while readily claiming others.

The case for coordination rests on capability. Both speakers argue that Ukraine could not conduct deep strikes at this scale without Western satellites, intelligence and targeting support, which could be withdrawn at will. The interviewer cites a source working on NATO contracts who says the alliance facilitates such strikes, and points to published reporting on British and American involvement in Ukrainian operations. Western support for Ukraine's long-range campaign is widely reported. That the strikes were timed to serve a strategy aimed at China is an inference. There is also a simpler explanation for each strike taken alone: Ukraine has its own reasons to hit Russian export revenue and plants that make ammonium nitrate, a precursor for explosives. Coincidence cannot be ruled out; neither can design.

5. The Atlantic rift that isn't

Much is made of apparent splits between Washington and Europe over Ukraine and Russia. Perkins thinks they are largely cosmetic. To understand the relationship, he argues, look at its balance sheet: around $7 trillion of transatlantic direct investment, by far the largest bilateral relationship of its kind, binding the two economies together. Within that relationship the power runs one way. The euro depends on dollar markets for international funding, and in a crisis European institutions rely on dollar liquidity they cannot create themselves. The eurozone debt crisis of a decade and a half ago deepened that dependence.

Read this way, public quarrels serve a domestic purpose. Washington has long pressed its allies to carry more of their own defence. European governments must justify that spending to voters, and the message that America is walking away and Russia may be next does the job. Perkins points to the 2025 trade arrangement between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump, which included commitments to buy large quantities of American weaponry, much of it, he expects, to be built under licence in Eastern Europe with German finance.

The interviewer adds an argument from first principles. A threat needs both intent and capability, and he sees neither for a Russian attack on NATO beyond grey-zone actions that stay below the threshold of war. He expects European states to start arming against each other as well, since intentions change faster than capabilities.

6. The case against the theory

An argument this ambitious deserves its strongest objections, and there are several.

Foreseeable is not the same as intended. Governments often go to war accepting costs they know will follow. Treating a known risk as an accepted price is very different from treating it as the goal. Proving intent needs evidence of a decision, which Perkins concedes he lacks.

The pain is not neatly targeted. Among the hardest-hit economies are close US allies: Japan, South Korea and the eurozone, where the ECB raised rates in June for the first time in three years. American drivers paid more at the pump in an election year. And Washington has visibly pushed for reopening: President Trump demanded that NATO and China help, signed a memorandum in June meant to restore shipping, and launched naval operations to escort traffic.

The lever leaks. From early March, Iran allowed approved ships through, mostly tankers bound for China and India. China cut imports, drew down stocks, switched to coal and leaned on Russian supply. A weapon that the target can partly route around is a blunt one.

Simpler explanations exist. Israel's security goals, the nuclear question and a misplaced belief in a quick result may explain the war without any grand design. The interviewer himself thinks Washington underestimated how effectively cheap drones would push American forces out of the region.

Perkins has an answer to some of this. His theory does not require control of the strait, only the ability to raise or lower pressure on it. In his article he describes a zone between full closure, which would hurt everyone including the United States, and full reopening, which would remove the leverage. On this view, public demands to reopen are compatible with private comfort at the result. The fairest verdict is that the argument is strongest as a description of the incentives that now exist and weakest as a claim about what was in anyone's mind on 28 February.

The argument is strongest as a description of the incentives that now exist, and weakest as a claim about what was in anyone's mind on 28 February.

7. The tide beneath the waves

Perkins places the Iran war in a longer arc. In his account, American foreign policy this century has been driven by the defence of dollar hegemony through the containment of China, in three phases. The War on Terror sought military control of energy resources and bogged down in Iraq. From around 2011, the Arab Spring era relied on proxies and colour revolutions that proved impossible to control. From about 2014, the wars in Ukraine and Iran became the vehicles. This is interpretation rather than established history, and each phase has other well-known explanations.

Beneath it, he sees a slow economic tide that a 24-hour news cycle trains Western audiences to miss. Decades of financialisation have built a pyramid of financial claims that grows faster than the real economy beneath it. That "fictitious" wealth must periodically be converted into real things (pensions, mansions, private jets), and the strain of doing so drives the desperation behind wars abroad. He contrasts this with China's accumulation of real assets: railways, buildings, universities. He links the same pressure to rising domestic repression in the West, from immigration enforcement on American streets to arrests for social-media posts in Britain, and argues that fascism has historically been an economic emergency response, with ideology added afterwards as justification. These are the most contestable claims in the interview, and readers will weigh them differently.

The interviewer pushes the logic to an awkward conclusion. If this is a strategy of desperation, it may be self-defeating. Reputation, as Henry Kissinger stressed, is a strategic asset, and allies who watch their fuel bills climb while the rules-based order is mocked do not forget quickly. Pressure on Russia and China at once has pushed them together; in Perkins' phrase, they now stand back to back. China, he adds, has no expeditionary military and no wish to build one: its vision is multilateral, a world of equal sovereign states, rather than a contest of a few great powers. On this reading, the effort to prevent a multipolar world may be accelerating it.


Bottom Line

Perkins' most useful contribution is a change of question. Whether or not anyone in Washington planned a half-open strait, a half-open strait is what exists, and it distributes pain in a recognisable pattern: least to the issuer of the world's reserve currency, more to Europe, most to manufacturing Asia and to the countries that must buy their energy in someone else's money. His claim about original intent remains unproven, and the counterarguments are real. His claim about who benefits from the present arrangement is much harder to dismiss.

The wider implication cuts in two directions. For energy importers, it means planning for a long squeeze rather than waiting for normal service to resume. For Washington, it means that even a lever that works has a price: every month the strait stays half-shut, allies count the cost, rivals draw closer, and the trust that underpins the dollar's role wears a little thinner. When a so-called failure persists, and its costs fall consistently on one's rivals, at what point does the difference between accident and design stop mattering?

Deep Dive: the Petroyuan Trap in brief

The interview draws on a series Perkins calls the Petroyuan Trap hypothesis. In outline, it proposes three successive blows to China's economic sovereignty: an energy shock through Hormuz, a food shock through disrupted fertiliser and grain, and, he postulates, a speculative attack on the offshore yuan. Each is meant to reduce the state's capacity to absorb the next. He connects this to calls in 2026, including from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in June and in the Wall Street Journal, for a new Plaza Accord to force a revaluation of the renminbi, echoing the 1985 agreement that pushed up the Japanese yen. Perkins notes that China in 2026 is not Japan in 1985: it has nuclear weapons, a powerful military, deep industrial capacity and leverage over Western supply chains, which is why, on his account, pressure must be applied indirectly, at the edges of the Chinese system. This is a hypothesis about strategy, not an established account, and readers can follow its development in his series (see Further Reading).


Glossary

Strait of Hormuz – the narrow channel between Iran and Oman linking the Gulf to the open ocean; before the war it carried about a fifth of the world's seaborne oil.

Hard currency – a currency widely accepted in international trade and finance, such as the dollar, euro or pound, which lets its issuer pay for imports in its own money.

Conditionality – the policy conditions attached to emergency loans from the IMF, World Bank and similar lenders, such as spending cuts or privatisation.

Producer Price Index (PPI) – a measure of the prices businesses receive for their output; a rise in PPI without a matching rise in consumer prices means firms are absorbing costs.

Consumer Price Index (CPI) – the standard measure of the prices households pay for goods and services.

Financialisation – the growing weight of finance and financial claims in an economy relative to the production of goods and services.

Fictitious capital – Perkins' term, after Marx, for financial wealth that represents claims on future production rather than real assets.

Multilateral and multipolar – a multipolar world has several great-power centres; a multilateral one, as Perkins describes China's aim, treats all sovereign states as equals.

War-risk insurance – marine cover for ships entering conflict zones; when insurers withdraw it, a route becomes commercially unusable even without a physical blockade.

Grey-zone action – hostile activity, such as sabotage or cyber attacks, kept deliberately below the threshold that would count as an act of war.

Plaza Accord – the 1985 agreement among major economies to push down the dollar, which forced a sharp rise in the Japanese yen.

References

  1. Ryan Perkins, The Strait Isn't Supposed to Reopen, Ryan Perkins Geopolitics, 9 October 2026.
  2. European Central Bank, blog on Gulf supply-shock scenarios by Pablo Aguilar, Lukas Boeckelmann and Antoine Kornprobst, 2 July 2026.
  3. Cyprus Mail, Gulf supply shocks could hit euro area growth, warns ECB, 3 July 2026.
  4. Intereconomics, A critical inputs playbook: what the Strait of Hormuz tells Europe, 2026.
  5. MUFG Americas, Strait of Hormuz closure would be different, 19 February 2026.
  6. Hellenic Shipping News, China accounting for 19% of global crude oil trade, 2026.
  7. South China Morning Post, China's crude purchases plunge in June, July 2026.
  8. Bank of Finland BOFIT, Weekly Review 18/2026.
  9. NPR, Can oil pipelines replace the Strait of Hormuz?, August 2026.
  10. Korea Times, Bessent says Strait of Hormuz would be 'worthless piece of water', 2 September 2026.
  11. The Moscow Times, Ukrainian drone attack on Smolensk region fertilizer plant kills 7, 25 February 2026.
  12. Bloomberg, Russian fertilizer plant hit by drones to stay shut until May, 17 March 2026.
  13. Kyiv Post, Ukrainian drone strike on Russian chemical plant in Smolensk, 25 February 2026.
  14. Wikipedia, 2026 Strait of Hormuz campaign and 2026 Iran war ceasefire.

Further Reading