17 July 2026
What Prof Pape might have got wrong is to assume that if America withdraws from the Gulf region, Iran will fill the vacuum and become a fourth global power.
Well no, there is a missing first step here - to become a global hegemon, a country must first be a regional hegemon.
Contents cover the following:
• Professor Robert Pape's argument that Iran could emerge as a fourth global power.
• Why regional hegemony is the essential missing step.
• The obstacles Iran would still face.
• Why long-term survival is likely to be Tehran's first priority.
• The possible roles of nuclear deterrence, Russia, China and Türkiye.
• Why the next five years are unlikely to produce an Iranian global power.
1. The Missing Step in Pape's Argument
Professor Robert Pape has suggested here that, should the United States substantially reduce or possibly abandon its military presence in the Gulf, Iran could emerge as the world's fourth global power. It is a provocative idea, but one that leaves an important question unanswered.
Before any state can become a global power, it must first become the accepted regional hegemon.
Military strength alone is not enough. History suggests that regional dominance requires neighbouring states to adjust their policies because they conclude that resistance is either impossible, prohibitively expensive or no longer in their interests. Military superiority transforms into political authority through recognition.
At present there is some though not a lot of convincing evidence that this process has begun.
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies, Jordan and Israel have certainly adjusted aspects of their policies towards Iran, but none has accepted Iran as the region's "security manager". Most continue to balance Iranian influence through diplomacy, military spending or external alliances.
Glossary
Regional hegemon – the dominant state within a geographical region whose influence is recognised, even reluctantly, by its neighbours.
Balance (or balancing) – a strategy whereby states seek to prevent one country from becoming dominant by strengthening their own military capabilities, forming alliances, or deepening diplomatic and economic ties with other powers. The objective is not necessarily to defeat the stronger state, but to deter it and preserve a balance of power.
Example: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states seek to balance Iranian influence by maintaining close security relationships with the United States while also expanding their own defence capabilities.
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2. Survival Comes Before Ambition
There is another assumption that deserves examination.
Much Western analysis begins by asking what Iran wants to achieve. A more realistic question may be what risks Iran might face and whether it is possible to mitigate them.
Since 1979, Iran has endured one devastating conventional war (Iraq 1980-88), decades of sanctions, repeated covert operations, the murder of its spiritual leader and his family and much of the cabinet, assassinations of senior military officers and nuclear scientists, cyber attacks, proxy conflicts across the Middle East, and direct military confrontation with Israel and the United States, the world's foremost military power. From Tehran's perspective, this history helps explain why long-term survival and deterrence are a first priority although once achieved regional political authority - not territorial expansion - would be the next priority. And given this history it is pretty certain that Iran would choose revenge at the risk of matrydom or extinction, rather than submission to America.
Whether one agrees with that perception is almost beside the point. States formulate strategy according to their founding myths and how they interpret threats, not how others interpret them.
If Iranian leaders conclude that future attacks are inevitable unless they fundamentally alter the regional balance of power, then ensuring that such attacks become prohibitively costly becomes the logical objective.
In that sense, survival is not merely remaining in office. It is creating a security environment in which regime change by external powers becomes effectively impossible.
Glossary
Deterrence – persuading an opponent not to attack because the expected costs outweigh any possible gains.
Proxy war – a conflict in which rival powers support opposing local forces rather than fighting each other directly.
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3. The Search for Long-Term Security
If survival is indeed Tehran's principal objective, several strategic consequences follow.
Iran is likely to continue investing heavily in missiles, drones, air defences and dispersed military command and infrastructure.
It may also continue strengthening strategic relationships with both Russia and China. Neither country is necessarily seeking Iranian regional dominance, but both have reasons to oppose further expansion of American influence across Eurasia.
Many analysts also believe that Iran will now now, under new leadership, be developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons quickly if it judges its security environment to demand it. Whether Tehran ultimately chooses to cross that threshold remains uncertain and contested, but the debate itself reflects the central importance of deterrence.
None of these developments automatically makes Iran a regional hegemon. They simply make it increasingly difficult to coerce.
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4. The Obstacles to Regional Hegemony
Even assuming a gradual reduction of American influence, Iran would still face formidable obstacles.
Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources and continues modernising its armed forces.
Türkiye combines a large industrial economy, NATO-standard military capabilities and growing regional ambitions. In many respects, Türkiye may represent the most significant long-term competitor for influence across West Asia (and this would be why Israel now views Türkiye and more of a threat than Iran).
Israel is still a militarily powerful and technologically advanced threat to the region.
Nor is it obvious that the Gulf monarchies would simply exchange American protection for Iranian leadership. More likely, they would attempt to balance among several external powers while preserving their own autonomy.
Regional hegemony cannot simply be declared... it has to be accepted.
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5. Could America Reopen the Strait of Hormuz?
The Strait of Hormuz remains central to every discussion of Gulf security.
Iran has successfully disrupted maritime traffic, and reopening the waterway would almost certainly prove far more difficult than many public discussions imply.
It is conceivable that the United States could eventually reopen the Strait, through an extended military campaign. However, the scale, duration and costs of such an operation are highly uncertain. Military, political and logistical factors do not give confidence.
Equally important are the economic consequences of this prolonged disruption. Even a temporary interruption of Gulf energy exports places severe strain on global markets, and global reserves are expected to run out in August ie well before any military campaign could achieve its objectives.
These uncertainties help explain why deterrence and signalling remain so important in Gulf strategy.
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6. The Long Road to Becoming a Global Power
Iran's strategies to successfully secure its long-term survival and future include deterrence, preventing hostile encirclement, maintaining influence in neighbouring conflicts, reducing or expelling US and Israeli military presence.
But becoming a global power would require several further steps.
First, Iran would have to become the recognised regional hegemon.
Second, it would need to transform military influence into durable economic leadership.
Third, neighbouring states would need increasingly to consult Tehran on regional security.
Fourth, major global powers would have to treat Iran as an indispensable participant in resolving international crises.
Today, those conditions have not been fulfilled.
Iran is undoubtedly an important regional actor. It has demonstrated resilience under extraordinary pressure and has significantly expanded its military capabilities. But, given that
- like all political leaders Trump cannot withdraw as this would be seen by his MAGA base as surrender and cost him the midterms, his credibility, and his legacy;
- while Iran by its national character as much as by the assassinations and betrayals it has suffered at the hands of the West seeks martyrdom or extinction and probably revenge rather than submission to America;
we are likely to see some form of intermittent or forever war though on a far greater scale leading to military exhaustion; and not a neat reopening of hormuz with the oil price falling gently back to the $70s.
So Iran will not be the one to fold, yet resilience should not be confused with hegemony, nor hegemony with global power.
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7. Conclusion
Professor Pape's scenario remains intellectually stimulating because it forces readers to think beyond the immediate conflict and ask what a post-American Gulf might look like.
However, the pathway from survival to regional hegemony, and from regional hegemony to becoming a fourth global power, wood need a bit more thinking through as to how it might come about.
Iran has no avowed ambition to build an empire, rather, it is seeking to ensure that no foreign power can again threaten its existence without facing unacceptable costs.
If that is indeed the primary objective, then military deterrence, strategic partnerships and political resilience is the path it is likely on.
Whether these developments eventually produce a new regional order remains uncertain.
Over the next five years, however, Iran appears more likely to consolidate its security than to emerge as the world's fourth global power.
References
• Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win and subsequent lectures on coercion and American grand strategy.
• Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers.
• John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
• Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
Related articles:
• THE ESCALATION TRAP
• America's Enduring Goal and Grand Strategy for War
• BOMBING TO WIN: PAPE ON IRAN
• BOMBING TO WIN: PAPE ON RUSSIA
ADDENDUM -- Iran's principal military conflicts:
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
An eight-year conventional war initiated by Iraq's invasion.
Approximately 500,000–1,000,000 total military and civilian casualties on both sides (estimates vary).
Lebanon conflict (1982–present, indirect)
Iran has supported Hezbollah against Israel through funding, training and weapons.
This has involved repeated conflicts, notably in 2006 and subsequent exchanges.
Syrian Civil War (from 2011)
Iran intervened in support of the Syrian government.
It deployed advisers, organised allied militias and provided extensive military assistance.
War against ISIS in Iraq (2014–2017)
Iran supported the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias against ISIS.
It played a significant role alongside the US-led coalition, although independently.
Yemen conflict (from around 2015, indirect)
Iran has backed the Houthis politically and militarily, while Saudi Arabia led a coalition supporting the internationally recognised government.
Direct conflict with Israel and the United States (2024–present)
Following years of covert operations and proxy warfare, the confrontation has increasingly involved direct missile and drone exchanges, Israeli strikes inside Iran, and US military involvement.
Before publishing, I'd make one factual refinement. The draft currently presents several future possibilities (for example, Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, the future of Israel, or the duration of any Hormuz disruption) as hypotheses rather than established outcomes. Keeping those clearly framed as scenarios rather than predictions will strengthen the article's analytical credibility with readers.
