UK DEBT - THE WEIGHT OF PROMISES

9 June 2026

In Britain on the Brink we looked at Liam Halligan's analysis of UK Debt, Energy and "the Coming Crisis". In this article, we shall seek to understand why UK debt continually increases and what if anything can be done about it.

Overview

UK public debt has risen from near-zero in the mid-1970s to around £3.5 trillion today, not in a smooth line but through a series of crisis-driven jumps that reset the fiscal baseline each time. 

Beneath the headline number lies a more structural story: an ageing society, slowing productivity growth, and repeated political choices that expand long-term commitments faster than the tax base can sustainably support. 

While the language of “decline” is often invoked, the more precise dynamic is one of accumulating rigidity rather than imminent breakdown. The UK retains full monetary sovereignty and deep access to global capital markets, meaning this is not a classical solvency story, but a gradual tightening of fiscal space in which pensions, healthcare, and debt interest increasingly pre-allocate the state’s resources before any discretionary policy is even considered.

1. THE WEIGHT OF PROMISES — UK DEBT IN STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The chart is striking. From a near-zero base in the mid-1970s, UK public sector debt has climbed in three distinct lurches to reach £3,513.7 billion - more than three and a half trillion pounds. It is the kind of graph that prompts strong reactions: alarm, outrage, or, from certain quarters, dark talk of civilisational decline and wipeout. To understand what it actually shows, and what it doesn't, requires separating structural arithmetic from historical analogy.

Glossary

Structural debt – accumulated borrowing that persists across cycles rather than being temporary.
Public sector debt – total outstanding borrowing by government and related public bodies.
Civilisational decline – broad historical interpretation linking economic indicators to societal contraction.

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2. THE ARITHMETIC FIRST - WHY DEBT BECOMES STRUCTURAL

The UK has gradually evolved into a state that promises more than its economy can sustainably finance. This is not a partisan observation. Successive governments of all parties have faced the same underlying numbers.

An ageing population means rising pension, NHS healthcare, and social care costs year after year. Economic growth has slowed markedly since the 1970s, constraining the expansion of the tax base. Voters resist both higher taxes and cuts to visible public services. And politicians, operating on four- or five-year electoral cycles, have little structural incentive to address debt that accumulates over decades.

For example, the per capita monthly cost of the NHS:

Low estimate:

£2,685 ÷ 12 ≈ £224 per month

High estimate:

£2,985 ÷ 12 ≈ £249 per month

Reasonable working range: £220–£250 per man woman and child per month.

On top of this chronic mismatch, major shocks deliver step-changes. The early 1990s recession, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 2020 Covid response each produced a permanent upward shift in debt. After each crisis, spending commitments remained elevated while growth recovery lagged.

The result is a structural deficit - a gap between spending and revenue that persists even in normal economic conditions.

Glossary

Ageing population – rising proportion of elderly citizens relative to working-age groups.
Structural deficit – persistent fiscal shortfall across the economic cycle.
Fiscal shock – sudden event that increases government spending or reduces revenue.

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3. WHY EVERY GOVERNMENT MAKES IT WORSE - POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM

Debt accumulation is not primarily a partisan outcome. It is an institutional equilibrium.

Conservative administrations tend to prioritise lower taxation, defence spending, and protection of pensions and healthcare. Labour administrations tend to prioritise public investment and welfare expansion, while also protecting core services. Both therefore avoid confronting the largest structural spending areas.

Three underlying drivers explain persistence.

First, demographics. In 1950, around seven workers supported each pensioner. Today it is closer to three, and the ratio continues to deteriorate.
Second, deindustrialisation. Manufacturing has fallen from around 30% of GDP in the 1970s to roughly 10%, narrowing the tax base.
Third, weak productivity☆ growth since 2008, limiting wage growth and tax revenue expansion.

In combination, these forces produce a system in which spending commitments rise faster than the willingness or ability to fund them.

Glossary

Dependency ratio – ratio of non-working to working-age population.
Deindustrialisation – long-term decline in manufacturing share of the economy.
Productivity growth – increase in output per unit of labour input.

☆ Why weak productivity growth since 2008? See footnote

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4. THE IMPERIAL ANALOGY — WHERE IT HAS TRACTION

Historical parallels are often invoked because the long-run shape of debt accumulation resembles earlier imperial cycles.

Late Rome experienced shrinking fiscal capacity and currency debasement. The Spanish Empire repeatedly defaulted despite inflows of silver. The Ottoman Empire lost fiscal autonomy through foreign debt administration in the 19th century. Britain itself shifted from creditor to debtor after 1918.

The common pattern is rising structural costs, weakening revenue bases, and increasing fiscal rigidity.

In the UK context, similar features are visible. A growing share of spending is absorbed by pensions, healthcare, and debt interest before discretionary policy begins. This creates what can be described as fiscal sclerosis - increasing rigidity in public finances. Relative economic weight has also declined in manufacturing and global GDP share.

The analogy is useful as it highlights constraint, rigidity, and long-run relative decline.

Glossary

Fiscal sclerosis – progressive rigidity in government spending due to fixed obligations.
Debt interest – cost of servicing accumulated government borrowing.
Relative economic decline – fall in share of global output rather than absolute contraction.

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5. WHERE THE ANALOGY BREAKS — MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY AND MODERN FINANCE

Despite its rhetorical appeal, the imperial analogy has what you might call "structural limits".

Historical empires often lost monetary control. Rome debased currency under fiscal stress. Spain defaulted in foreign-denominated obligations. The Ottoman Empire borrowed in external currencies and lost fiscal autonomy.

The UK does not operate in that framework.

First, it is a sovereign currency issuer. Debt is denominated in sterling, and the Bank of England supports liquidity in the system.

Second, gilts are a deep global asset class held by domestic institutions and international investors. There is no immediate shortage of demand for UK debt.

Third, sterling retains reserve-currency "adjacency", giving it financial flexibility absent in most historical empires.

Additionally, modern defence commitments are heavy, but not structurally comparable to expansionist imperial militaries☆☆. NATO membership and nuclear deterrence limit fiscal exposure.

The constraint is therefore not insolvency risk in the classical sense of default or "going bust", but the rising cost of servicing debt within a low-growth economy, threatening increasing poverty and social fragmentation.

Glossary

Monetary sovereignty – ability of a state to issue and control its own currency.
Gilts – UK government bonds.
Reserve currency – widely held global currency used in trade and finance and reserves.

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6. THE REAL QUESTION - ADJUSTMENT, NOT COLLAPSE

The relevant framework is not collapse but adjustment.

Three broad paths exist.

Fiscal tightening would involve higher taxation or reduced spending, but faces political resistance. 

Growth-led stabilisation would require productivity improvement through education & technology dev. and rollout, more investment in the real including infrastructure, and institutional reform and de-regulation. 

Financial repression would involve maintaining low real interest rates relative to inflation, gradually burning off debt burdens in real terms.

The UK appears to be mixing all three, with limited success in each.

The key point is that none of these paths imply systemic failure, the failure of the system as a whole. They imply distributional choices over time ie who bears the cost of adjustment - taxpayers, savers, or future service users?

Glossary

Financial repression – suppression of real interest rates below inflation.
Real interest rates – nominal rates adjusted for inflation.
Fiscal adjustment – policy changes to restore balance between spending and revenue.

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7. ON BALANCE - STRUCTURAL STRAIN WITHOUT TERMINAL COLLAPSE

The UK exhibits features consistent with late-cycle fiscal systems: slow growth, ageing demographics, and increasing entitlement burdens.

However, it does not exhibit classical end-of-empire failure modes such as loss of monetary control, external fiscal domination, or inability to refinance debt in domestic currency.

The outcome is more consistent with long-term fiscal compression than abrupt crisis. Living standards and fiscal flexibility may erode gradually, but within a framework of institutional continuity.

The £3.5 trillion debt is therefore best seen as a constraint on the future policy space rather than a precursor to systemic collapse.

The key issue is not whether the system breaks, but how the adjustment burden is distributed across time and social groups, if a fourth turning is to be headed off before collapse.

Glossary

Fiscal compression – long-term tightening of available public spending space.
Policy space – range of feasible government fiscal options.
Institutional continuity – persistence of core state structures despite economic change.

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Footnotes

☆ Why weak productivity growth since 2008?

The 2008 crisis triggered a prolonged period of cheap credit that kept "zombie" firms alive - businesses too weak to invest or innovate but able to service debt at near-zero rates, dragging down economy-wide productivity. 

At the same time, the UK's particular mix of post-crisis austerity and weak business investment starved the economy of the capital deepening - esp. better machinery, technology, infrastructure - that normally drives output per worker higher. 

Underlying this was a structural shift: an economy increasingly weighted toward low-productivity services, retail, and hospitality rather than high-value manufacturing or R&D-intensive industries.

So the UK became a financialised economy ie consumption-lead, debt-driven economy, rather than a real economy ie production and investment economy.

This is precisely the financialisation thesis at the heart of this blog's core argument. 

When an economy prioritises consumption, property, and financial services over production and capital investment, it generates wealth on paper but hollows out the real productive base that sustains long-run growth, wages and tax revenues. The UK became, in effect, a leveraged consumer - borrowing against rising house prices to fund living standards that the underlying economy could no longer organically support. 

This is why the debt chart and the productivity chart are really the same story told twice. And why a possible solution to the financialisation debt trap would reverse this - fiscal prudence, real wage increases, and investment for reshoring and growth of the real economy... is it too late?

☆☆ Modern defence commitments are heavy, but not structurally comparable to expansionist imperial militaries

The data supports the point clearly. UK defence spending stood at 3.3% of GDP in 1990-91 and has since fallen to around 2.3% (Institute for Fiscal Studies) - despite current pressures to rebuild. Compare that to the Roman or Spanish imperial military burden, which routinely consumed 50–70% of state revenues. 

Current UK spending is around 2.4% of GDP, with commitments to reach 3.5% by 2035 (House of Commons Library) - significant, but a managed collective obligation shared across NATO allies, not the open-ended unilateral cost of empire.

And America?

America is the exception that proves the rule - and arguably the last empire still paying the full unilateral cost.

US defence spending runs at around 3.5% of GDP, but that figure understates the true burden when you add veterans' benefits, intelligence agencies, foreign military aid, and the nuclear arsenal maintenance. More structurally, the US maintains approximately 750 military bases in 80 countries - a global garrison posture with no historical peacetime parallel. The fiscal consequence is visible: US defence spending is the single largest discretionary item in the federal budget, and cumulative post-9/11 war costs have been estimated by Brown University's Costs of War project at over $8 trillion.

The irony is that NATO, from a European perspective, has been a mechanism for offloading precisely this imperial overhead onto American taxpayers - which is the real grievance behind Trump's burden-sharing complaints, whatever you may think of his manner of expressing it.

Read More

BRITAIN ON THE BRINK

31 May 2026

Britain on the Brink: Liam Halligan on Debt, Energy and the Coming Crisis

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1. The Debt Emergency

Britain's public finances are in systemic distress. In February 2026 alone, the government borrowed £14.3 billion, of which £13 billion went on debt interest payments. Long-term gilt yields are now at their highest levels since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, even as the Bank of England cuts its policy rate.

This unusual divergence suggests that financial markets are becoming increasingly sceptical about Britain's ability to control inflation and stabilise its finances. The UK now pays more to borrow than several countries once regarded as financially fragile, including Greece and Morocco. In this environment, the judgement of global bond markets matters more than decisions made by Threadneedle Street.

Glossary

Gilt – A UK government bond used to finance public borrowing.

Yield – The return demanded by investors for lending money.

Debt interest – The cost of servicing existing government debt.

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2. The Political Class Has Lost Touch with Markets

When Labour entered office in 1997, memories of Britain's 1976 IMF crisis remained vivid. Senior figures ensured that experienced market practitioners remained close to government decision-making.

According to Halligan, that instinct has largely disappeared. He argues that today's political leadership contains too few people with practical experience of running businesses, managing investment risk or responding to market pressures. The result is a political culture that struggles to understand how investors react to fiscal and economic policy.

The deeper concern is not any individual minister but a wider political and media establishment that appears unable to discuss reducing the growth of public spending without treating it as politically impossible.

Glossary

Fiscal policy – Government decisions on taxation and spending.

Market confidence – Investor belief that a government can manage its finances responsibly.

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3. The Tax Burden Reaches a Modern Peak

Britain's overall tax burden has reached its highest level in roughly three-quarters of a century.

Recent measures, including higher employer National Insurance Contributions, reduced tax thresholds, changes to agricultural and business property relief, and penalties associated with electric vehicle mandates, have increased costs across the economy.

Critics argue that these measures are placing particular strain on small and medium-sized enterprises while simultaneously reducing opportunities for younger workers. Youth unemployment has risen sharply, and lower employment thresholds mean that businesses incur payroll taxes much earlier than before.

The concern is that policies designed to raise revenue may ultimately reduce economic activity and weaken the tax base itself.

Glossary

SME – Small and medium-sized enterprise.

National Insurance – Payroll tax used to fund state benefits and public services.

Tax base – The economic activity from which governments collect tax revenue.

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4. The Ghost of 1976

Britain's IMF crisis of 1976 remains one of the most important turning points in modern British economic history.

Facing a collapse in confidence, the government was forced to seek external financial support. The IMF required spending reductions and economic reforms in exchange for assistance. The political damage was profound and helped reshape British politics for a generation.

Today's circumstances differ, but Halligan sees an important parallel. The constraint no longer comes from formal international institutions but from global bond markets. When governments ignore financial realities, investors eventually impose discipline through higher borrowing costs.

Similar dynamics have occurred in countries such as Ireland, Italy and Greece during the past two decades.

Glossary

IMF – International Monetary Fund, a lender of last resort for sovereign states.

Sovereign debt – Money borrowed by national governments.

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5. Index-Linked Debt: Britain's Hidden Vulnerability

One of Britain's least discussed financial vulnerabilities is the unusually large share of index-linked government debt.

About a quarter to a third of UK government borrowing is linked directly to inflation. This proportion is significantly higher than in most advanced economies.

The consequence is a dangerous feedback loop. When inflation rises, debt servicing costs rise automatically. Higher interest costs require additional borrowing, which can further undermine confidence in public finances.

Compounding the problem is the changing ownership of British government debt. Domestic pension funds, once major long-term holders of gilts, play a smaller role today. Increasingly, ownership rests with international investors and financial institutions whose commitment depends entirely on returns rather than national interest.

Glossary

Index-linked debt – Bonds whose payments rise with inflation.

Feedback loop – A process in which an effect reinforces its original cause.

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6. Energy Policy and Economic Competitiveness

Energy remains central to Britain's economic challenges.

The UK imports significant quantities of oil and gas despite possessing substantial North Sea resources. Gas storage capacity is limited compared with major European economies, leaving the country more exposed to supply disruptions.

Meanwhile, North Sea tax revenues have fallen dramatically as investment has weakened. Critics argue that high windfall taxes discouraged new development, reducing future production and government income simultaneously.

The automotive sector faces additional pressure from electric vehicle mandates. Manufacturers must balance regulatory requirements, consumer demand and international competition at a time when the industry is already undergoing significant structural change.

The broader criticism is that energy policy has become disconnected from economic competitiveness and energy security.

Glossary

Windfall tax – An additional tax on unexpectedly high profits.

Energy security – Reliable access to affordable energy supplies.

ZEV mandate – Regulations requiring a growing proportion of vehicle sales to be zero-emission.

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7. The Strait of Hormuz and the External Shock

Around one-fifth of global oil and gas trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the world's most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

Any prolonged disruption affects not only energy prices but also fertiliser production, transportation costs and food prices. Because supply chains operate with delays, the economic consequences often emerge weeks or months after the initial disruption.

Britain enters such a scenario from a position of relative vulnerability due to its dependence on imported energy and limited storage capacity.

The concern is that an external energy shock could arrive just as public finances and economic growth are already under pressure.

Glossary

Strait of Hormuz – Narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to global shipping routes.

Supply shock – A sudden reduction in the availability of goods or resources.

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8. Is There a Way Out?

Halligan's proposed solutions begin with spending restraint rather than immediate tax reductions.

He argues that restoring fiscal credibility requires demonstrating control over government expenditure before attempting significant tax cuts. Other proposals include raising the VAT threshold, reducing regulatory burdens on smaller firms, encouraging investment, and making more productive use of publicly owned land.

Whether such reforms are politically achievable remains uncertain. Halligan's central argument is that meaningful change is unlikely until financial markets force a reassessment of current policies.

History suggests that governments often postpone difficult decisions until external pressures leave them with no alternative.

Glossary

VAT threshold – The turnover level at which businesses must register for Value Added Tax.

Fiscal credibility – Market confidence in a government's financial management.

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9. The Consent Problem

Beneath the economic arguments lies a deeper political concern.

Modern democracies depend not only on elections but also on public trust that institutions are broadly competent and responsive. When citizens repeatedly experience financial crises, declining living standards and policy failures, confidence gradually erodes.

The growing support for insurgent political movements across the political spectrum may reflect less a shift in ideology than a search for alternatives. Voters who feel ignored by established parties often look elsewhere, regardless of whether those alternatives ultimately succeed.

Economic indicators can measure debt, inflation and growth. Public consent is harder to quantify. Yet history suggests it may be the most important variable of all.

Glossary

Political consent – Public acceptance of the legitimacy and effectiveness of governing institutions.

Insurgent parties – Political movements challenging established parties and institutions.

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References

Liam Halligan interview and commentary, 2026.

UK Office for National Statistics (ONS)

UK Debt Management Office (DMO)

Bank of England

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)

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DO WE WANT OR NEED A DIGITAL ID CARD

11 October 2025

What do they really want?? They want us to have nothing and be happy.

What do we want? Freedom, security and equality.

Technocrat or humanist - Blair v Field.

Of these, freedom for us individualists is the greatest. (In that video, the author mentions China. If it "works" for them, it could be because they put the community first, before the individual, and they seek harmony over freedom.)

Freedom means free to do, think, and live according to my own choices, with minimal interference from the state, big business, or social coercions. It's freedom from interference and it's freedom to develop my maximum according to my possibilities.

It's a qualitative thing, how you feel, but could some quantitative scale be assembled against which the unique ID number identifier proposal could be judged?

The benefits Starmer offers in that video clip are poppycock. The implementation risks are in that video. Where are the costs to us living under this freaky control regime? We in the West no longer live in true democracies, and unfortunately the "technocrats" who govern operate a global governance organisation, they view government as a tool that functions best under competent leadership, irrespective of the democratic quality of the system, except that recent leaders defer to Washington and show little sign of competence - look at this ID card idea ... will it turn out like HS2 or the poll tax or the Covid lockdowns - examples where competent leaders may still make poor decisions if they lack a robust guiding philosophy. Except rhat now we have Starmer.

Contrast this with sadly departed Frank Field, influenced by a fading Christian socialist tradition. Frank Field emphasised the dangers of rationalism (aka technical competence) in politics. He advocated for acknowledging human nature's limitations and promoting "self-interested altruism".

What's left of the benefits of being alive today? To answer this q, just assess how much control we individuals would have left over our lives across political, economic, social, digital, and psychological dimensions.

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WILL THE UK NEED A BAILOUT

29 August 2025

Will the UK Need a Bailout?

Introduction

Talk of a UK bailout still feels far-fetched - after all, Britain has advantages that France does not enjoy. The UK issues debt in its own free-floating currency, has an unusually long average gilt maturity of around 14 years, and benefits from an independent central bank that can backstop markets, as the Bank of England showed during the 2022 LDI pension fund crisis. 

These buffers give more breathing room than France, now under pressure for emergency spending cuts and its government demanding a vote of confidence on its austerity plan.

Yet Britain’s fiscal arithmetic is tightening. With debt at historic highs, annual borrowing still large, and gilt yields back to levels not seen since the 1990s, the question requires very serious consideration.

1. Where the UK is Today

2. How We Got Here

3. Where We Need to Be

4. The Path to Get There - and the Risks

1. Where the UK is Today

• Public debt stands at £2.77 trillion (97% of GDP), the highest ratio since the early 1960s

• The deficit remains about 4.4% of GDP, or £121 billion per year

• Gross financing needs are truly enormous: around £299 billion of gilt issuance scheduled in 2025/26

• Debt interest is consuming £111 billion annually - more than the education budget ... and rising as older gilts are refinanced at higher rates

• Yields on 10-year gilts are around 4.7%, with 30-year above 5.5%, showing markets demand a significant premium.

2. How We Got Here

• A decade of weak growth has made every fiscal shock harder and harder to absorb

• COVID-19 borrowing and energy subsidies after NATO expansion finally provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, piling on fresh debt

• Reliance on index-linked gilts (~22% of the total) backfired when inflation spiked, pushing up interest costs

• The LDI “mini-budget” crisis of 2022 demonstrated how quickly markets can revolt if fiscal policy appears unfunded, but equally how quickly confidence can return when government applies the brakes

3. Where We Need to Be

SMART Targets

• Stabilise debt by reducing borrowing below 3% of GDP (~£80 billion), within the next five years

• Bring the interest bill back under control, aiming to cap it below 3% of GDP (~£85 billion)

• Preserve the UK’s strengths: long debt maturities, central bank independence, credibility with investors

• Restore enough fiscal space to invest in productivity drivers - energy security, AI, infrastructure, skills, start-up incubators - so consolidation doesn’t turn to permanent stagnation.

4. The Path to Get There - and the Risks

• Consolidation: fiscal effort worth 1 - 2% of GDP (£30–60 billion) through a mix of targeted tax reform and spending restraint

• Windfall taxes eg on banks, to raise billions

• Market management: the BoE can pause quantitative tightening or intervene in gilt markets again if disorder arises, but credibility requires political discipline too

• Growth strategy: faster productivity growth can make the debt sustainable long-term. That means tackling housing, planning, and skills bottlenecks.

• Risks:

o Political backlash against spending cuts or tax rises, and civil unrest

o External shocks (oil prices, US rates, inflation reduction act and tariffs, more war) pushing yields higher

o If credibility is lost, an IMF-BoE package in the order of £120–180 billion could become unavoidable, with painful conditionality.

In short, the UK is not yet France, but its fiscal cushion is eroding. Unless borrowing is curbed and growth restored, the conversation about bailouts could shift from speculation to reality within this Parliament. 

Read More

THE UK GOVERNMENT'S SUPER INJUNCTION

21 July 2025

What's this fuss about a super injunction? And the 30,000 who are being integrated into the UK?

treason-uks-secret-plan-to-resettle-thousands-of-afghans-revealed-after-superinjunction-lifted/

The public are being lied to

- Unprecedented secrecy: first known instance of a government using one a super injunxtion (silly name)

- Democratic failure: we were all denied oversight for nearly two years

- Risk - reward miscalculation: judge told rhe MoD risks were overestimated, yet the gag remained in place

- Public trust eroded: how many more cockups are being covered up; why did a labour Prime Minister cover up for the Tories, like for the elite?

Well maybe it was a cock-up, but Ida thought that these are exactly the kind of people that the UK wants - educated and loyal and young - what a scoop!

There we go - what might have been a positive thing and in accord with a moral duty, has instead turned into a political scandal over secrecy and accountability.

Who gives a damn - they were only loyal afghanis.

As u wld say, "what a mess". As Mearsheimer says, " they've got the meidas touch in reverse"... everything they touch turns to s**t.

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TECHNOCRAT OR HUMANIST - BLAIR V FIELD

26 April 2024

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/04/25/tony-blair-offers-a-terrifying-glimpse-into-our-future/

Is it better that the country be governed by a philosopher king and his best solutions, or by the people and their values?

SUMMARY

1. Contrasting Political Philosophies of Tony Blair and Frank Field

Background and Ideological Differences

Tony Blair and Frank Field represent two distinctly different approaches within the Labour Party. Frank Field, influenced by a fading Christian socialist tradition, emphasised the dangers of rationalism in politics and advocated for acknowledging human nature's limitations and promoting self-interested altruism. In contrast, Tony Blair operates a global governance organisation, viewing government as a tool that functions best under competent leadership, irrespective of the democratic quality of the system.

2. Blair's Governance Philosophy

Pragmatic, technocratic, focus on competence over form

Blair's approach to politics is highly pragmatic, focusing on competence over the form of government. He suggests that non-democratic systems can function effectively if led by smart individuals, although this perspective overlooks the broader implications of such governance styles. Blair supports his view by pointing to exceptions like Singapore and the UAE, which he sees as examples of effective governance due to competent leadership.

3. Critique of Competence as a Sole Leadership Quality

Effective leadership requires strong moral beliefs

The notion that only competence should drive government is critiqued. Competence alone, without a strong value system, is seen as insufficient for effective leadership. Historical policies like the poll tax and the Covid lockdowns are cited as examples where competent leaders may still make poor decisions if they lack a robust guiding philosophy.

4. The Role of Values in Politics

Solutions flow from values

The article argues against the idea that there are definitive "right answers" in politics, suggesting instead that solutions depend significantly on the underlying values and priorities. 

For instance, Frank Field's approach to reforming the benefits system was deeply rooted in his values, focusing on promoting work and individual freedom over reducing inequality.

5. Dangers of Technocratic Governance

Real choice requires that the "why" must precede the "what"

There is a significant criticism of reducing politics to mere administration without underlying principles. The article expresses concerns about technocracy, where politics is merely about managing public opinion to support "the right" policies, which could lead to a lack of genuine political choice and engagement.

6. The Potential Perils of a Labour Election Win

Leave people free to learn from their mistakes

The commentary expresses fear that a Labour victory could lead to governance by those who are overly confident in their moral and intellectual positions, leading to incessant interventions in personal freedoms under the guise of achieving societal perfection.

7. Preference for Human-Centred Governance

Ultimately, the author expresses a preference for leaders like Frank Field, who, despite their flaws, are seen as more in tune with human nature and less likely to pursue overly ambitious or unrealistic goals at the expense of practical consensual governance. Humanity over execution competence, a trust in the people, if reform is needed it is rather to "the system".

Glossary of Terms

- Christian Socialism

An ideological perspective within Christianity that combines elements of socialism with some Christian ethics, focusing on social justice and welfare.

- Rationalism in Politics 

A belief in reason and logic as the primary sources of authority and legitimacy in political decision-making and technology for execution. Cf. a more conservative belief in people and values adaption by consensus.

- Technocracy 

A system of governance where decision-makers are selected based on their expertise or technical knowledge rather than popular support.

ARTICLE

I don’t generally wish to send traffic to The Telegraph’s competitors, but if you can bear it, I urge you to have a look at The Times’s interview last weekend with Sir Tony Blair. Then contrast his approach to politics with the sadly departed Frank Field’s. Two Labour Party figures, two Christians – and yet how different their worldviews.

Frank Field came from a Christian socialist tradition that has almost died out in the Labour Party – more’s the pity, as it was the source of most of what is good in that party’s philosophy. Field wrote in his final book last year of Michael Oakeshott’s “emphasis on the danger of rationalism in politics”, of the need to recognise the limits inherent in human nature, the importance of “a sense of self-interested altruism”.

Blair runs a global governance organisation. Not surprisingly, his philosophy is quite different – and we must take it seriously given his obvious influence on Keir Starmer. He sees government in entirely instrumental terms. “The problem with countries that aren’t democracies is they’re fine if you happen to have really smart people running them, but if you don’t, there’s a problem.” Here, competence is the only test for good government: the important thing is not the system, but having “smart” people in charge. 

Look around the world, though, and neither democracies nor authoritarian states seem to be particularly good at giving political power to smart or competent people. The system doesn’t select for that. The odd exception, like Singapore or maybe the UAE, about both of which Blair speaks approvingly, doesn’t disprove the general point. 

But in any case, competence and smartness are not the most valuable qualities for leadership. Able and intelligent people can become prey to intellectual fads just as easily as anyone else – maybe more so – and take the most terrible decisions. Consider the poll tax, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, net zero, or the Covid lockdowns, if you doubt me.

Blair seems blind to this. Indeed he goes on to claim that “politics works when policy comes first and politics comes second. When you ask what’s the right answer to a problem and then you shape the politics around that.” 

He isn’t, of course, unique in thinking this. This centrist dad worldview, the idea that men and women of good will from all parties can get together and find the indisputably right answer to our difficulties, is widely shared across the so-called centre ground of politics, from the Blairite Left to the supposedly “One Nation” Right. 

It’s still wrong. There aren’t unambiguous “right answers” to problems in politics. Everything depends on the value system you bring to them. 

Suppose you are trying to reform the benefits system, as Frank Field spent much of his life trying to do. If your priority is to encourage work, aspiration, and individual freedom, then you will arrive at one set of solutions. You’ll come to quite different ones if your primary aim is to reduce inequality and make sure absolutely no one can slip through the net. 

Or: if democracy, national cohesion, and immigration control are your top priorities, then you probably supported leaving the EU. If you favour diversity, migration, and being part of a bigger power bloc, then you probably didn’t. It depends what you think is more important. The value system, the politics, comes first. 

This is why competent administration, the capable managerialism that so many seem to wish for, simply isn’t enough on its own. In the end, however well done, it must fail. It’s no good being good at doing things if you don’t know why you want to do them. There has to be a value system that visibly drives actions. 

And you have to win the arguments in public for that value system. That’s how to bring people with you. If instead you take the view that there are self-evidently “right” policies supported by all sensible people, and then reduce politics to the task of shaping public opinion so it supports them, that squeezes out political choice and turns politics into a technocracy. Blair says the country has had too much politics: I say it hasn’t had enough. 

Yet that isn’t even the worst consequence of this way of thinking. It’s: where do you stop? If you think every problem can be solved by clever people, then why not try to solve every problem? 

But there will never be an end to problems – which means there is no limit in principle to what the government can do. The only constraint is a practical one, and AI, digital currencies, restrictions on speech, or China’s emerging social credit system show that the limits to social control are weakening all the time. 

So that’s the politics I fear if Labour wins the election: that of the moral improvers, the politicians who think they know best, and will not give up trying to make us live as they think we should. Give me the Frank Field’s any day. I’d much rather be governed by normal capable human beings who may have flaws but who understand human nature, than by relentless high-achieving busybodies with noble goals. Those people will never leave us alone until they have achieved perfection – and they never will.

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