IS PROF PAPE RIGHT - CAN IRAN BECOME THE FOURTH GLOBAL POWER

17 July 2026

Can a nation become a global power before it has first become the accepted leader of its own region?

Contents cover the following:

• Professor Robert Pape's argument that Iran could emerge as a fourth global power.

• Why regional hegemony is the essential missing step.

• The obstacles Iran would still face.

• Why long-term survival is likely to be Tehran's first priority.

• The possible roles of nuclear deterrence, Russia, China and Türkiye.

• Why the next five years are unlikely to produce an Iranian global power.

1. The Missing Step in Pape's Argument

Professor Robert Pape has suggested here that, should the United States substantially reduce or possibly abandon its military presence in the Gulf, Iran could emerge as the world's fourth global power. It is a provocative idea, but one that leaves an important question unanswered.

Before any state can become a global power, it must first become the accepted regional hegemon.

Military strength alone is not enough. History suggests that regional dominance requires neighbouring states to adjust their policies because they conclude that resistance is either impossible, prohibitively expensive or no longer in their interests. Military superiority transforms into political authority through recognition.

At present there is some though not a lot of convincing evidence that this process has begun.

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies, Jordan and Israel have certainly adjusted aspects of their policies towards Iran, but none has accepted Iran as the region's "security manager". Most continue to balance Iranian influence through diplomacy, military spending or external alliances.

Glossary 

Regional hegemon – the dominant state within a geographical region whose influence is recognised, even reluctantly, by its neighbours.

Balance (or balancing) – a strategy whereby states seek to prevent one country from becoming dominant by strengthening their own military capabilities, forming alliances, or deepening diplomatic and economic ties with other powers. The objective is not necessarily to defeat the stronger state, but to deter it and preserve a balance of power.

Example: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states seek to balance Iranian influence by maintaining close security relationships with the United States while also expanding their own defence capabilities.

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2. Survival Comes Before Ambition

There is another assumption that deserves examination.

Much Western analysis begins by asking what Iran wants to achieve. A more realistic question may be what risks Iran might face and whether it is possible to mitigate them.

Since 1979, Iran has endured one devastating conventional war (Iraq 1980-88), decades of sanctions, repeated covert operations, the murder of its spiritual leader and his family and much of the cabinet, assassinations of senior military officers and nuclear scientists, cyber attacks, proxy conflicts across the Middle East, and direct military confrontation with Israel and the United States, the world's foremost military power. From Tehran's perspective, this history helps explain why long-term survival and deterrence are a first priority although once achieved regional political authority - not territorial expansion - would be the next priority. And given this history it is pretty certain that Iran would choose revenge at the risk of matrydom or extinction, rather than submission to America.

Whether one agrees with that perception is almost beside the point. States formulate strategy according to their founding myths and how they interpret threats, not how others interpret them.

If Iranian leaders conclude that future attacks are inevitable unless they fundamentally alter the regional balance of power, then ensuring that such attacks become prohibitively costly becomes the logical objective.

In that sense, survival is not merely remaining in office. It is creating a security environment in which regime change by external powers becomes effectively impossible.

Glossary

Deterrence – persuading an opponent not to attack because the expected costs outweigh any possible gains.

Proxy war – a conflict in which rival powers support opposing local forces rather than fighting each other directly.

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3. The Search for Long-Term Security

If survival is indeed Tehran's principal objective, several strategic consequences follow.

Iran is likely to continue investing heavily in missiles, drones, air defences and dispersed military command and infrastructure.

It may also continue strengthening strategic relationships with both Russia and China. Neither country is necessarily seeking Iranian regional dominance, but both have reasons to oppose further expansion of American influence across Eurasia.

Many analysts also believe that Iran will now now, under new leadership, be developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons quickly if it judges its security environment to demand it. Whether Tehran ultimately chooses to cross that threshold remains uncertain and contested, but the debate itself reflects the central importance of deterrence.

None of these developments automatically makes Iran a regional hegemon. They simply make it increasingly difficult to coerce.

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4. The Obstacles to Regional Hegemony

Even assuming a gradual reduction of American influence, Iran would still face formidable obstacles.

Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources and continues modernising its armed forces.

Türkiye combines a large industrial economy, NATO-standard military capabilities and growing regional ambitions. In many respects, Türkiye may represent the most significant long-term competitor for influence across West Asia (and this would be why Israel now views Türkiye and more of a threat than Iran).

Israel is still a militarily powerful and technologically advanced threat to the region.

Nor is it obvious that the Gulf monarchies would simply exchange American protection for Iranian leadership. More likely, they would attempt to balance among several external powers while preserving their own autonomy.

Regional hegemony cannot simply be declared... it has to be accepted.

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5. Could America Reopen the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz remains central to every discussion of Gulf security.

Iran has successfully disrupted maritime traffic, and reopening the waterway would almost certainly prove far more difficult than many public discussions imply.

It is conceivable that the United States could eventually reopen the Strait, through an extended military campaign. However, the scale, duration and costs of such an operation are highly uncertain. Military, political and logistical factors do not give confidence.

Equally important are the economic consequences of this prolonged disruption. Even a temporary interruption of Gulf energy exports places severe strain on global markets, and global reserves are expected to run out in August ie well before any military campaign could achieve its objectives.

These uncertainties help explain why deterrence and signalling remain so important in Gulf strategy.

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6. The Long Road to Becoming a Global Power

Iran's strategies to successfully secure its long-term survival and future include deterrence, preventing hostile encirclement, maintaining influence in neighbouring conflicts, reducing or expelling US and Israeli military presence.

But becoming a global power would require several further steps.

First, Iran would have to become the recognised regional hegemon.

Second, it would need to transform military influence into durable economic leadership.

Third, neighbouring states would need increasingly to consult Tehran on regional security.

Fourth, major global powers would have to treat Iran as an indispensable participant in resolving international crises.

Today, those conditions have not been fulfilled.

Iran is undoubtedly an important regional actor. It has demonstrated resilience under extraordinary pressure and has significantly expanded its military capabilities. But, given that 

- like all political leaders Trump cannot withdraw as this would be seen by his MAGA base as surrender and cost him the midterms, his credibility, and his legacy; 

- while Iran by its national character as much as by the assassinations and betrayals it has suffered at the hands of the West seeks martyrdom or extinction and probably revenge rather than submission to America; 

we are likely to see some form of intermittent or forever war though on a far greater scale leading to military exhaustion; and not a neat reopening of hormuz with the oil price falling gently back to the $70s.

So Iran will not be the one to fold, yet resilience should not be confused with hegemony, nor hegemony with global power.

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7. Conclusion

Professor Pape's scenario remains intellectually stimulating because it forces readers to think beyond the immediate conflict and ask what a post-American Gulf might look like.

However, the pathway from survival to regional hegemony, and from regional hegemony to becoming a fourth global power, wood need a bit more thinking through as to how it might come about.

Iran has no avowed ambition to build an empire, rather, it is seeking to ensure that no foreign power can again threaten its existence without facing unacceptable costs.

If that is indeed the primary objective, then military deterrence, strategic partnerships and political resilience is the path it is likely on.

Whether these developments eventually produce a new regional order remains uncertain.

Over the next five years, however, Iran appears more likely to consolidate its security than to emerge as the world's fourth global power.

References

• Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win and subsequent lectures on coercion and American grand strategy.

• Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers.

• John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

• Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances.

Related articles:

• THE ESCALATION TRAP

• America's Enduring Goal and Grand Strategy for War

• BOMBING TO WIN: PAPE ON IRAN

• BOMBING TO WIN: PAPE ON RUSSIA

ADDENDUM -- Iran's military conflicts:

Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

An eight-year conventional war initiated by Iraq's invasion.

Approximately 500,000–1,000,000 total military and civilian casualties on both sides (estimates vary).

Lebanon conflict (1982–present, indirect)

Iran has supported Hezbollah against Israel through funding, training and weapons.

This has involved repeated conflicts, notably in 2006 and subsequent exchanges.

Syrian Civil War (from 2011)

Iran intervened in support of the Syrian government.

It deployed advisers, organised allied militias and provided extensive military assistance.

War against ISIS in Iraq (2014–2017)

Iran supported the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias against ISIS.

It played a significant role alongside the US-led coalition, although independently.

Yemen conflict (from around 2015, indirect)

Iran has backed the Houthis politically and militarily, while Saudi Arabia led a coalition supporting the internationally recognised government.

Direct conflict with Israel and the United States (2024–present)

Following years of covert operations and proxy warfare, the confrontation has increasingly involved direct missile and drone exchanges, Israeli strikes inside Iran, and US military involvement.

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WHO WAS HERBERT HOOVER

16 July 2026

1. Who was Herbert Hoover?

Herbert Hoover was the 31st President of the United States, serving from 1929 to 1933. Before becoming president, he was an internationally respected mining engineer, humanitarian, and Secretary of Commerce.

Great Depression – the severe worldwide economic downturn that began in 1929.

2. What happened during his presidency?

Hoover's presidency was overshadowed by the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, just months after he took office.

He was widely criticised because:

Unemployment rose to around 25%

Thousands of banks failed

Businesses collapsed.

Many Americans lost their homes and savings.

Hoover believed strongly in:

Limited federal government

Voluntary cooperation between businesses

Balanced budgets

Local rather than national relief efforts.

Many Americans felt these measures were too little and too late.

3. The Bonus Army

One event particularly damaged his reputation.

In 1932, thousands of First World War veterans marched on Washington demanding early payment of promised bonuses. When many refused to leave, Hoover ordered the Army to remove them. Troops under Douglas MacArthur used cavalry, infantry and tear gas.

Images of veterans being driven out shocked the country and further weakened public support.

Bonus Army – a group of veterans seeking early payment of promised military bonuses.

4. Defeat and later life

In the 1932 presidential election, Hoover was overwhelmingly defeated by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

After leaving office, he spent many years criticising Roosevelt's New Deal. His reputation gradually recovered.

Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower asked him to lead commissions to improve the efficiency of the federal government.

He remained active in public service until shortly before his death.

5. His legacy

Historians today generally take a more balanced view than was common for decades.

Many argue that the Great Depression was already beginning before Hoover could influence events.

He actually expanded federal involvement more than previous presidents, though far less than Roosevelt would later. His cautious approach proved politically disastrous because the crisis demanded far more visible government action.

He died on 20 October 1964 at the age of 90 in New York City and was buried in West Branch, Iowa, beside his wife, Lou Henry Hoover.

His reputation remains mixed: remembered by many as the president associated with the Great Depression, but also recognised as an accomplished engineer, humanitarian, and capable administrator whose presidency was overwhelmed by one of history's worst economic crises.

6. What this means for Trump

For Donald Trump, one of the greatest political nightmares would be to acquire a "Hoover legacy" ie a presidency forever defined by economic collapse. 

Herbert Hoover entered office only months before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, yet history largely remembers him as the president of the Great Depression, regardless of the deeper structural causes that had been building for years. 

Trump is acutely aware that history often judges leaders by outcomes rather than by theue own personal responsiblities. Today, the United States faces its own structural vulnerabilities: historically high public debt, persistent fiscal deficits, elevated asset valuations, this and other geopolitical tensions, and the possibility that tariffs, supply-chain disruption or financial instability could trigger a broader downturn. 

Whether or not such a crisis originated during his administration, a severe recession or debt shock before he leaves office could become inseparably linked with his name. This creates a powerful incentive to prioritise economic stability, maintain market confidence and avoid any policy that might precipitate a crisis. 

In this sense, the fear of becoming "another Hoover" may weigh as heavily on Trump's seemingly erratic decision-making as any foreign policy calculation because presidents are remembered less for the complexity of the circumstances they inherit than for the condition in which they leave the nation.

Trump is determined to avoid ending his presidency with either a "Carter moment" abroad or a "Hoover moment" at home.

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IRAN NEW DEFENDER OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN WEST ASIA

IRAN NEW DEFENDER OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN WEST ASIA

Overview

On 17 June 2026, after months of war, blockade and brinkmanship, the United States and Iran signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding. The Strait of Hormuz reopens. The naval blockade lifts within 30 days. Up to $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets becomes available. A $300 billion reconstruction plan is to be built with regional partners. Sanctions are on a path to termination, contingent on a final deal within 60 days, itself to be endorsed by binding UN Security Council resolution.

Most analysts are reading the document for what it does to Iran's economy and to the oil market. Fair enough - both matter. But the document is also a text, in the way Joseph Campbell taught us to read texts: as the surface expression of a much older structural pattern. And read that way, the MOU is not really about Iran at all. It interestingly allows us to see this story as one where Iran is being written into a new role as Defender of American Interests in West Asia, replacing a failed Israel. Iran also offers the advantage of a pristine market with unmatched resources and consumer population untouched for 47 years.

The pattern Campbell described

Campbell's Hero's Journey runs through a recognisable sequence of figures: the weakness that traps the hero in ordinary life, the demon that weakness curdles into, the protector who does not slay the demon for the hero but equips the hero to face it, and the transformation that follows. The detail people skip past is that demon and protector are not fixed roles. They are functions that a story assigns and reassigns as the plot requires. The dragon of one chapter can become the guide of the next, if the story's needs change and someone is willing to write it that way.

That is precisely what happened in Washington this week, except the author is a superpower and the manuscript is a memorandum of understanding.

What makes this geopolitical moment feel decisive rather than merely a 39th tactical move is when the story's functions finally match the facts on the ground. But of course this could all be a Minsk-type trap for Iran.

The Minsk analogy — a framework designed to look like resolution while buying time for the other side to rearm. Iran's hardliners are certainly reading it that way, and they have 47 years of evidence for their scepticism.

Israel: the rising power that exhausted its role

For two decades, Israel occupied the protector function in America's Middle East story: the regional partner whose threat assessment Washington adopted as its own, whose intelligence and strikes did the work US policymakers wanted done without US fingerprints, whose enemies became, by extension, American enemies. That arrangement reached its operational peak in the February 2026 war — joint US-Israeli strikes, a campaign with the explicit ambition of breaking Iran's nuclear infrastructure and possibly its regime.

It did not deliver a clean result. It delivered a 14-point memorandum that Israel was not shown until after it was substantially settled, and reportedly continued not seeing for some time after that. Netanyahu's own coalition and opposition are now united in calling the war's outcome a strategic failure, his domestic position has become an open question ahead of autumn elections, and a former prime minister has said in public what Israeli officials have been saying anonymously: Iran emerged stronger, Israel emerged weaker. Whatever one thinks of the merits, that is the protector function visibly failing to protect the thing the story needed protected — stable, cheap transit through Hormuz, a contained Iran, an American position in the region that didn't require permanent military overwatch.

A protector who cannot deliver protection stops being cast as the protector. That is not a moral judgment. It is just how the role works in any story, mythic or geopolitical.

Iran: the demon being recast

Here is the move almost nobody in the commentary is naming, because it inverts forty-five years of received categorisation. The MOU does not just de-escalate. It assigns Iran a new function in the story. Iran becomes the guarantor of free transit through Hormuz, in active dialogue with Oman and the Gulf states on the strait's future administration. Iran becomes the recipient of a $300 billion American-coordinated reconstruction plan — not a punished adversary, but a project America is now invested in succeeding. Iran becomes the counterparty whose "good behaviour," in the words of one US official, is rewarded on a dial, not a switch — meaning Washington has committed itself to a relationship that continues, that requires tending, that has stakes in continuing to work.

None of that is friendship. It is something more useful than friendship: function. America's interest in the Gulf — open shipping lanes, contained nuclear risk, a check on chaos that disrupts energy markets and currency flows — increasingly requires Iranian cooperation to deliver, and Washington has just put $300 billion and a UN-endorsed deal architecture behind making that cooperation durable. The demon has been handed the protector's job description. Whether Iran performs the role well is a separate, open question — and Israeli officials are right that the missile programme, the proxy network and the regime's durability are all unresolved. But the role has been offered, and Tehran has signed for it.

Why this is the part everyone is missing

The analyst consensus I'm seeing frets that Iran "rises to become a fourth global power." That framing assumes Iran is acting alone, accumulating power against American interests. It misses that the more consequential rise here is being engineered, not resisted, by Washington. A power that the United States needs and is actively building up to perform a function for it is a fundamentally different geopolitical object than a power rising in defiance of the United States. Saudi Arabia, since the 1940s, has been the textbook case of the former. Iran, as of this week, has been handed the application.

This is also why the Lebanon clause matters more than its brief mention suggests. The MOU folds Israel's war in Lebanon into the same ceasefire architecture, over Israeli objections about freedom of action. That is not incidental housekeeping. It is the new protector being given authority over the old protector's remaining theatre of operations — Iran's position on Hezbollah and Lebanon now sits inside the framework America is building, while Israel's position sits outside the room where the framework was written.

The economics: what a 90 million-person market unlocked looks like

Set the mythic frame aside for a moment and look at the balance sheet, because this is where the thesis stops being interpretive and starts being investable. Iran has roughly 90 million people, a young and reasonably well-educated population, a domestic engineering and manufacturing base built under decades of sanctions pressure (which forces self-reliance the way nothing else does), the second-largest natural gas reserves on the planet, and oil infrastructure that has been running under sanctions constraint rather than capacity constraint. Layer on $100 billion in unfrozen assets, a $300 billion reconstruction commitment, and a sanctions-termination pathway, and you have the outline of one of the largest single-country reopening trades available anywhere in the world economy — bigger, in raw addressable-market terms, than anything else currently on offer in emerging markets.

Reconstruction capital flows first into energy infrastructure, ports, and the Hormuz transit and demining work the MOU itself specifies. Behind that comes telecoms, healthcare, consumer goods and financial services serving a population that has been cut off from global supply chains for most of two generations and has pent-up demand to show for it. None of this happens on the original 60-day clock — the nuclear question is still open, the "minimum methodology" for down-blending enriched material is unresolved, and Israel's continued operations in Lebanon are a live spoiler risk to the whole architecture. But the direction of travel, and the scale of capital Washington has now committed to that direction, is the signal worth pricing.

The closing irony

It is worth sitting for a moment with the country that doesn't get this treatment. Russia has comparable resource depth, a comparable case for reconstruction-led growth once a settlement exists, and no equivalent path on offer from its principal antagonists. Europe, unlike Washington with Iran, shows no sign of being willing to write Moscow into a protector role at any price, on any timeline, however reluctantly. Whether that reflects sounder judgment about Russia or simply a different story being told is a question for another post. But the contrast is a useful reminder that what looks like geopolitical reality is often, underneath, a choice about which character gets cast in which part.

The Minsk objection mentioned above is serious. But in the case of Russia, Minsk cost NATO nothing if it failed. This Iran deal has already cost Washington something that can't be clawed back - its posture towards Israel, now visibly subordinated to a framework Israel didn't write and wasn't shown.... and Trump has made himself a heap of enemies by signing this MoM (memo of misunderstanding).

Reality Check

Prof Pape says there is no graceful way out of the escalation trap for America in its conflict with Iran, but ...

The truth about the Iran deal that no one seems to have noticed (perhaps for good reason and it's me missing something) is that this is a classic case of demon-transformed-into protector - America is replacing a failed Israel with a winning Iran. 

America gets two things:

- a new and competent protector of its interests in the Gulf ;

- and a far more monetisable market of over 90 million people, with a work force that is skilled in Engineering and Technology, and a land full of resources, fueled by the return of its frozen assets and the lifting of sanctions.

It's a great deal though it relies on

- Iran following the American lead & breaking with its allies; and

- the neocon hardline zionists in Washington n Tel Aviv "shutting their clappy".

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PEACE IN THE GULF FROM LOCAL CONTROL OF HORMUZ

POWER SECURITY AND THE NEXT WORLD ORDER - PT 1 of 2

Security through mutual cooperation rather than permanent confrontation

1. Why Iran Controls the Strait of Hormuz

Iran is often criticised in the West for taking a hard-line position over the Strait of Hormuz. However, from the Iranian perspective, maintaining leverage over the strait is fundamentally about security.

The argument is that if Iran remains vulnerable to sanctions, military pressure, economic coercion, and the presence of hostile military bases surrounding it, then it requires some strategic counterweight of its own.

The Strait of Hormuz provides that leverage.

As necessary, Iran can potentially impose costs on states that sanction it or host military infrastructure directed against it. In this sense, control over Hormuz is viewed by Tehran not as an end in itself, but as a way of preventing a return to a period where Iran could be threatened without possessing meaningful leverage to counter.

From the Iranian viewpoint, giving up unilateral influence over the strait without wider security guarantees would simply restore the old imbalance of power.

Strait of Hormuz - Narrow maritime passage between Iran and Oman through which a large proportion of global oil exports pass.

Strategic leverage - The ability to influence other states through control of an important asset or position.

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2. Iran’s Preferred Alternative: Collective Security

Iranian policymakers, alongside proposals advanced by China and Russia, seem to be arguing for an inclusive regional security architecture in the Gulf.

How would this work?:

• Regional states would collectively manage security.

• External military domination would be reduced.

• Security guarantees would apply to all states rather than to rival blocs. (Alliances are anathema to shared security arrangements.)

• Economic cooperation would little by little replace confrontation.

In this scenario, Iran might become less insistent on independently controlling Hormuz because its security would no longer rely solely on unilateral deterrence.

The argument is therefore not necessarily that Iran seeks permanent domination over the strait, but rather that it does not trust the current regional order to protect its interests fairly.

Thiugh it avoids the other reason given for Iranian control of Hormuz, that a tollbooth is a way to extract compensation for the distruction of its country.

Security architecture - The overall framework through which states attempt to maintain stability, manage conflicts, reduce mutual threats, and organise regional or international security relationships, whether through cooperation, neutrality, diplomacy, treaties, alliances, or shared institutions.

Deterrence - The use of strategic pressure or retaliatory capability to discourage hostile action.

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3. The Gulf System and the Logic of Dependency

Critics of the current Gulf order argue that the existing system operates through a balance of fear and dependency. As long as Gulf Arab states remain in confrontation with Iran:

• The United States retains a central military role in the region.

• Gulf states remain dependent on American protection.

• Iran remains strategically constrained.

From this perspective, regional division reinforces the wider hegemonic structure because no local balance independent of external power is allowed to emerge. This is the Divide and Rule mechanism.

The argument is that rivalry itself becomes part of the system’s stability.

Hegemony - Dominance by one power over a wider political or strategic system.

Dependency structure - A system in which weaker states rely heavily on a stronger external power for security or economic stability.

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4. The European Parallel After the Cold War

A similar debate emerged in Europe after the end of the Cold War.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was initially discussion about creating a broader inclusive European security architecture that would incorporate both Western Europe and post-Soviet Russia into a shared framework.

Institutions linked to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were viewed by some as a possible foundation for such a system.

The idea was that Europe could potentially move beyond Cold War bloc politics entirely.

This could have meant:

• A genuinely pan-European security framework.

• Reduced military confrontation between Russia and the West.

• Less dependence on opposing military blocs.

• A long-term continental security arrangement involving all major European powers.

However, this was not ultimately the path that emerged.

Instead, the post-Cold War order developed around the expansion of NATO eastwards.

Supporters of NATO expansion argued that Eastern European states freely chose membership for their own protection and stability.

Critics argued that this prevented the emergence of a genuinely inclusive European security system and instead preserved Cold War strategic logic under new conditions.

From that perspective:

• Russia became increasingly marginalised from European security structures.

• Europe remained strategically tied to American military leadership.

• Bloc politics gradually re-emerged.

• Mutual distrust deepened over time.

The argument is therefore not simply about military expansion itself, but about which type of post-Cold War order Europe ultimately chose to build.

Pan-European security architecture - A continent-wide security framework including both Western Europe and Russia.

Bloc politics - International relations organised around rival alliance systems.

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5. The Helsinki Vision and the Lost Post-Cold War Settlement

The roots of this debate can be traced back to the Helsinki Accords and the wider East-West diplomatic process that later evolved into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The Helsinki framework attempted to create a pan-European system based on: 

• Sovereign equality. 

• Non-intervention. 

• Dialogue between rival blocs. 

• Collective stability through cooperation rather than domination.

Importantly, both the Western and Soviet blocs participated.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some policymakers hoped this process could evolve into a genuinely inclusive European security architecture involving both Western Europe and post-Soviet Russia.

The idea was that Europe might finally move beyond Cold War bloc politics altogether and develop a shared continental security framework.

However, that vision ultimately gave way to a different settlement centred around: 

• NATO expansion. 

• Continued American strategic leadership. 

• The preservation of Atlantic security structures.

Supporters argued this brought stability and protection to Eastern Europe.

Critics argued it prevented the emergence of a broader cooperative European order that included Russia as a permanent participant rather than an external rival.

The debate therefore was never simply about military expansion itself, but about which type of post-Cold War Europe would ultimately emerge.

Helsinki Accords - 1975 East-West agreement establishing principles for European security and cooperation.

Inclusive security architecture - A security system designed to include rival powers within the same framework rather than organising them into opposing blocs.

6. Why This Debate Matters Today

The wider issue concerns whether regions can eventually move from systems based on rivalry, expressed in a bloc politics and Alliances, and external dependency; towards systems based on collective security arrangements.

For supporters of inclusive security models, the long-term objective would be:

• Reduced geopolitical fragmentation.

• Less reliance on external military guarantors.

• Greater regional autonomy.

• Security through mutual accommodation rather than permanent confrontation.

However, achieving such a transition would be extremely difficult, especially immediately after wars, sanctions, proxy conflicts, and long periods of distrust.

That is why the Strait of Hormuz remains not only a strategic waterway, but also a symbol of a much larger debate about regional order, sovereignty, and the future structure of global power.

NEXT

Pt. 2

Has security through mutual cooperation rather than permanent confrontation ever been tried? What lessons can be drawn from previous attempts?

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WAR, OIL, AND THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL

15 April 2026

WAR, OIL, AND THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL

Scope

Excludes the character of the occupant in the White House

Excludes consideration of the effect of Israel in this conflict

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1. Overview

Markets are pricing resolution. The system is drifting toward escalation. With two choke points, fragile energy infrastructure, and asymmetric escalation dynamics, the real risk is not a temporary shock but a sustained disruption to flows, pricing, and confidence.

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2. THE MISPRICING – MARKETS ARE LOOKING THE WRONG WAY

The S&P 500 stands close to all-time highs. This reflects a belief in negotiation, stabilisation, and a return to normal energy flows. Yet the underlying structure points in the opposite direction.

Iran has already demonstrated selective control over the Strait of Hormuz, allowing passage on conditional terms. The United States has imposed a parallel blockade targeting Iranian trade rather than neutral shipping per se. At the same time, Washington continues to deploy additional naval assets into the region.

This is not de-escalation - watch what they do not what they say. It is a layered confrontation. Markets are therefore not pricing the system as it is, but as they hope it will become.

Risk mispricing - when markets underestimate the probability or impact of adverse events

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3. THE REAL ENERGY SHOCK – A SYSTEM UNDER STRAIN

The dominant narrative focuses on Hormuz. This is incomplete. The system is better understood as a network of interlocking constraints.

The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly one-fifth of global petroleum flows. A second chokepoint constraint lies at Bab el-Mandeb, through which a further meaningful share of global distribution passes. If proxy forces close or disrupt this route, the Suez Canal effectively ceases to function as a viable corridor.

The effect is not simply additive. It is systemic. Supply chains do not degrade linearly. They fracture.

At the same time, the physical pipeline is already tightening. The last tankers that exited the Gulf before the latest escalation are now reaching European ports - with prices expected from 150 dpb and recorded at 210 in Singapore. There is limited visibility on sustained follow-on shipments under current conditions. This marks the transition from financial pricing to physical shortage.

Choke point - a narrow route where disruption can restrict large volumes of trade

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4. INFRASTRUCTURE RISK – THE HIDDEN ESCALATION

A further layer of risk sits beneath the shipping story. Energy infrastructure itself is vulnerable.

Refineries in Gulf Arab states, and potentially in Iran, represent high-value, low-redundancy targets. Their destruction is not a short-term disruption. Reconstruction timelines are measured in months, often six months or more. During that period, crude may exist but cannot be efficiently processed into usable fuels.

More critically, the Gulf states depend heavily on desalination. In several cases, dependence ranges between 70% and 90% of potable water supply. These plants are exposed, coastal, and difficult to defend comprehensively.

If targeted, the effect is immediate and severe. A loss of desalination capacity is not an inconvenience. It is a civilisational constraint. Urban populations, including capital cities, would face rapid depletion of fresh water supplies. The economic impact would be secondary to the humanitarian and political consequences.

This is a genuine escalation lever. It moves the conflict beyond energy into basic state viability.

Desalination - the process of removing salt from seawater to produce fresh water

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5. ESCALATION DYNAMICS – NO SIDE CONTROLS THE LADDER

The concept of escalation dominance is central here. Drawing on the work of Robert Pape, escalation is rarely one-sided. Each action invites a counter-action.

In this framework, the United States does not possess clean escalation dominance. It can escalate, but it cannot guarantee that escalation will remain contained or produce a stabilising outcome.

This has direct market implications. Uncertainty is not transient. It becomes structural. Volatility is not a spike. It becomes a regime.

Escalation dominance - the ability to control the pace and level of conflict without effective retaliation

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6. THREE SCENARIOS – MARKET PATHWAYS

6.1 air war resumes without a ground incursion

In the first scenario, an air war resumes without a ground incursion. Oil rises as risk premia return and shipping remains constrained. Gold initially benefits from safe-haven demand, but its trajectory becomes unstable as rising yields and a stronger dollar offset the bullish narrative. Equities correct, but not catastrophically, reflecting disruption without systemic breakdown. Industrial metals trade unevenly as supply constraints are balanced against weakening growth expectations.

6.2 coastal landing that fails

In the second scenario, the United States attempts a coastal landing and fails. This is the most destabilising outcome. Oil spikes aggressively as both Hormuz and the Red Sea system become unreliable. Insurance, freight, and physical delivery markets dislocate. Gold benefits from a surge in systemic risk, though it remains intermittently capped by rising yields. Equities move decisively into a risk-off regime, with a deeper and more sustained drawdown. This is the moment when markets shift from pricing disruption to pricing loss of control.

6.3 coastal landing successful

In the third scenario, the United States successfully seizes coastal facilities. The immediate reaction is still risk-negative. Oil rises on escalation, gold strengthens, and equities fall. The medium-term outcome depends on whether this produces stabilisation or retaliation. Given the absence of escalation dominance, the probability leans toward a wider conflict rather than a contained resolution. In that case, markets begin to resemble the second scenario rather than diverging from it.

Glossary

Risk-off - market environment where investors move away from equities into safer assets

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7. PRECIOUS METALS – STRUCTURE AND CONSTRAINTS

Gold remains the primary geopolitical hedge, but its behaviour is more complex than a simple upward trend. Rising oil prices feed inflation expectations, which in turn push up bond yields. Higher yields increase the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets such as gold.

At the same time, systemic risk, currency instability, and geopolitical uncertainty support demand for bullion. The result is a volatile equilibrium rather than a clean trend.

Gold miners do not provide the same exposure. They carry equity beta and are therefore vulnerable to broader market sell-offs. In stress conditions, bullion is the cleaner instrument.

An additional factor is sovereign behaviour. Countries facing higher energy import costs may liquidate reserves, including gold, to fund purchases. This introduces intermittent selling pressure into the market.

Yield - return on a bond, especially government debt

Equity beta - sensitivity of a stock to overall market movements

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8. THE EQUITY MARKET – FRAGILE OPTIMISM

The S&P 500 is not priced for disruption. It is priced for recovery.

Energy cost inflation, supply chain disruption, and rising yields all act to compress margins and reduce valuations. Under all escalation scenarios, earnings expectations weaken.

The vulnerability lies not in current conditions, but in positioning. A market priced for good news is structurally exposed to bad news.

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9. FINAL SYNTHESIS – FLOWS, NOT NARRATIVES

The decisive variable is not war in the abstract. It is control over flows.

At present, control is fragmented. Iran influences passage through Hormuz. The United States constrains Iranian trade. Proxies threaten secondary routes. Infrastructure itself is exposed.

This is not a stable equilibrium. It is a system under strain.

If hostilities resume after 22 April, oil rises in all scenarios, with the strongest move under failed escalation. Gold rises but with volatility shaped by yields and currency dynamics. Equities fall, with the deepest impact where escalation reveals loss of control.

The asymmetry is clear. Upside risk in energy is substantial. Downside risk in equities remains underpriced.

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10. REFERENCES

Reuters – April 2026 coverage on US-Iran conflict, shipping disruption, oil pricing

https://www.reuters.com

U.S. Energy Information Administration – global oil flow data

https://www.eia.gov

IMF – commodity shock transmission mechanisms

https://www.imf.org

Academic framework – Robert Pape on escalation dynamics - The Escalation Trap

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HIGH ANXIETY IN IRAN PEACE TALKS AND AN IMPOSSIBLE DEMAND OF PROOF

12 April 2026

We suspect Iran's intentions, but what are America's and Israel's true intentions?

America is demanding proof of the unprovable. This is not a negotiation about whether Iran may build nuclear weapons. It seems to be about Iranian future intentions, but look beyond the pretense of American suspicion and Israeli high insecurity, to find proof of America's true intentions.

1/ The Impossible Demand

So the U.S. demands that Iran permanently renounce any intention to build nuclear weapons.

Doesn’t this strike you as weird? Iran is being asked to prove its innocence indefinitely… into the eternal future.

It has been inspected by just about everyone, looking everywhere, even behind the coach. America’s own intelligence agency and the IAEA say there is nothing there.

Look at its history. It has never expressed any desire to build a bomb. Even when Saddam Hussein was hurling chemical weapons against it for six years, Iran did not retaliate in kind.

Plus, it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, for what it’s worth, there is a religious ruling, a fatwa, against nuclear weapons.

So compliance does not end suspicion.

Here's the weird part. Iran is being asked to prove that it will never have the intention of building a bomb. How can it prove that? How can anyone provide evidence in the real world for something that does not exist?

America is effectively asking for proof of what Iran will never think about doing.

It’s like the police asking you to prove that you will never think about murdering your wife.

Or you go to your mortgage broker, show your accounts, your income, your history, and the broker says:

“We will only give you a mortgage if you can prove that you will never think about defaulting on the loan… not today, not in ten years, not even in a moment of stress.”

So we end up in a position of permanent ambiguity and suspicion. The conflict can continue indefinitely or - now here’s the thing - until America finally gets control of Iran’s resources.

2/ Composition Of The Negotiating Parties

Iran sent its minister of foreign affairs and a team of skilled negotiators. They arrived with a short list of unambiguous demands and a well prepared agenda.

But hey look who we have on the American side, who accompanied J.D. Vance? His team or his minders? Why was he accompanied by a couple of Israeli agents?

So the demand that Iran prove the unprovable appears political rather than logical. And in demanding proof of the non-existence of a future intention, it reveals not just suspicion and high anxiety butt points to a pattern of American intervention in its foreign policy since the last world war.

3/ A Pattern Of American Interventionism 

Across modern history, particularly since the mid-20th century, a consistent pattern emerges. A foreign leader is portrayed as a threat - brutal, unstable, or dangerous - and the situation is framed as a moral crisis requiring intervention. Action is justified in the language of values of democracy, human rights and security. 

Yet, despite these stated aims, the outcomes always seem to converge: weakened states, fractured societies, prolonged instability, and far removed from the original promises of liberation or protection.

4/ The Usual Imperial Pattern of Expansion, Debt, And Collapse

This behaviour is not uniquely American but characteristic of empires across history, from the Roman Empire expansion to the British Empire expansion. Empires by definition are expansionist, they have to continuously expand to secure resources and sustain and this expansion must increasingly be financed by rising debt. Over time, currencies are debased to manage that debt, while further expansion becomes necessary to access new collateral to back the debt with the Imperial bankers and maintain the system. 

Eventually, the model reaches its limits: debt burdens become unsustainable, expansion stalls, confidence in the currency weakens, and the imperial structure begins to fragment or collapse.

5/ Conclusion

So applying the pattern found in history to Iran, the current U.S. intervention in Iran looks less like an isolated response to events and more like the latest iteration of a familiar cycle. 

The conflict has been framed in terms of security, nuclear risk, human rights, democracy and liberation of the people, yet the operational reality centres on strategic control of resources, particularly of energy flows and the Strait of Hormuz, through 20% of global oil supply, a third of LNG, the precursors of fertilizer... passes. 

Recent military actions, including devastating strikes on infrastructure, efforts to reopen the strait, I failed attempt to seize the enriched uranium, point to the centrality of these economic and logistical factors. 

So in conclusion what is unfolding is not simply about Iran itself, but about maintaining a broader system under strain. A debt-heavy, resource-dependent economic order requires stability in flows and continued access to critical assets. When those flows are threatened, intervention becomes more likely, and the familiar narrative of values is deployed to secure public support for what is essentially an illegitimate project. Whether intentional or structural, the pattern holds: strategic necessity drives action, narrative legitimises it, and the long-term consequences remain uncertain but, if history is any guide, unlikely to match the stated aims, nor the expectations of the aggressors.

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AMERICA'S ENDURING GOAL AND GRAND STRATEGY FOR WAR

20 March 2026

AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY

Iran is a step on the road to weakening China in order that America can maintain its global dominance. Iran is part of America's war against a multipolar world. 

A crisis is unfolding. America escalates, Europe pays, Russia benefits, China waits its turn. Slowly slowly, America's long-term goal and strategies becomes visible to us.

Overview
A war that looks chaotic may in fact have an elaborate structure and careful detailled planning. The peoples of Europe are beginning to notice and wake up to their dilemma, but it may already be too late.

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1. Stage Three And Rising Fear

Professor Robert Pape warns that we are entering stage 3 of 5 in escalation against Iran. Stage 3 is already scaring the bejesus out of most of us.

If stage 3 already feels extreme, then stages 4 and 5 move into territory that could engulf entire regions and possibly the globe. This is not a limited conflict. It is a ladder, and each rung increases risk exponentially.

What makes this alarming is not just the military dimension, but the systemic exposure. Energy markets, supply chains, and financial systems are all tightly coupled. A disruption in the Gulf spreads quickly into oil and gas price hikes, inflation, recession, and social fragmentation worldwide.

What's happening is is global loss, but we do not see any rational objective here. What is going on? 

Glossary
Escalation ladder – a structured sequence of conflict stages where each step increases intensity and risk
Systemic risk – risk that spreads across interconnected systems rather than remaining localised, becoming uncontrollable. 

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2. Europe Caught Between Freedom and Security 

Into this comes the Belgian Prime Minister’s complaint. Europe is funding the war in Ukraine, yet is absent from negotiations.

The phrase “it is not normal” is revealing. It signals not outrage, but a slightly pathetic recognition of Europe's weakness.

Europe finds itself in a structurally subordinate position. It contributes financially and bears economic consequences, yet strategic decisions are taken elsewhere. This is not an accident. It reflects the architecture of NATO and the post war Atlantic system.

In practical terms, Europe is exposed to:

• Energy shocks
• Refugee flows
• Economic disruption

Yet it lacks any decisive influence over war termination. It is divided, irresolute, lacks military force, is paralysed and excluded from a say in its future. 

This makes it illegitimate as far as the peoples are concerned. If you pay, you expect a voice. If you do not have a voice, you do not have sovereignty.

Glossary
Strategic autonomy – the ability of a state or bloc to make independent defence and foreign policy decisions
Vassalisation – a condition where a state retains formal independence but lacks real strategic control

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3. Orbán And The Geography Problem

Viktor Orbán cuts through the rhetoric with a blunt observation: Russia is permanent.

Geography does not change with ideology. Europe sits next to Russia. Energy flows, trade routes, and security realities follow that grounded fact.

Orbán’s argument is therefore structural and realistic, not ideological. Stability requires integration, not eternal exclusion. Security cannot be built indefinitely against a neighbour that cannot be moved... Or you get is instability. 

This reflects an older European logic. Balance of power rather than permanent confrontation.

• Geography pushes Europe toward Russia
• Security pulls Europe towards America

This contradiction sits at the heart of Europe’s dilemma.

Glossary
Security architecture – the framework of alliances and institutions that shape regional stability
Balance of power – a system where states maintain equilibrium to prevent dominance by any single power

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4. The American Strategy Revealed

Now let's step back and join the dots on the longer timeline.

Three key reference points:

• Wesley Clark, 2007 – sequential regime change thinking
• Brookings, 2009 – structured options to weaken Iran
• RAND, 2019 – methods to extend Russia

Individually, these are policy discussions, that seen as a whole they form a pattern.

The Glenn Diesen - Brian Berletic discussion makes the link explicit. Policy papers are not abstract. They are blueprints that evolve into strategy, doctrine, operations and action. 

The pattern suggests:

• Target regional powers
• Prevent consolidation across Eurasia
• Apply pressure through proxies*, sanctions, and war

This aligns closely with an updated version of Mackinder’s classic geopolitical thesis. Control or fragment Eurasia, and global dominance follows:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island commands the world.

Glossary
Grand strategy – long term coordination of military, economic and political tools to achieve dominance
Mackinder theory – the idea that control of Eurasia determines global power

ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) - the systematic collection and analysis of information about an adversary through observation, monitoring, and data gathering, used to guide military decisions and targeting

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5. The Multipolar Threat And The Rise of China

The deeper layer is China. Brian Berletic highlights a critical point. The ultimate constraint on US dominance is the rise of China as a fully integrated industrial, financial, and energy independent power.

From this we can understand why :

• Iran matters as an energy node
• Russia matters as a strategic and resource base
• The importance of The Middle East in providing the primary input to industry 
• Eurasia as an integrated system 

Disrupt these, and China’s rise slows.

The strategy described is not simply about individual conflicts, it is about preventing and disrupting the emergence of a coherent alternative system.

Energy is central - restrict energy flows and you will restrict growth. Target infrastructure, and you reshape global trade. The ultimate aim is to throttle Chinese growth and stall a multi polar world. 

This is geoeconomics at scale.

Glossary
Multipolar world – a global system with several major centres of power rather than one dominant state
Geoeconomics – the use of economic tools such as energy, trade, and sanctions to achieve geopolitical goals

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6. Continuity Across Presidencies

One of the most striking observations is continuity.

From Bush to Obama to Trump, the trajectory remains pretty consistent - tactics may change, rhe language used certainly changes, but the direction persists. 

This raises an uncomfortable question about democracy.

If strategic outcomes remain stable regardless of electoral change, then where does real power sit... Not with the people?

Brian Berletic suggests that:

• Corporate and financial interests, through lobby groups, shape long term policy
• Think tanks develop frameworks
• Governments implement variations of the same agenda

The reality is of very limited choices at the urns, the breaking of campaign promises, the continuity across the electoral cycles.

Glossary
Policy continuity – the persistence of strategic direction across different political administrations
Think tank – an organisation that produces policy research and strategic recommendations

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7. Europe’s Strategic Trap

Europe now faces a narrow choice that can be resumed to a choice between freedom or security.

Remain aligned with the Atlantic system and accept limited sovereignty; or attempt strategic independence and accept higher risk.

Constraints are real:

• Military dependence on the US
• Fragmented political structure and EU impotence 
• Energy vulnerability

This is why many complaints continually emerge but change does not follow.

Europe is too large to ignore, but too divided to act independently, with the result being paralysis. And the EU leadership knows this but can do nothing. 

Glossary
Dependency structure – a system where one actor relies on another for critical capabilities
Strategic paralysis – inability to act decisively due to conflicting objectives or constraints

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8. The Emerging Inflection Point

The United States may be pushing multiple fronts simultaneously - surely Iran, Russia, and China represent a scale of challenge that stretches resources too far.

History suggests that empires often fail not from defeat, but from debt, overreach abroad and fragmentation at home.

If that is the case, a turning point may come where:

• Costs exceed benefits
• Allies question alignment
• Multipolar structures strengthen faster than they can be disrupted

At that point, Europe may find space to reposition itself, though this requires a general awakening. 

Glossary
Overextension – a condition where a power stretches its resources beyond sustainable limits
Inflection point – a moment where a trend changes direction or accelerates rapidly

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9. Bottom Line

This is the core reality.

America seeks to preserve its primacy.
China rises.
Russia resists.
Iran takes the pressure and escalates.
Europe hesitates.

And the world moves, step by step, up an escalation ladder, with America falling into an "escalation trap", as Robert Pape calls it.

The tragedy is that what seems like a completely irrational and utterly pointless War, may be entirely logical within the system that created it.

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10. References

Why Iran GROUND INVASION IS Likely COMING (Robert Pape interview)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfyllo2Qiq8

Europe Paying For War But Not At The Table (Sebastian commentary on De Wever and Orbán)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPEXMGCfws8

Glenn Diesen Interviews Brian Berletic On US Strategy And Multipolar War
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rHhRNaH9LI

Gen Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid And Discusses US War Plans (Democracy Now, 2 March 2007)
https://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/2/gen_wesley_clark_weighs_presidential_bid

Which Path To Persia? Options For A New American Strategy Toward Iran (Brookings Institution, 2009)
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/which-path-to-persia-options-for-a-new-american-strategy-toward-iran/

Which Path To Persia? Full Report PDF (Brookings Institution, June 2009)
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_iran_strategy.pdf

Extending Russia: Competing From Advantageous Ground (RAND Corporation, 2019)
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3063.html

Extending Russia Full Report PDF (RAND Corporation, 2019)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3063/RAND_RR3063.pdf

De Wever Confirms Support For Ukraine While Questioning Europe’s Role (The Brussels Times, 2026)
https://www.brusselstimes.com/belgium/2031297/de-wever-confirms-100-belgian-support-for-ukraine

No Appetite In EU For Renewed Energy Deals With Russia, Kallas Says (Reuters, 17 March 2026)
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/no-appetite-eu-energy-deals-with-russia-kallas-says-2026-03-17/

Orbán: Russia Should Remain Part Of Europe’s Security, Energy And Trade Systems (Novinite, 2026)
https://www.novinite.com/articles/237577/Orban%3A%2BRussia%2BShould%2BRemain%2BPart%2Bof%2BEurope%E2%80%99s%2BSecurity%2C%2BEnergy%2C%2Band%2BTrade%2BSystems

Orbán Says Russia Must Be Included In Europe’s Future Systems (TASS, 2026)
https://tass.com/world/2103567

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IRAN WAR REALITIES

18 March 2026

IRAN WAR REALITIES: POWER, PERCEPTIONS AND THE GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES

https://www.youtube.com/live/btfqR-LV7sk?si=OwfSXExqZSp4K9cf

https://youtu.be/Q3Hy-qVJB6A?si=3OaBmsu-Q1qmNZtL

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A long-standing narrative casts Iran as the central threat in West Asia and globally, yet the deeper reality is that rivalry with Israel has been the cause of global insecurity since the start of the Cold War, when both emerged as competing regional powers. 

The present conflict which started on 28th February reveals a stark asymmetry. Iran cannot strike the American homeland, yet it holds decisive leverage over global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is targeting the global economy rather than seeking outright military victory.

For the United States, Netanyahu played a psychologically thrilling a game by selling Donald Trump the idea that a fight with Iran would produce a quick, clean and decisive outcome. In fact Netanyahu, understanding Trump's psychology, laid a strategic trap . For Israel, even partial degradation of Iran may already constitute success as it would set a random back a decade. 

Meanwhile, inside Iran, war is likely to strengthen hardline control rather than weaken the regime.

The result is a familiar but dangerous pattern. Military action intended to resolve instability instead deepens it, with consequences extending far beyond the region into global markets, political alignments, and the balance of power itself.

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1. Why There Has Been Persistent Hostility Towards Iran

Iran and Israel were not always enemies. For decades, Iran was central to Israel’s security architecture, supplying oil and acting as a key non-Arab ally. This aligned with Israel’s strategy of balancing hostile Arab states through peripheral alliances.

The rupture came with the 1979 revolution. However, the decisive shift into sustained hostility occurred after the Cold War. With the Soviet Union gone and Arab nationalism weakened, Iran and Israel emerged as rival regional powers.

At that point, Israeli leadership, including figures such as Benjamin Netanyahu, actively pushed Washington to reframe Iran as a primary threat. The narrative that Iran was perpetually “two years away” from a nuclear weapon dates from this period.

From this perspective, hostility was not inevitable. It was constructed to maintain Israel’s strategic relevance in US foreign policy and to block any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.

Geostrategic – relating to power shaped by geography and regional positioning
Rapprochement – restoration of relations between previously hostile states
Threat Inflation – exaggerating a danger to justify policy or action

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2. Whether Iran Is Truly The World’s Leading Sponsor Of Terrorism

The claim rests heavily on how “terrorism” is defined. If it means supporting groups opposed by the United States or Israel, then Iran fits the label.

If it means sponsoring attacks like 9/11 or operations in Europe and America, the evidence is weak. In fact, much of that activity has historically been linked to Sunni jihadist networks, often with roots in US-aligned Gulf states.

The credibility of the “terrorism list” itself is questioned. Groups have been removed after lobbying campaigns, despite histories of violence, and later used in operations aligned with Western or Israeli interests.

The conclusion is blunt. The label functions as a political tool rather than a consistent analytical category.

Terrorism – use of violence against civilians for political aims
Proxy Groups – non-state actors supported by states to pursue strategic goals
Political Labelling – assigning labels to shape perception rather than reflect reality

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3. Whether The Iranian Population Supports The Regime

Support for the Iranian system is limited but far from negligible. Around 15–20% form a highly committed base, numbering in the tens of millions.

A second group, often younger, is strongly opposed and increasingly radicalised by failed reform efforts.

The decisive factor is the large middle. This group does not support the regime but rejects regime change imposed through foreign bombing or invasion.

This middle bloc prevents collapse. It blocks both internal revolution and external overthrow, ensuring continuity despite dissatisfaction.

Theocracy – political system governed by religious authority
Reform Failure – inability of gradual change to meet public expectations
Middle Majority – large non-aligned segment stabilising a system

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4. Why War Strengthens Rather Than Weakens Iran

External attack does not fragment Iran. It consolidates it.

War energises regime supporters and shifts power towards hardline institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard. Even critics of the regime resist foreign intervention.

The likely outcome is not regime collapse but a more repressive and centralised state. War eliminates moderates and empowers those arguing that compromise with the West is futile.

Rally Effect – population unites under external threat
Hardline Consolidation – strengthening of authoritarian factions during conflict
Repression – increased control over political and social life

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5. Whether The War Was A Miscalculation

The argument is asymmetric.

From Israel’s perspective, particularly under Netanyahu, the objective was not necessarily regime change. It was to degrade Iran and permanently block US–Iran diplomacy. Even a partial setback for Iran counts as success.

From the US perspective, the operation appears as a strategic miscalculation. It assumed rapid collapse, underestimated Iranian resilience, and failed to define a viable endgame.

This creates a divergence. What is a tactical success for Israel becomes a strategic trap for the United States.

Strategic Divergence – allies pursuing different end goals
Degradation – weakening an adversary without defeating it
Endgame – defined objective and exit strategy in conflict

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6. The Role Of Trump And Political Psychology

Donald Trump’s decision-making is framed as highly outcome-driven. He avoids prolonged, messy conflicts but is receptive to actions framed as quick, decisive victories.

This creates an opening. By presenting Iran as weak and near collapse, advocates of war made the operation appear low-risk and high-reward.

Previous decisions reinforced this pattern. Moves such as recognising Jerusalem or killing Soleimani did not trigger immediate catastrophe, reinforcing a belief in consequence-free escalation.

The result was overconfidence. The expectation of rapid Iranian capitulation proved false, leaving no coherent Plan B beyond continued bombing.

Overconfidence Bias – overestimating likelihood of success
Strategic Framing – presenting actions in a way that influences decisions
Plan B Failure – absence of fallback strategy when initial assumptions fail

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7. Whether The United States Is Acting Independently

The analysis is blunt.

Statements from US officials indicate that Washington entered the conflict partly because Israeli actions made retaliation likely. Instead of restraining escalation, the US chose to join it.

This suggests a reactive posture. Rather than controlling the timeline, the US allowed Israeli decisions to shape its own involvement.

The implication is uncomfortable. US policy appears influenced, if not driven, by Israeli strategic priorities rather than independent assessment of American interests.

Strategic Autonomy – ability of a state to act independently in its own interest
Escalation Entrapment – being drawn into conflict by an ally’s actions
Policy Capture – external influence shaping national decision-making

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8. Control Of The Strait Of Hormuz

Iran’s strongest leverage is not symbolic but economic.

Control over the Strait of Hormuz allows Iran to disrupt global oil flows. Countries seeking passage have negotiated directly with Tehran, not Washington, indicating where practical control lies.

Military options to reopen the strait carry high risk. US naval forces would need to enter missile range, exposing them to significant losses.

This shifts the balance. Iran may lack global reach, but it controls a critical node in the global system.

Chokepoint – narrow passage controlling major trade flows
Maritime Denial – preventing access to sea routes
Leverage – ability to influence outcomes through control of key assets

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9. The Real Battlefield: The Global Economy

Iran is not primarily trying to defeat Israel militarily.

Instead, it targets the most vulnerable pressure point: the global economy. By disrupting Gulf energy flows and regional production, it creates cascading economic damage.

Estimates already indicate severe contractions in Gulf economies, with knock-on effects across Asia and beyond. Fuel shortages and disruptions are appearing within weeks.

This is strategic logic. Economic pain is faster and more decisive than military attrition.

Economic Warfare – using economic disruption as a weapon
Shock Transmission – rapid spread of economic disruption across systems
Systemic Risk – threat to the stability of an entire system

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10. How The Conflict Is Likely To End

A clean victory is unlikely.

Iran is unlikely to reopen the Strait of Hormuz without concessions, particularly sanctions relief. Without this, it would emerge weaker and vulnerable to future attacks.

The most plausible outcome is a negotiated settlement mediated by external powers. Public narratives may claim victory, but the substance will reflect compromise.

The deeper consequence is structural. Rather than weakening the Iranian system, the war is likely to strengthen hardline control and reduce prospects for internal reform.

Sanctions Relief – easing of economic restrictions imposed by other states
Negotiated Settlement – agreement reached through diplomacy rather than force
Authoritarian Entrenchment – strengthening of a centralised, repressive system

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FALLOUT FROM AMERICA BOMBING IRAN'S URANIUM NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

24 June 2025

It was always a stupid idea to want to blow 400 kg of highly enriched uranium out of its safe bunkers, deep underground, up and out into the atmosphere and strewn across the surface of the planet, blown by the winds, hither and thither.

But even dumber was to imagine that the owners would not have taken steps to safeguard their little haul, because now, no one except a handful of highly trusted officials know where it is! It's gone walkies!!

Offers of help to find it must be pouring in, but I imagine the owners will accept offers from anyone able to quickly turn it into an atomic weapon.

Stupid is as stupid does.

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