1. The Brutal Logic Of War
Wars do not usually end in tidy negotiations. They end in defeat. Clear, recognisable defeat. The belief that modern imperial conflicts can be negotiated away is appealing, but history from Rome onwards tells us that the drive for expansion is absolutely ruthless.
American interventions illustrate the point. With the partial exceptions of post-war Japan and South Korea, most campaigns - particularly in West Asia - have struggled to achieve their stated political objectives. Tactical victories, yes, but these have rarely translated into durable political outcomes. America won every battle against Vietnam but lost the war.
So why do these "forever wars" continue?
Military defeat – the point at which a state recognises that it can no longer achieve its objectives buy military means and must concede defeat
Strategic victory – achieving long-term political goals rather than short-term battlefield success
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2. The War Incentive Structure
One explanation lies in incentives. Foreign policy is not driven by pure strategy, still less by any morality. In the case of America, being the hegemon men's answerable to no one and so international law counts for little. Foreign policy is shaped by the convergence of five interests.
industrial and financial interests.
The Israeli lobby is clearly a powerful force acting on Donald Trump, and is undoubtedly the decider for American policy in West Asia, but it is far from the only pressure point. The decision space around him is crowded and conflicted. The military industrial complex MIC, financial markets esp. banks / bond markets, public opinion, and the long-standing globalist neoconservatives v. the nationalists especially Trump's MAGA base.
All exert their own gravitational pull on the POTUS.
This creates a classic situation of competing imperatives, where policy is less a coherent strategy and more the resultant vector of multiple pressures. In that sense, what we are observing may not be a clean neocon plan, but a negotiated outcome between power centres, explaining in part at least Trump's erratic and inconsistent behaviour.
The military-industrial complex carries on operating regardless of outcomes on the battlefield. In fact, prolonged conflict can be economically beneficial to those producing weapons, systems, and logistics. Duration, in this sense, can matter more than victory.
This is not necessarily conspiracy. It is structure. Large defence industries require sustained and predictably long periods of demand in order to justify the substantial upfront investments required, and war provides it.
Military-industrial complex – the network of defence contractors, governments, and institutions tied to military spending
Incentive structure - the system of motivations that shapes behaviour within institutions
World hegemon - the goal is to remain the global rule-giver
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3. Europe’s Expanding Role In The Ukraine War
A less visible shift is Europe’s growing role in sustaining Ukraine. Financially, European states are underwriting the Ukrainian state, with estimates often cited in the range of €80–100 billion annually to keep the system functioning.
But the more interesting development is on the production side, where Europe is taking you over from America, mainly in terms of drone production.
Weapons are no longer simply delivered as finished systems. Component parts or sub assemblies are manufactured across Europe – including in the UK – and shipped into Ukraine for final assembly. Ukraine is evolving into a distributed assembly hub rather than just a recipient.
Underwriting – providing financial support to sustain operations
Distributed production – manufacturing spread across multiple locations rather than centralised
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4. Reusing the Airbus Model, For Warfare
The structure increasingly resembles modern auto and aerospace manufacturing. Airbus produces components for its civil and military aircraft across Europe, which are then assembled in final assembly lines in Toulouse and Hamburg.
A similar model is emerging in Ukraine. Multiple suppliers in multiple European and Turkish jurisdictions. Final assembly innumerous FALs close to the theatres of operations.
This creates resilience and flexibility and protects suppliers from attack. But it also creates traceability. Supply chains leave traceable patterns.
Russia has identified elements of this network, suggesting that parts manufacturers and logistics routes are being mapped. This means the war shifts from a battlefield contest to a supply chain contest.
Final assembly line - the FAL, the place where components are brought together to create the finished product
Supply chain - the network from production of sub-units, thriugh transport, to final assembly, and delivery of goods
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5. Drone Warfare And The Border Problem
A defining feature of the conflict is the rise of drones. Increasingly, they account for a large share of battlefield impact, with reports suggesting that perhaps over 90% of casualties are now caused by unmanned systems.
At the same time, the geography of attacks is becoming more complex.
There are now indications that Ukrainian drones are launched from within Ukraine, but then leave Ukrainian airspace and track along the borders of Belarus and the Baltic states on the European side, before turning towards targets deeper inside Russia, including and beyond Saint Petersburg.
This creates a strategic dilemma. Russia is aware of these routes. But what is the response? Intercepting drones over or near NATO territory risks escalation. Not intercepting them invites continued penetration. This is similar to Stalin's dilemma - he wanted to destroy the Bandarites, but feared a nuclear response from America.
Drone warfare – the use of unmanned aerial systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and attack
Strategic dilemma – a situation where all available responses carry significant risk
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6. Historical Shadows – The Banderite Question
History remains present in powerful ways.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet authorities faced nationalist movements in western Ukraine, often associated with the Banderites. Stalin might have chosen to deal with these groups more decisively in the immediate post-war period.
However, such actions carried risk. The emergence of the American nuclear arsenal imposed a new strategic constraint. Escalation, even at the regional level, now had potentially existential consequences.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a period of weakness. After the 1990s and early 2000s, some argue that Moscow could have pushed more firmly for neutrality among former Soviet states, rather than allowing America to advance NATO up to its doorstep.
Banderites – Ukrainian nationalist groups associated with Stepan Bandera and anti-Soviet resistance movements
Nuclear deterrence – the use of nuclear weapons capability to prevent escalation by raising the cost of conflict
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7. From Battlefield To System War
The deeper shift is conceptual.
Modern conflict extends beyond the battlefield into infrastructure, logistics, finance, and the production economy. It becomes a system or "total war", the country runs on a war economy.
If one side targets military assets, the other may target the network that sustains them. Even if production is decentralised, it will still be targeted using drones and high-precision missiles.
The concept of escalation dominance is central here. Drawing on the work of Robert Pape, escalation is rarely one-sided. Each action invites a counter-action, doubling down or raising the stakes with diminishing chance of descending the escalation ladder. This is the trap described in his book.
This raises a difficult question. If infrastructure and bases can be struck by Iran in Israel and Gulf Arab States, could similar logic be applied to production nodes elsewhere, Russia hitting weapons facilities in Europe?
That would represent a major escalation. But it would follow the internal logic of system warfare and should be expected.
System war – conflict targeting the entire economy and network supporting military capability
Infrastructure targeting – attacks on facilities that enable military operations
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8. The Escalation Ladder
All of this points towards a recognisable pattern.
Each move invites a counter-move. Each adaptation triggers another response. Over time, the conflict expands in scope, geography, and intensity.
Strategists describe this as an escalation ladder - a sequence of steps, each more severe than the last.
The danger is that once the conflict turns into a hot war, it is very difficult to avoid "the escalation trap".
Escalation ladder – a framework describing progressive stages of increasing conflict intensity
Counter-move – a response designed to offset an opponent’s action
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9. Final Reflection
History suggests that wars do not end because participants choose to stop. They escalate in entirely predictable ways, until one side is obliged to recognise a sound military defeat.
Until then, incentives persist, systems expand, and escalation continues.
The real question is not whether there is an escalation ladder - of course there is - but how to get off it before what some are calling nuclear Armageddon.
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