Travel the globe

Showing posts with label #Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #Russia. Show all posts

Saturday, 17 October 2026

THE SUWALKI GAP KALININGRAD - IS EUROPE FIGHTING THE WRONG WAR?

, , , , , No comments

If the North European Plain has been Europe's invasion highway for four hundred years, why are both sides still digging trenches across it, when the contest that will shape this century is being decided thousands of miles to the east?



Fast Track

The Suwałki Gap, a 65 km stretch of the Polish–Lithuanian border, is NATO's only land link to the Baltic states and Russia's only possible land route to Kaliningrad. Each side sees it as the other's opportunity, and both are fortifying it. That fear is rooted in geography: the North European Plain has carried Western armies deep into Russia for four centuries, and Russia has always answered with depth. But the great-power rivalry that now matters most is between the United States and China, which raises a somewhat contrarian question: is Europe guarding yesterday's front line?


Introduction

When we first started talking about this war with Russia, two names kept coming up: Kaliningrad and the Suwałki Gap. Three and a half years on, they are still there, still on every military planner's map, and still among surely the tensest few dozen miles in Europe, at least from a military point of view.

At first sight the story is straightforward. A small Russian exclave sits inside NATO territory, and a narrow corridor separates it from Russia's ally Belarus. Whoever controls that corridor holds a key to the Baltic.


Look closer and the corridor turns out to be a symptom rather than a cause. It sits on a vast plain across which Western armies have marched on Russia again and again, and Russian strategy has been built around that experience ever since. This article follows that thread from a strip of Polish farmland to the question of whether Europe's security problem is still really in Europe at all.

Why It Matters

If deterrence fails anywhere between NATO and Russia, the Suwałki Gap is one of the most likely places. Around six million people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia depend on that corridor for any land reinforcement in a crisis, while nearly a million Russians in Kaliningrad depend on Russia's ability to supply them. Beyond the region, the gap sits at the centre of a larger choice Europe now faces: how much of its money, attention and military power to commit to a standoff with Russia while the global balance of power shifts towards Asia.

1. A 65-kilometre problem

Kaliningrad is a small piece of Russia on the Baltic coast, wedged between Poland and Lithuania, with no land border with the rest of the Russia. Until 1945 it was Königsberg, capital of German East Prussia. The Red Army captured the city in April 1945, and that summer at the Potsdam Conference the Allies, Britain and the United States included, agreed in principle to transfer it to the Soviet Union. Reunified Germany formally gave up any claim in the 1990 treaty that settled its borders. The West did not merely tolerate a Russian Kaliningrad; it signed it over. Today it is Russia's westernmost territory, one of the most heavily armed places in Europe, encirled by NATO and plum in the middle of NATO's eastern flank. It is at the same time the main base of Russia's Baltic Fleet at Baltiysk.

The Suwałki Gap is the stretch of the Polish-Lithuanian border that runs between Kaliningrad in the west and Belarus in the east. It is roughly 65 km (40 miles) wide at its narrowest, and it is NATO's only land route into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

It is very important to understand the stakes here. Russia does not need the gap to reach Kaliningrad: it gets there by sea, by air, and by rail across Lithuania under an EU transit arrangement in place since 2003 (restricted for sanctioned goods since 2022). The gap would give Russia overland access to its only open-water Baltic port, although not access to the Baltic as such which it already has. Should Russia consider it necessary to seize the corridor, this would create a continuous Russian land bridge from Belarus to Kaliningrad, and cut the three Baltic states off from the rest of NATO by land.


2. Two fears, one corridor

NATO presents the gap as its weak point, a door Russia might one day kick open. From Moscow the picture is reversed. Kaliningrad is an outpost entirely surrounded by an alliance whose eastern edge has moved from the middle of Germany in 1990 to about 140 km from St Petersburg today, and which since 2023 has added Finland's 1,340 km border with Russia. Russia did not move towards NATO; NATO progressively advanced on Russia.

Furthermore, that Russian fear is not imaginary. In July 2025 General Christopher Donahue, commander of US Army forces in Europe and Africa, said NATO could now take Kaliningrad "from the ground" faster than ever before. He framed it as deterrence rather than a plan. Moscow heard a threat, and Russian officials have since accused the alliance of rehearsing a blockade of the exclave, promising to use the full range of its weapons if the exclave is threatened.

Both sides are now digging in. Poland's East Shield programme is building anti-tank ditches and obstacles along its borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad, with German army engineers helping in 2026. Lithuania is fortifying a second road route through the gap, due by 2028. Polish, Lithuanian, French, American and Portuguese troops have exercised there repeatedly this year. On the other side, Russia put its nuclear-capable Oreshnik intermediate-range missiles on combat duty in Belarus in December 2025, and Belarus held drills near the Polish and Lithuanian borders in September.

There is still no public evidence that either side is preparing to move. But one asymmetry is worth noticing: over the past thirty years it is NATO's frontier, not Russia's, that has advanced hundreds of miles towards the other side.

Each side reads the other's defences as preparation for attack, which is exactly how the plain has always worked.

3. The great flat highway

Why does a strip of farmland matter so much? Because it sits on the North European Plain, the lowland that runs from northern France and the Low Countries through Germany and Poland, then widens into the vast East European Plain all the way to the Ural Mountains. There are few mountain ranges to stop an army; the main obstacles are rivers, marshes, forests and sheer distance.

It is a natural strategic highway, and it has carried invaders east many times. Polish and Lithuanian forces occupied Moscow in 1610. Sweden's Charles XII marched in in 1708. Napoleon came in 1812, Germany fought deep into the Russian Empire in 1915–18, Western powers sent troops into the Russian Civil War in 1918–20, and Germany invaded again in 1941. Napoleon and Hitler are simply the two everyone remembers.

But highways run in both directions. Russian armies crossed the same plain to Paris in 1814 and to Berlin in 1945, and Russia's own expansion westward has repeatedly come across this open ground. The plain does not favour one side; it favours whoever moves first and furthest.

4. Depth: Russia's oldest defence

Russia's long-standing answer to an open frontier is strategic depth: put as much territory as possible between an invader and Moscow and St Petersburg, ideally in friendly neutral buffer states. Today that means Belarus and Ukraine.

Depth works by turning distance into a weapon. In 1812 the Russian army fell back, traded space for time, and let distance, winter and stretched supply lines destroy the Grande Armée. In 1941–42 the Red Army lost enormous ground before it held at Moscow and Stalingrad and turned the tide. It was not always a deliberate plan, and the human cost was immense, but the geography rewarded the defender who could keep falling back and still survive.

From Moscow, NATO's expansion to the Baltic and Polish borders, and the war over Ukraine, look like the buffer being stripped away by the same West whose armies crossed the plain in 1812 and 1941. Poland, the Baltic states and Ukraine reply that they are sovereign countries, not buffers, entitled to choose their alliances, and they point to 2014 and 2022 as their reason. The history in this article explains why Moscow hears that argument as a description of encirclement, a policy of containment.

5. Does the pattern hold?

The game has been played so many times that it is obvious what is going on... and yet the West keeps choosing to play it. The historical pattern runs like this: Western Europe invades Russia, and Russia pushes back into Eastern Europe.

The two biggest cases fit it closely. Napoleon's invasion of 1812 ended with Russian troops in Paris. Hitler's invasion of 1941 ended with the Red Army in Berlin and Soviet control of Eastern Europe for more than four decades. Seen through those two wars, much of Russia's behaviour looks defensive: it pushes its frontier west to make sure the next invasion starts further away.

The awkward episodes, and Moscow's own explanation

Critics of this reading point to episodes that do not fit: Russia's part in partitioning Poland in 1772–95, its attack on East Prussia in 1914, the Soviet invasions of eastern Poland, Finland and the Baltic states in 1939–40 while allied by treaty with Nazi Germany, the crushing of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Those episodes are real, and Russia's neighbours remember them. But they do not overturn the larger pattern. In modern times every invasion that threatened Russia's survival, in 1610, 1708, 1812 and 1941, came from the west. Russia's westward pushes, however harsh, have largely followed one logic: move the frontier further away before the next invasion comes.

Episode Moscow's reason
Partitions of Poland, 1772–95Protecting Orthodox subjects, and ending the instability of a collapsing state that Prussia and Austria would otherwise have carved up alone.
East Prussia, 1914Germany had already declared war on Russia (1 August). Russia attacked early to draw German troops away from Paris, as its alliance with France required.
Eastern Poland, 1939Protecting Ukrainians and Belarusians once the Polish state had collapsed, and recovering land lost in 1921.
Finland, 1939–40The border lay just 32 km from Leningrad, and Finland refused to trade territory to move it back.
Baltic states, 1940Forward bases against the German attack Moscow expected, which came in 1941.
Hungary, 1956Hungary announced it was leaving the Warsaw Pact; Moscow called it a Western-backed counter-revolution.
Czechoslovakia, 1968Fear that reform would pull the country out of the Soviet bloc and towards West Germany, opening a hole in the buffer.
Ukraine, 2014A Western-backed coup against an elected president, and the need to keep its Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol out of NATO's reach.
Ukraine, 2022Ukraine's path to NATO membership, promised in principle in 2008, and protection of Russian speakers in the Donbas.

This is the core insight. On an open plain, the country that has been invaded most often will treat every advance towards it as the opening move of the next invasion, and the West has supplied that fear with four centuries of evidence. That is what makes the cycle so wearily predictable, and so hard to break.

On an open plain, one side's security is the other side's threat, and both can cite centuries of evidence.

6. Has Mackinder's pivot moved east?

In 1904 the British geographer Halford Mackinder argued that the "Heartland" of Eurasia, roughly Russia and Central Asia, was the pivot of world power. In 1919 he summed it up: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the world." Eastern Europe, and the plain this article has crossed, was the gateway.

A century on, the centre of gravity has plainly shifted. Economically and militarily, the main challenger to the United States is China, not Russia, and successive US administrations have identified China as their principal long-term competitor. In the 1940s the American strategist Nicholas Spykman argued that Eurasia's coastal "Rimland" mattered more than Mackinder's Heartland; today the most contested stretch of that Rimland runs through East Asia, from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea.

In that light, a Europe that once had thriving economies on cheap Russian energy, now pours its energy into a permanent standoff on the Polish border - this looks like a Europe or EU that is fighting the last century's war.... why would it want to commit suicide in this way?

7. A Eurasian bloc: the case and the obstacles

So would it make more sense for Europe and Russia to settle their differences and form a Eurasian bloc, still within the American-led order, that could balance China? The idea has a long pedigree, from Charles de Gaulle's vision of a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" to Vladimir Putin's own 2010 proposal for a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Its supporters argue that Europe and Russia share a continent, complementary economies and a long-term interest in not being dominated by China.

The obstacles are serious, and the case for the idea is stronger for facing them squarely:

  • Trust: Russia's 2022 forced invasion of Ukraine destroyed confidence across most of Europe's leadership, despite the warnings and advice, and more so in the countries nearest to it.
  • Direction of travel: Moscow has spent the years since moving closer to Beijing, not away from it. China is now Russia's largest trading partner, and the two declared a "no limits" partnership weeks before February 24th 2022.
  • Russia's own aims: Moscow does not want to be a junior partner inside an American-led system; its stated goal is a multipolar world and this is increasingly the world we live in.
  • The neighbours: Poland and the Baltic states would doubtless see any grand bargain struck over their heads as a repeat of 1939 and 1945.

None of this makes a European–Russian détente impossible in the long run. It does mean it would need a new leadership in Ukraine, and an understanding of Kremlin's point of view, requiring professional diplomacy, before it could get off the ground.

Bottom Line

The Suwałki Gap is dangerous not because Russia is bent on conquest, but because the West keeps pressing forward on the very plain its armies have used to invade Russia for four centuries. NATO enlargement, fortifications and armaments on Russia's doorstep and public talk of taking Kaliningrad are all understood in Moscow as the next chapter of that story. Russia's response, from Belarus to the Oreshnik, follows the oldest rule of its strategy: meet pressure with depth. Seen this way, the standoff is less a Russian threat than habitual Western aggression.

The larger question is whether Europe can afford to keep playing this game while the decisive rivalry of the century unfolds elsewhere and more immediately the imminent of its economies. A Europe-Russia bloc against China is not on the table while the war in Ukraine continues, it is true. But history suggests that alliances which look unthinkable in one generation can look obvious in the next. The question worth asking is not whether Europe and Russia will ever stop guarding this corridor, but what would have to change, in Europe and in Moscow, for them to decide they no longer need to.

Deep Dive: four centuries of crossings

The plain has carried armies both ways. Arrows show the direction of the main advance.

Years Who moved Direction Outcome
2022–Russia into UkraineWest →War ongoing
1956, 1968USSR into Hungary, CzechoslovakiaWest →Uprisings crushed
1941–45Germany into USSR; then Red Army to Berlin→ East, then West →Soviet control of Eastern Europe
1939–40USSR into Poland, Finland, Baltic statesWest →Territory annexed
1918–20Western Allied intervention; Polish–Soviet war→ East, both waysSoviets survive; Poland holds Warsaw
1914–18Russia into East Prussia; Germany deep into Russian EmpireBoth waysRussian Empire collapses
1812–14Napoleon to Moscow; Russia to Paris→ East, then West →Napoleon defeated
1772–95Russia (with Prussia, Austria) partitions PolandWest →Poland disappears
1708–09Sweden into Russia→ EastSweden defeated at Poltava
1610–12Poland-Lithuania occupies Moscow→ EastExpelled; Romanovs take power

Related Articles

Glossary

Exclave – a part of a country that is separated from the rest of it by foreign territory, as Kaliningrad is from Russia.

Suwałki Gap – the roughly 65 km stretch of the Polish–Lithuanian border between Kaliningrad and Belarus; NATO's only land link to the Baltic states.

North European Plain – the broad lowland running from northern France and the Low Countries through Germany and Poland into the East European Plain.

Strategic depth – the distance between a country's front line and its vital centres; the more of it a defender has, the more ground it can give up without being defeated.

Buffer state – a country lying between two rival powers that one or both would like to keep neutral or friendly, so that any attack must cross it first.

Heartland theory – Halford Mackinder's 1904 idea that control of inner Eurasia, centred on Russia, is the key to world power.

Rimland – Nicholas Spykman's term for the coastal belt around Eurasia, from Western Europe through the Middle East to East Asia, which he saw as more important than the Heartland.

Deterrence – preventing an attack by convincing a potential aggressor that the cost would outweigh any gain.

References

Reading

  • Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography (2015) – an accessible tour of how terrain shapes strategy, with a strong chapter on Russia.
  • Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon (2009) – how Russia actually defeated the 1812 invasion, and why it was more than winter.
  • Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (1944) – the original Rimland argument.
  • Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (2012) – Mackinder and Spykman applied to the modern world.
Read More

Wednesday, 16 April 2025

THE STEPPE: HIGHWAY FOR THE RUSSIAN BOGEYMAN

No comments

The Steppe Highway: The Deep Roots of Russophobia

For millennia, the great expanse of the Pontic-Caspian steppe has served as the launchpad for mass human migrations and military invasions into Europe. This flat, open corridor stretching from Central Asia to Eastern Europe offered an unobstructed route westwards — a natural highway used repeatedly by nomadic and imperial forces alike.

From the Scythians and Sarmatians, to the Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, Pechenegs, Cumans, Mongols, and Tatars — wave after wave swept across this grassland. Each group left its own imprint on the cultural, genetic, and political makeup of Europe. But these incursions also shaped a collective memory: one of threat and trauma from the East, which over centuries hardened into a cultural anxiety — what we might now call Russophobia.

It is a mystery why so many educated alert peoples should have a deep fear of Russia in today's world. Here, we try to explain this in terms of the collective unconscious, built over centuries of cultural memory, myth, and trauma.


 

The Drivers of East-to-West Migrations

  • Ecological pressure: Harsh winters, droughts, or overgrazing pushed nomadic peoples west in search of new pasture and resources.
  • Political fragmentation: The collapse of centralised powers in Asia or the Middle East often set off chain migrations.
  • Imperial ambition: Empires such as the Huns or Mongols were expansionist, seeking to incorporate wealthier, settled lands into their dominion.

The Impact on Europe

The invasions brought violence, cultural mixing, and political upheaval. Rome reeled from the Huns; the Magyars reshaped the Carpathian Basin; the Mongols devastated much of Eastern Europe in the 13th century. Cities fell, populations fled, and feudal societies adapted in response to these existential threats.

Though centuries have passed, the memory of these incursions remains embedded in the European psyche, especially in Eastern Europe, where the scars are deepest. Today, this historical memory colours how many in the West perceive Russia: a vast land stretching eastward into the steppe, capable of launching power from the same corridor as those ancient invaders.

Russophobia, then, is not just a Cold War construct. It draws on something older and more primal — the fear of that great open plain, and what might come galloping out of it.

A History of Steppe-Borne Migrations and Invasions

From prehistory to early modernity, many waves of nomadic peoples have crossed this steppe:

  • Cimmerians (c. 1000 BCE)

  • Scythians (c. 700 BCE)

  • Sarmatians (c. 300 BCE)

  • Huns (4th century CE)

  • Avars (6th century)

  • Magyars (9th century)

  • Pechenegs (10th century)

  • Cumans/Kipchaks (11th-13th centuries)

  • Mongols (Golden Horde) (13th century)

These movements shaped the ethno-political landscape of Europe, often arriving suddenly, spreading fear, and transforming borders. Many of these peoples were either pushed westward by climate change, overpopulation, internal conflicts, or new invading forces from further east (like the Mongols displacing the Kipchaks).

Why Did They Move?

Three main drivers of steppe migration stand out:

  1. Ecological pressure: Droughts or overgrazing pushed populations west in search of fertile pastures.

  2. Military displacement: Defeat or pressure from rising powers (e.g., the Mongols) pushed earlier nomads further west.

  3. Opportunity and wealth: The wealth of settled civilisations in Europe presented tempting opportunities for raiders and migrants alike.

Consequences for Europe

These steppe invasions had profound impacts:

  • Collapse of empires: e.g., Rome weakened under pressure from Hunnic movements.

  • Formation of new states: e.g., the Magyar migration led to the formation of Hungary.

  • Cultural exchange and warfare: Ideas, technologies (like stirrups and compound bows), and genetic lineages spread westward.

But they also left deep scars in European memory. For centuries, "threat from the East" became a powerful cultural narrative. This long memory helps explain the roots of modern Russophobia: Russia, geographically positioned in the steppe's path and having inherited the legacy of Mongol rule and power projection, became—fairly or unfairly—the stand-in for these ancient threats.

Understanding this geography and history is essential to appreciating the psychology of fear and mistrust that persists in parts of Europe today. For American Russophobia, see here.


 

 

Steppe Migrations and Their Impact on Europe

Steppe Migrations and Their Impact on Europe

1. Why Did They Migrate?

1.1 Environmental Stress & Resource Scarcity

  • Droughts, overgrazing, or climatic shifts made steppe life unsustainable.
  • Tribes moved west seeking better pastures and stability.

1.2 Population Pressure

  • Expanding populations demanded more grazing land.

1.3 Internal Power Struggles

  • Collapse of khanates and tribal confederacies triggered factional migrations.

1.4 Pressure from Other Nomadic Groups

  • The domino effect: one tribe displacing another further west.

1.5 Strategic Expansion & Plunder

  • Some migrations were militarised invasions (e.g., Huns, Mongols).

2. Consequences for Europe

2.1 Demographic Shocks

  • Population displacement and ethnic transformation.
  • Groups like the Magyars settled permanently.

2.2 Cultural Exchange

  • Introduction of cavalry warfare, stirrups, and new foods and words.

2.3 Military Disruption

  • Empires like Rome weakened under pressure.
  • Eastern Europe became a turbulent frontier.

2.4 Political Fragmentation

  • Collapse of kingdoms, rise of fragmented tribal zones.

2.5 Lasting Fear of the East

  • Generational trauma evolved into lasting Russophobia.

3. How Far Did They Get?

  • Huns: Reached France (Battle of the Catalaunian Plains, 451 CE).
  • Alans & Vandals: Settled in Spain and North Africa.
  • Magyars: Raided Germany and Italy before settling in Hungary.
  • Mongols: Reached Austria and Poland (1241–42).
  • Steppe-descended peoples: Bulgars, Tatars, and Magyars shaped modern Eastern Europe.
Read More

Wednesday, 19 March 2025

EUROPE'S MANY ATTEMPTS TO DISMEMBER AND PLUNDER RUSSIA

No comments
19 March 2025

Europe’s Many Attempts to Subjugate Russia

For centuries, European powers have repeatedly launched invasions and attacks against Russia, often under the leadership of a dominant Western power. These assaults have ranged from outright military invasions to economic and political subjugation. Was the motive a fear of Russia, or was it a greed for Russia's resources?

Napoleon’s Grand Failure (1812)
In June 1812, Napoleon assembled the largest invasion force the world had ever seen—600,000 troops—on a mission to conquer Russia. But this was not just a French attack. It was a European campaign, bringing together soldiers from France, Poland, Spain, Italy, Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, the Netherlands, Croatia, and Hungary. Six months later, this grand coalition was shattered by Russian resilience, the vastness of the land, and the brutal winter.

Hitler’s Barbarossa Disaster (1941)

Obsessed with Napoleon’s failure, Hitler sought to avoid his mistakes. In June 1941, he launched Operation Barbarossa, the largest military invasion in history: 3.8 million troops, 3,600 tanks, 2,700 aircraft, and tens of thousands of artillery pieces. Again, this was not just a German attack—it was a European assault. Troops from Germany, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium all took part. They too failed, facing the same fate as Napoleon, as Russia’s vastness and resilience broke their campaign.

A Long History of Western Attacks on Russia

Russia has endured major invasions and interventions from the West since the 17th century:

1. Polish-Lithuanian Invasion (1598-1613)

During Russia’s "Time of Troubles," Poland sought to place a Polish king on the Russian throne. Polish forces occupied Moscow from 1610 to 1612 before being expelled by Russian militias.

2. Swedish Invasion (1708-1709)

Charles XII of Sweden invaded Russia but was crushed at the Battle of Poltava in 1709.

3. French Invasion (1812)

Napoleon’s doomed march to Moscow.

4. Crimean War (1853-1856)

A British-led coalition, including France, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire, sought to weaken Russia.

5. World War I (1914-1918)

Germany and Austria-Hungary launched a massive Eastern Front offensive, with other European nations contributing troops.

6. Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921)

Poland attempted to carve out territory and create a buffer zone at Russia’s expense.

7. Western Intervention in Russian Civil War (1918-1922)

Britain, the U.S., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Japan sent troops into Russia. The official narrative claims they supported the anti-Communist Whites, but in reality, their intervention helped stabilise Bolshevik rule. Western powers ensured that the Whites remained weak, allowing Lenin and Trotsky to consolidate power.

8. World War II (1941-1945)

Hitler’s doomed Operation Barbarossa.

The Economic War on Russia

9. The 1990s – A Silent Invasion

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was not invaded militarily but economically. Western financial interests, acting through their proxies—the oligarchs—seized control of the country. Under Western-backed economic "shock therapy", Russia’s GDP collapsed by 50%, a far worse decline than during World War II. By the late 1990s:

Over 50% of Russians lived in poverty, with 25% in desperate conditions.

Death rates increased by 60%, with an estimated 5-6 million surplus deaths - equivalent to losing 3.4%-4% of the population.

Western banks and institutions effectively controlled Russia’s wealth until Putin began reversing this in the 2000s.

10. Ukraine War (2014-Present): The Latest Western Proxy War

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is not a local civil war but a NATO-backed proxy war against Russia. The West has armed, financed and trained Ukrainian forces, and applied almost 30,000 "sanctions" using them as a tool to weaken Russia. The various tactics for extending Russia are described in a document commissioned by the Pentagon in 2019 that can be found on the internet titled RAND_RR3063.pdf.

The EU is currently attempting to raise €800 billion from its members to rearm and is planning to send an expeditionary force that they call peacekeepers to Russia.

Conclusion

From military invasions to economic warfare, Europe’s history with Russia has been one of hostility, betrayal, and failed conquests. Russia has survived them all.


Read More

Sunday, 16 June 2024

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA

No comments
16 June 2024

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA



1. The Origin of the Slavic People and the Eastern Slavs

- Early Slavs: The Slavic people emerged in Eastern Europe around the 5th century AD. They were originally divided into three main groups: Western Slavs, Southern Slavs, and Eastern Slavs.
- Eastern Slavs: The Eastern Slavs settled in areas that are now part of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. They established early tribal confederations and laid the foundations for future states.

2. The Vikings and the Kievan Rus


- Viking Descent: In the 9th century, Viking traders and warriors, known as Varangians, began to travel along the river routes of Eastern Europe. They traded, raided, and eventually settled in the region.
- Formation of Kievan Rus: Around 882, the Varangian leader Oleg seized control of Kiev, establishing the state of Kievan Rus. This state united various Slavic tribes under a central authority.
- Expansion: Kievan Rus expanded its influence from the Baltic Sea in the north, through Kiev, to the Black Sea in the south. It also maintained significant trade relations with Constantinople (Byzantium) and the Middle East.
- Golden Age: The 10th and 11th centuries marked the peak of Kievan Rus's power, with the adoption of Christianity in 988 under Prince Vladimir the Great, aligning the state culturally and politically with Byzantium.

3. Genghis Khan, the Mongols, and the Golden Horde
- Genghis Khan: In the early 13th century, Genghis Khan united the Mongol tribes and embarked on a series of conquests that created one of the largest empires in history, stretching from China to Europe.
- Mongol Invasion of Rus: In the 1230s, the Mongols, led by Batu Khan (Genghis Khan’s grandson), invaded Kievan Rus. By 1240, they had destroyed Kiev and subjugated the region.
- The Golden Horde: The western part of the Mongol Empire, known as the Golden Horde, ruled over the Russian principalities. The Golden Horde collected tribute from the Russian lands and exerted political control, influencing the development of Russian states.
- Moscow’s Rise: During the Mongol period, Moscow grew in power and influence. By the late 14th and early 15th centuries, Moscow began to assert its independence, culminating in the defeat of Mongol forces at the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380.

4. Synthesis: The Evolution of Russia

- Foundation: The early Eastern Slavs laid the cultural and ethnic foundations for future Russian states.
- Kievan Rus: The Viking influence and the establishment of Kievan Rus created the first significant East Slavic state, integrating Slavic and Norse elements and establishing crucial cultural and political ties with Byzantium.
- Mongol Rule and Moscow’s Ascendancy: The Mongol invasion and subsequent rule by the Golden Horde drastically altered the political landscape. The period of Mongol dominance saw the rise of Moscow, which eventually emerged as the new centre of power, leading to the formation of the Russian state.

Glossary of Terms:

- Varangians: Norse traders and warriors who settled in Eastern Europe.
- Kievan Rus: A medieval state founded by the Varangians, centred around Kiev.
- Golden Horde: A Mongol khanate that ruled over parts of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 1Ine of four appanages created by Genghis Khan


Further Reading:

- [The Primary Chronicle](https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/primarychronicle.asp) - Fordham University
- [History of Kievan Rus](https://www.britannica.com/place/Kievan-Rus) - Encyclopedia Britannica
- [The Mongol Empire](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mongol-empire) - Encyclopedia Britannica

Read More

Sunday, 25 June 2023

MOSCOW HAS NOT BEEN SACKED

No comments
24 June 2023

Putin has always treated Prigozhin like a wayward kid brother and now lets him off the hook and slink away to Belarus, a less well structured state where he Prigozhin could do real damage - Belarus is almost as important to Russian security as Ukraine.

In a Western democracy, Prigozhin would be under lock and key by now.

Imagine if Prigozhin had reached Moscow and begun looting. Reminds me of those few hundred crusaders who got into Constantinople and sacked it before being beaten away. Or the military who challenged de Gaulle back in 1962 over his decision to liberate Algeria.

People are pointing out how weak Russia is north of Ukraine and a push by Ukraine would give a Kievian army access to the M4 motorway and Moscow, as had Wagner. Well, many have gone in (over 50 invasions, helps understand Russian security concerns), Napoleon the best known, the Germans tried it, history is that few have come out in one piece, so Kiev en route to Moscow is a bit fanciful ... but increasing surprises in the world today ... I'd not have imagined Moscow would let Prigozhin get this far, it sows doubts about the governance of Russia frankly.

===

A coup attempt - to denounce and decry as a coup would be a classic tactic of Putin's enemies. But attempted coup it was, though Prigozhin has denied trying to topple the govt, saying he had wanted to object to a decision to disband his militia as well as demonstrate the weakness of Russia’s domestic defences.

This was an increasingly vitrioloc attack by a battlefield commander (more on that later) on his generals sitting back in HQ. Yevgeny Prigozhin considers he was deliberately undersupplied with munitions by envious armchair generals. 

From what I can understand, Prigozhin was deliberately slowed down in this military operation named by Russia named Operation Meat Grinder (sic - Russian military gave this  name, or adopted it) because the idea was that the Ukrainians would file into the Bahkmout trap and be annihilated - the longer they filed in the better for this strategy of attrition.

But of course the longer the strategy went on the more of Prigozhin's soldiers were sacrificed. There is one famous video of him standing in front of the bodies of 94 of his men killed he says because they did not have munitions in sufficient quantities to defend themselves.

On the one hand, you can argue that this is proof that Putin is not a dictator; but what is worrying is Putin's slack treatment of this insubordination, as though Prigozhin were a wayward kid brother. His whole approach to the war has been to try and spare the suffering, to spare the lives of his troops and also civilian lives in Ukraine.

So putting all this together, we get the impression of a rather too political or soft leadership - Putin has even let Prigozhin off the hook, aswhere we would have put him in gaol, as he is now off to Belarus where he may cause more trouble again.

While the pro-Russian chattering classes on telegram etc all rally round Putin, including Putin's harshest critics, we do come away with the worrisome impression that Putin is not fully in charge, not fully in control - this is worrisome to his people, but also to his allies. 

===

Strange that Ukraine's offensive and Prigordzin's coup both coincided and both required Russian weakness if they were to succeed.

Prigozhin has a massive energy behind a massive ego. This rant of his has been building since February.  Russian authorities allowed all that and seemingly didn't see the trek up the M4 coming. The Russians are so confident they didn't imagine others would perceive weakness.

The attempt failed because Prigozhin had no support and the authorities mobilised quickly to put it down without bloodshed.

So it shows how solid is Russia's present political system, but it also demonstrates a strength of democracy, that opposition can flow through institutional channels and not butt against them.

My memory of this short-lived rebellion will be Putin's speech comparing this with 1917 - must be said seemed a bit panicky.

===

It was in CNN 2 weeks beforehand... but of course no one in Russia reads the Western press, not for a moment.

What I would like to know is who organised this? Because Prigozhin, a figurehead, lacking military qualifications, relying on his generals, couldn't have done it on his own

But his generals didn't support him.

So he must have had outside help.

And yet no one in Russian Society supported him either.

So where did that help come from, I wonder... not that I'm paranoid or a conspiracist

We need Seymour Hersch on the trail.

Seems everyone knew what was going on except of course Putin

And that includes Prigozhin, aware he had no support, neither within Wagner, nor within Russian society ... if true what was he thinking about? What was he doing this for? Well, now he has given his explanation.
Read More

Saturday, 23 April 2022

RUSSIAN AIMS AND STRATEGY

No comments
23 April 2022

🎉🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿Happy St. George’s day🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🎉

It is the land power (Russia, the Rus, the Mongol Hordes of Asia) v. The sea power (formerly the UK now America) for position as World Hegemon No. 1. That's why America and Russia are always fighting. Many think it's China? No. It's the no.1 land power v. the no.1 sea power. That's the game.

 Russia could take in Iran & Pakistan, even Japan?, so Islam and Asia, and seek to separate the UK from Europe, while fomenting dissent along race woke etc lines in the US. Their plan. Seems mad?

The Russian homeland, home to four out of five Russians, is in the European Plain. The plain stretches from the Volga to the Yangzie and the Artic to the Caspian.  Russian Govt policy is mainly made for Moscow and St Petersburg, the homeland - it is in Europe, we are fighting Europeans v. Europeans, thanks America.

That boundary Europe-Russia, in East Europe, is the world peace pivot. If you control that, you control Europe and Asia and should be able to dominate the world.  It is 2,000 kms from Finland and the Baltics, South to Romania, and has Russia's natural geographic protective anchors, such as the Baltics, Suwalki, Carpathian, Volgograd, as well as nine gateways through these, gateways that Russia must protect from historic invaders. 

So, taking Ukraine and Moldova would reduce its patrol area from 2,000 to 600 kms.

If it lost Georgia it would lose the Volgograd Gap and potential access to the Black Sea, Caucuses and Caspian.

You'd think cyber and air today, but after the artillery come the tanks and troops. How will they get through? Think Napoleon or Hitler.

You could ask, why the need for natural defensive frontiers when you've got nuclear?

Ultimately, Russian govt authority and legitimacy comes from conquest and respect abroad, as well as - as for us - meeting the needs of the core popn at home (well, our govts used to..).

As crises go, this one is more interesting than the debt 2008 crisis and coming liquidity; much more intetesting than covid; Woke is a distraction and a Big Yawn; but I wonder what comes next ... any ideas?

America is pushing Russia to the edge. Will it go nuclear?

It's true Putin has reduced countries to rubble when he can't get what he wants but in previous cases it has had little to no repurcutions on his own country whereas deploying nuclear missiles would be disastrous for him aswell and he may be crazy ( I dont think so, as above), but surely not suicidal.
Read More

CAN YOU IMPOSE NEUTRALITY ON INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES?

No comments
23 April 2022

Why is Russia in perpetual insecurity?

Putin is treated to madman or throwback to Soviet or czarist (caesar) times, but careful examination of the geopolitical, demographic, economic and social constraints show how he perfectly rationally interprets a country's - his country's - primary need for security.

As the West seeks an adequate response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, it is useful to understand what Vladimir Putin thinks he is doing, and why. Understanding Putin is not to apologize for him, but understanding is important in any negotiations.
Finland invaded. Sweden twice. France. Germany twice. The Turks through the Crimea.
Why Russia is so big?
It is because it is mainly flat open steppe and tundra, with no natural defences that would normally make for a border. It means one power - the Rus, the Mongols - can come to dominate this central asian plain and on to the central european plain. Russia is the heartland of Asia although its home territory, where 80% of its people live, is in Eastern Europe.
The world's weak spot is the east european border where the Russian land power meets the European (formerly British, now American) sea power. How can one power protect itself from the other?
From Russia's point of view, its natural defences - the Baltics, Suwalki Gap, Carpathian Mountains, Volgograd Gap - are also home to independent nations and so tantalisingly out of its reach, unless - for reasons of its own survival - it moves by force to take them over.
For example, taking Ukraine and the Transnistra (Moldova) would reduce the border it has, a great expense, to protect, from 2,000 km to 600.
Another example. Losing the Volgograd (Caucuses) would mean losing access to the Black Sea, Crimea and the Caspian.
Another example. When the Baltic trio got independence in 1999, Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) - a wedge-shaped piece of land along the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania - was almost cut off, access is via Belarus and the Suwalki.
Do you think NATO parking its tanks on Russia's "front porch", its "near abroad", was a good idea if NATO's intentions were purely peaceful? What of promises to respect the neutrality of the 14 former Union republicks in 1991? What is your opinion?
Read More

Sunday, 27 February 2022

THE ORIGINS OF RUSSO PHOBIA

, No comments

27 February 2022

 A great presentation and question and answer session with Tom and John Measheimer. 

https://youtu.be/Nbj1AR_aAcE

One. On the origins of Russo-phobia. 

This argument from John is quite American centric. If you live in Europe, you might have a different perspective. 
But I would say from the American perspective that the dislike of Russia goes back past the Monroe doctrine to Woodrow Wilson's talk in 1916.
 And from the European point of view, you have to go all the way back past the centuries and see that the threat is almost ingrained and instinctive as it originates in a nomadic people living on the euro Asian plateau, poor steppes land, and always moving westward. These were migratory invasions, I would imagine, as perceived by the Europeans of the time. There was also Tamerlane, Genghis Khan, Marco Polo, the mongol hordes, and Josef Stalin was from Georgia.

 Two. On the other point about the part played by nuclear weapons. 

I would say that Russia and Putin see themselves as truly under a real existential threat. If Putin fails in his Ukraine invasion, surely he will be replaced, and even if he succeeds the sanctions are likely to put a lot of pressure on those who formerly supported him to get rid of the dictator. We saw in the eyes of his security council this week a lot of fear, of course, but enough to stop an assassin?
If Ukraine fails for the Russians and the States wins again, this would be fatal for Russia, surely? There's the threat of a colour revolution at home. There's the Russian power elite losing control. There's potentially a breakup of Russia itself. 
 So surely in this situation where the very existence of Russia or of Putin is threatened, Russia would play its final card and quite possibly launch a hypersonic nuclear tipped missile on Washington. They travel at 25,000 miles an hour, they are virtually undetectable, and they would take 15 minutes from launch to destroy the White House.

  Three. This brings me to a final and rather wild thought. 

If Russia ceases to exist as a country and is in some way or other taken over by democratic liberal forces, where does this leave the pivot to Asia? China would wake up with a new neighbour. Nato would have a new purpose as it would be able to encircle and menace China, this time from the North.

Putin himself explains russo-phobia by saying that the West fears Russia because of its size:
https://youtu.be/MOkl2XgZlw0
















Read More