12 July 2026
The escalation trap - how it works and the ways out of it.
THE ESCALATION TRAP: WHY WARS CAN BECOME HARDER TO END
1. OVERVIEW
This report argues that the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran has entered what political scientist Robert Pape calls an escalation trap. Rather than compelling Iran to make concessions, military pressure has strengthened Iranian nationalism and increased Tehran's determination to resist. According to this interpretation, each attempt to restore deterrence instead creates fresh incentives for further escalation.
Pape's escalation trap is a dynamic in which neither side can accept the political cost of stopping, so each move meant to gain advantage or de-escalate instead deepens military commitment. Tactical successes (a strike, a battlefield gain) can be strategically self-defeating, since they raise the stakes for the other side to respond rather than opening an off-ramp.
Professor Pape argues that wars often develop their own momentum. Once the balance of power changes, political leaders may find that compromise becomes domestically and strategically more difficult than continued conflict. He contends that this dynamic, rather than diplomatic agreements alone, now shapes events in the Gulf.
Glossary
Escalation trap - A situation in which each attempt to solve a conflict leads to greater military involvement.
Deterrence - Preventing an opponent from acting through the threat of retaliation.
Balance of power - The relative military, political and economic strength of competing states.
The Escalation Trap (3 stages) - Pape's actual "Escalation Trap" itself is a three-stage sequence (not five). It's one of four strategic patterns he identifies overall:
1. Tactical Success, Strategic Failure — Precision strikes succeed militarily, but the political goal (regime collapse/capitulation) doesn't follow.
2. Escalation — Believing they hold "escalation dominance," leaders double down: more strikes, broader targets, longer campaigns.
3. Strategic Risk — Domestic pressure makes accepting stalemate politically costly, tempting leaders toward ground forces or a much wider war - the point where the conflict escapes their control.
The other three patterns (horizontal escalation, the Smart Bomb Trap, and why airpower alone rarely produces regime change) are related but distinct concepts, not additional stages of the trap itself.
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2. THE THEORY OF THE ESCALATION TRAP
Professor Pape describes the conflict as unfolding in several stages.
First comes tactical success. Air strikes destroy military facilities, missile sites or senior commanders. However, tactical victories do not necessarily produce strategic success.
Secondly, the attacked state adapts. Rather than collapsing, it reorganises politically and militarily. According to Pape, this may leave the attacker strategically weaker despite battlefield successes.
Finally, political leaders face a dilemma. Accepting the new strategic reality risks appearing weak, while escalating the conflict risks a wider and potentially uncontrollable war. At that point there may be no politically acceptable middle course.
This pattern has appeared repeatedly throughout modern military history.
Glossary
Tactical success - Winning individual military engagements.
Strategic success - Achieving the broader political objectives of a war.
Escalation - Increasing the intensity or scale of military action.
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3. NATIONALISM UNDER ATTACK
A surprising central argument is that bombing campaigns and economic sanctions often strengthen rather than weaken national resolve.
Professor Pape draws upon decades of research into strategic bombing, arguing that populations under sustained attack frequently rally around their governments. Instead of demanding surrender, they often demand retaliation.
He argues that this phenomenon helps explain the large public demonstrations reported in Iran following recent military operations and the funeral of the previous ayatollah. Point being that punishment alone rarely forces governments to concede on issues they regard as existential.
Historical examples cited include Britain's destruction of German cities in response to German bombing during the Second World War, where attacks on British cities strengthened public determination rather than producing surrender.
Glossary
Nationalism - Strong identification with and loyalty towards one's nation. Ultimately the strongest force in geopolitics.
Strategic bombing - Air attacks intended to influence a nation's political or military decisions.
Existential threat - A danger perceived as threatening a state's survival.
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4. THE LIMITS OF MILITARY COERCION
There is a common assumption that increasing military pressure inevitably forces negotiations.
Professor Pape argues that coercion succeeds only under certain conditions. Where leaders believe vital national interests are at stake, they may accept extremely high economic and military costs rather than submit.
This argument challenges the view that sanctions, blockades or bombing automatically produce political concessions. Instead, he suggests that perceived victory or defeat influences decision-making more than the absolute level of suffering.
Glossary
Coercion - Using threats or force to influence another state's behaviour.
Sanctions - Economic restrictions imposed by one country upon another.
Blockade - Preventing goods or shipping from entering or leaving a region.
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5. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AS THE STRATEGIC CENTRE
Control of the Strait of Hormuz has become the central issue.
Iran now possesses superior leverage through its control of the world's most important energy chokepoint. From this perspective, the dispute is no longer primarily about diplomatic wording or individual agreements, but about regional control of this strategic maritime corridor.
Some military analysts argue that freedom of navigation can be restored by multinational naval operations, others believe Iran's geographic advantage is the deciding card in its hand.
Glossary
Strait of Hormuz - The narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman through which roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil normally passes.
Leverage - The ability to influence another party's decisions.
Chokepoint - A narrow route through which large volumes of trade or military traffic must pass.
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6. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND WAR
Another major theme is that domestic political pressures often prolong wars.
Professor Pape argues that leaders fear appearing weak more than they fear continuing costly conflicts. Electoral politics, party unity and public perceptions all influence military decisions.
He suggests that President Trump's political base may reward firmness more than compromise, making de-escalation politically difficult even as military escalation carries substantial risk.
This reflects a wider principle in political science: foreign policy decisions can be shaped by internal political incentives as much as by international events.
Glossary
Domestic politics - Political pressures arising within a country.
Political incentive - Factors encouraging leaders to adopt particular policies.
Lame duck - A political leader approaching the end of office with declining influence.
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7. BALANCE OF POWER VERSUS DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy alone cannot end conflicts if the major participants disagree about the underlying balance of power.
According to Professor Pape, agreements become durable only after the principal combatants accept the new strategic realities. Until then, ceasefires and negotiations may interrupt rather than resolve fighting.
This represents a realist interpretation of international relations, where military capability ultimately shapes political settlements.
Critics, however, argue that diplomacy itself can alter perceptions of power and that negotiated settlements have frequently prevented wars from escalating further.
Glossary
Realism - A school of international relations emphasising power and national interests.
Structural realism (neorealism) — A theory of international relations, most associated with Kenneth Waltz and John J Mearsheimer, holding that state behaviour is structural ie driven primarily by the anarchic structure of the international system rather than by ideology, leadership personality, or domestic politics. Because there is no higher authority to enforce order, states are compelled to prioritise their survival themselves by giving no. 1 priority to relative power, thus producing recurring patterns - power balancing, arms races, security dilemmas - regardless of who governs them or what they believe.
Ceasefire - A temporary suspension of fighting.
Armistice vs. peace agreement — An armistice ends active fighting without resolving the underlying political dispute; a peace agreement formally settles it. Korea (1953) illustrates the difference: the war never legally ended, only the shooting stopped.
Strategic settlement - A political agreement reflecting the accepted balance of power.
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8. CONCLUSION
Professor Pape argues that military pressure has reinforced Iranian nationalism, shifted the regional balance of power and locked all parties into an escalation trap from which no easy exit exists.
Professor Robert Pape argues that there are only two ways out of the escalation trap. The first is further escalation, in which the stronger power attempts to reverse its strategic setback through additional air strikes, possible limited ground operations, and efforts to neutralise Iran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, despite the risk that a limited conflict could expand into a much wider war.
The second is to accept the new balance of power by recognising that Iran has gained significant strategic leverage and negotiating a political settlement that reflects this altered regional reality.
He maintains that there is "no third way out" and "no off-ramp". In this assessment, military pressure alone is not likely to compel Iran to retreat. Instead, the conflict is likely to continue until the United States, Israel and Iran eventually accept a revised balance of power, and this probably only after changing domestic political circumstances.
The central insight is that wars are rarely ended solely through military victories. They usually conclude only when political leaders judge that continuing the conflict has become more costly than accepting a negotiated outcome.
And in this case that the President Trump is seeking a symbolic victory that he is unlikely to find and that passed the midterms and into the new year he will become a lame duck president and search for a solution will bypass him.
Glossary
Negotiated settlement - An agreement reached through diplomacy rather than military victory.
Regional hegemon - The dominant power within a particular geographical region.
Political settlement - A durable agreement resolving the principal issues in a conflict.
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REFERENCES
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell University Press, 1996).
Robert A. Pape, The Escalation Trap (Substack essays).
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966).
Carl von Clausewitz, On War.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History.
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
International Energy Agency (IEA), global oil market reports.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), analyses of the Strait of Hormuz and global oil flows.
